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Most people do not hold those who intentionally flout property laws in par-
ticularly high regard.  The overridingly negative view of the property lawbreaker 
as a “wrongdoer” comports with the status of property rights within our charac-
teristically individualist, capitalist, political culture.  This reflexively dim view 
of property lawbreakers is also shared, to a large degree, by property theorists, 
many of whom regard property rights as a relatively fixed constellation of enti-
tlements that collectively produce stability and efficiency through an orderly sys-
tem of ownership.  In this Article, Professors Peñalver and Katyal seek partially 
to rehabilitate the reviled character of the intentional property lawbreaker, and 
to show how property outlaws have played an important role in the evolution 
and transfer of property entitlements.  The authors develop a typology of the 
property outlaw by distinguishing between “acquisitive” and “expressive” out-
laws.  They show that both types of property outlaw have enabled the reevalu-
ation of, and, at times, productive shifts in, the distribution or content of prop-
erty entitlements.  What emerges from this study is a vision of property law that 
looks beyond its capacity for fostering order and stability, focusing instead on 
its dynamic function as a site for the resolution of conflict between owners and 
nonowners.  The authors argue that, if property is to perform this function, the 
law should be careful not to overdeter nonviolent refusals to abide by existing 
property arrangements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The image most of us have of the person who intentionally flouts 
property laws is not particularly favorable.  The Oxford English Diction-
ary, for example, defines a trespasser as a “transgressor, a law-breaker; 
a wrong-doer, sinner, offender.”1  In early modern England, landown-
ers frequently left “man traps” and “spring guns” along boundary lines 
to discourage trespass on their lands.2  Such violent measures were 
not prohibited by law until the nineteenth century.3  And in rural ar-
eas of the United States, it is not uncommon to come across signs 
warning that “Trespassers Will Be Shot.”4  The overridingly negative 
view of property lawbreakers in popular consciousness comports with 
the centrality of property rights within our characteristically individu-
alist, capitalist, political culture.5
The dim view of property lawbreakers is shared to a large degree 
by property theorists, many of whom tend to focus on the stabilizing 
role of property law.  The importance attached to exclusivity within 
contemporary theories of property underscores the apparent threat to 
order and stability posed by property lawbreakers.  Many courts and 
commentators have placed this right at the center of their concept of 
private ownership.6  And for those who conceive of “property as exit,” 
1 XI THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 328 (1961). 
2 See TOM STEPHENSON, FORBIDDEN LAND:  THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCESS TO MOUN-
TAIN AND MOORLAND 89 (Ann Holt ed., 1989) (discussing the use and dangers of these 
devices); see also Ilott v. Wilkes, (1820) 106 Eng. Rep. 674, 676-77 (K.B.) (deciding a 
case arising out of injuries inflicted on a trespasser by a property owner’s spring gun). 
3 See Spring Guns and Man Traps Act, 1828, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 18, § 12 (Eng.). 
4 See, e.g., Michelle Jones, Trespassers Will Be Shot, and More Family Fun, Blessings for 
Life (2001), http://blessingsforlife.com/southernliving/trespassers.htm (telling of a 
family’s road trip to a mountain lake, where they observed such a sign). 
5 See, e.g., Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 42 
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:  THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 18-20 (1991) (discussing the illusion of ab-
soluteness in property rights and how that illusion illuminates political theory in the 
U.S.). 
6 See Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (describing the right to 
exclude as “perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests”); Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“The power to exclude 
has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s 
bundle of property rights.”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional 
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 970-74 (2000) (discussing the idea of “exclusion” as “the 
hallmark of property”). 
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the right to exclude plays a crucial role in safeguarding individual lib-
erty, the security of which is a vital function of private ownership.7
As Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have correctly ar-
gued, one key purpose of property law is to provide stability, both for 
owners and for those who would engage in transactions with them.8  
Property law achieves this stability in a variety of ways.  One crucial way 
is through the criminal enforcement of existing property entitle-
ments.  Laws of criminal trespass protect the boundaries around real 
property established through market transactions.  Laws prohibiting 
larceny, fraud, robbery, and burglary similarly wrap privately deter-
mined entitlements within the safety of the publicly enforced criminal 
law. 
In this Article, we supplement the focus on the importance of 
property’s stability by highlighting the powerful, and at times ironic, 
role of the lawbreaker in the process of fostering the evolution of 
property.  Put another way, the apparent stability and order that 
property law provides owe much to the destabilizing role of the law-
breaker, who occasionally forces shifts of entitlements and laws.  A 
more balanced portrayal of the lawbreaker offers us a richer and 
much more accurate picture of the dynamics behind the evolution of 
property entitlements and the forces that generate them.  Our goal in 
this Article is therefore to rehabilitate, at least to a certain extent, the 
image of the intentional property outlaw, and to show how these law-
breakers have played integral roles in producing a system of property 
that is characterized by a complex and subtle contradiction:  it is at 
once stable, perhaps even essentially so, and yet this seemingly or-
dered system at the same time masks a pervasive, but constructive, in-
stability that is necessary to prevent the entire edifice from becoming 
outdated.9
7 See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1891-92 (2005) 
(describing the conception of “property as exit” as of the idea that liberty is secured by 
“a person’s ability to retreat into privately owned space”). 
8 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 531, 552 (2005) (“[T]he benefits provided by property systems increase with the 
stability of the property rights they create.”). 
9 Cf. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY:  ITS MEANING AND POWER 
143 (2003) (describing property as a tool for “the resolution of conflicting claims and 
conflicting desires for what are often external, physical, finite goods”); Nicholas Blom-
ley, Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence:  The Frontier, the Survey, and the Grid, 93 
ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 121, 126-33 (2003) (discussing property as 
a locus of repeated violence and resolution). 
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This dialogic vision of property law parallels in many ways recent 
discussions within constitutional theory that have privileged a popular, 
bottom-up conception of lawmaking over the more traditional focus 
on official organs of lawmaking.  Larry Kramer, for example, de-
scribes the important role played by lawbreaking and mob action in 
the early Republic’s popular constitutional legal culture.10  The use of 
such tactics, however, extends far beyond the realm of constitutional 
law. 
Our task is made easier by the fact that, despite the broadly nega-
tive view of property lawbreakers that prevails among lawyers and lay-
people alike, property outlaws have repeatedly played a powerful and 
visible role as catalysts for needed legal change.  Time and again, 
groups of people have intentionally violated property laws, and in a 
number of important instances, property law has responded by shift-
ing to accommodate their demands, bringing them back within the 
fold of the law-abiding community.  From the squatters and adverse 
possessors of the nineteenth-century American frontier, to the Native 
American and civil rights protesters of the 1960s, to the urban squat-
ters of the 1970s and 1980s, those disenfranchised by the existing 
property system have frequently flouted the law in hopes of achieving 
their goals.  Whatever one thinks about the merits of their positions, 
there can be no doubt that the activities of these property outlaws 
have been important engines for legal change. 
Yet the useful role repeatedly played by lawbreakers in forcing 
needed reform within the property system has been mostly ignored by 
property theorists.  The failure is attributable, at least in part, to a lar-
ger tendency among scholars to focus most of their attention on ques-
tions about the conditions conducive to the initial emergence of pri-
vate ownership regimes, either from systems of commons property or 
from open-access systems.11  In addition, a number of scholars have 
explored the roles of norms and private ordering in the informal ad-
justment of formal property entitlements.12
10 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 27 (2004) (discussing mob action as “an accepted . . . form of 
political action”). 
11 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347, 354 (1967); Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons:  Parking on Public 
Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S515, S516 (2002); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish:  
Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 129 (2005). 
12 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES vii (1991) (“[P]eople frequently resolve their disputes in cooperative fashion 
without paying any attention to the laws that apply to those disputes.”). 
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Property theorists have paid less attention, however, to the equally 
interesting question of how formal regimes of private ownership 
evolve from one particular bundle of ownership rights to another.13  
And yet there can be no doubt that, once a robust system of private 
property has been established, the precise content of that standard 
bundle of property rights shifts over time in response to varying pres-
sures and incentives, both internal and external to the institution of 
ownership.  Indeed, a focus on the mechanisms of legal evolution 
within existing private property regimes is all the more important and 
interesting in an advanced capitalist society like ours, where, for large 
swaths of resources, the nearly complete “enclosure” of the commons 
and of open-access resources already has been accomplished.14
Some scholars discussing the question of evolution within com-
mon law regimes more generally have, quite reasonably, focused on 
incentives to litigate as an explanation for patterns of change within 
the law.15  Others have focused on the means by which interest groups 
band together to influence legislative legal change, both in the arena 
of property and elsewhere.16  But these officially sanctioned mecha-
nisms of legal change offer us only part of the picture, particularly 
within the law of property. 
Certain categories of nonowners are likely to be reluctant, or sim-
ply financially unable, to initiate costly civil litigation or to assert effec-
tive political pressure to clarify their entitlements.  Intentional law-
breaking as a mechanism for legal change is, almost by definition, 
then, a strategy employed by those who cannot afford to file civil suits 
or whose voice in the legislative process is too weak to attract the at-
tention of lawmakers and thus unable to wrest a change in property 
13 This point is related to, but slightly different from, Stuart Banner’s observation 
that scholars have not focused enough attention on precise mechanisms by which one 
property regime evolves into another.  See Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property 
Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359, S359-60 (2002).  Of course, what is true for the regime 
shifts Banner describes is even more applicable to more modest transitions within ex-
isting regimes. 
14 See generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 2003, at 33. 
15 See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient 
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 72 (1977) (“The tendency toward efficiency is a function of 
the common law process according to which legal rules are generated from the in-
vestment in litigation by individual parties . . . .”). 
16 See, e.g., Banner, supra note 13, at S368-69 (discussing the role of oligarchies in 
pushing through changes in property regimes); William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 784, 
818-24 (1995) (describing an interest group theory of takings law). 
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relations from existing entitlements.17  In other words, intentional 
lawbreaking is a tool of the little people—of the “have-nots.”  In many 
cases, as we shall show, an initial transgression of a property entitle-
ment is an essential event in provoking a shift in the law.  It should 
therefore come as no surprise that some of the most significant judi-
cial opinions in the common law development of property have come 
from the criminal side of the docket.18  Alternatively, protracted law-
breaking, as in the case of civil rights protesters of the 1960s, may cata-
lyze a favorable legal response by shifting public opinion and inviting 
legislative intervention on the lawbreakers’ behalf.  Given its appeal to 
the powerless and marginal, it is unsurprising that many of the stories 
of property change on which we focus have an undercurrent of con-
cern about distributive justice. 
This Article does not pretend to provide a general theory of shifts 
in legal regimes, or even in property law.  Instead, we hope to explore 
just one facet of this larger issue by focusing on intentional lawbreak-
ing as a mechanism that, time and again, has played a key role in fos-
tering both symbolic and substantive evolution within the law of pri-
vate ownership.  In so doing, we hope to draw increased attention 
both to the general question of legal change within property law re-
gimes and, in particular, to the frequently dialogic function per-
formed by outlaws within that process. 
Recognizing this recurrent cycle of productive lawbreaking and 
legal reform yields a variety of interesting conceptual, descriptive, and 
normative conclusions.  To the extent that those on the outside of the 
property system frequently bring about a change in the content of 
property rights by flouting established property rules, the story we tell 
in this Article offers a view of property law as a dynamic institution 
that is broadly reflective of evolving community values, as opposed to 
a fixed set of entitlements rooted in abstract moral and economic 
theory.  Our discussion therefore contributes to the growing body of 
literature emphasizing the dialogic and social nature of property law 
and eschewing the frequently static, individualist conception of prop-
erty rights favored by libertarians and their sympathizers.19  More 
17 See Eric Kades, The Law & Economics of Civil Disobedience 20-21 (2005) (un-
published manuscript, on file with authors). 
18 See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374-75 (N.J. 1971) (finding no trespass by 
two individuals who entered a farmer’s private property to aid migrant farm workers 
living on the farm and employed by the owner). 
19 See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY:  COMPETING VI-
SIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 1 (1997); ERIC T. 
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normatively, however, we argue that lawbreakers have repeatedly 
played integral roles in spurring the evolution of property law.  Tell-
ing their stories argues in favor of a careful consideration of the ways 
in which legal processes can be shaped to isolate the productive con-
tributions of property outlaws from their less desirable effects. 
In Part I, we elaborate on two broad categories of intentional law-
breaking that are particularly relevant to our analysis.  For ease of dis-
cussion, we posit that intentional lawbreakers fall somewhere along a 
continuum of motivations, ranging from self-regarding, appropriative 
violations of property rights on one end, to more other-regarding, ex-
pressive violations of property rights on the other.  Based on this ob-
servation, we offer two broad categories of description:  “expressive” 
and “acquisitive” lawbreaking. 
“Expressive” lawbreaking, which corresponds loosely—though 
imperfectly—to the category traditionally called civil disobedience,20 
seeks to send a strong message about the perceived injustice of exist-
ing property arrangements.  “Acquisitive” lawbreaking, in contrast, in-
volves actions that are oriented primarily toward direct appropriation.  
Here, the dominant motivating factor might be to gain immediate ac-
cess or procure a certain good, as opposed to making a general state-
ment about the appropriate scope of property rights in such instances.  
The key difference between the expressive and acquisitive categories is 
the distinction between intentional lawbreaking that generates imme-
diate and substantial benefits for the lawbreaker and intentional law-
breaking that generates no such immediate benefits but that instead 
self-consciously aims at achieving (or generating support for) a larger 
legal goal.  Of course, in drawing this distinction, we recognize that 
self-interest and expression often can seem like inseparable halves of 
the same whole; nevertheless, we think it is appropriate to draw some 
descriptive and normative distinctions between the two, recognizing, 
of course, the need for caveats and the presence of borderline cases.  
FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 7 
(2003); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:  THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 11 
(2000); Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy:  Residential Associations and 
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1989); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy, 1 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Response, Property:  A 
Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1996); Andre J. Van der Walt, Prop-
erty Rights and Hierarchies of Power:  A Critical Evaluation of Land Reform Policy in 
South Africa § 1.4 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
20 We do not use the term “civil disobedience” so as to avoid any confusion about 
the broader scope of our discussion, which encompasses lawbreaking activity that 
would not normally be understood as civil disobedience. 
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For this reason, the pervasive admixture of these two primary motiva-
tions suggests a hybrid category:  “intersectional” lawbreaking, which 
occurs when movements extensively commingle both acquisitive and 
expressive activities. 
In the course of describing specific historical instances in which 
these categories of property lawbreaking have been put to use in the 
service of change within the law of property, we also discuss the differ-
ent ways in which the guardians of the status quo have responded to 
property outlaws by reaffirming, but sometimes by altering, various 
areas of property law.  In some cases, lawbreakers have succeeded in 
shifting property laws in their favor.  In others, the law has rebuffed 
their efforts.  But no matter the outcome, lawbreakers’ concerted ef-
forts have provided both citizens and lawmakers, in the legislature and 
the judiciary, with valuable opportunities to reconsider and deliberate 
the underlying justice of existing property arrangements. 
In Part II, we step back for a moment to ask why it is worth focus-
ing on the law of property in our discussion of outlaw tactics for legal 
change.  We argue that, despite the generalized nature of lawbreaking 
as a tool for reform, there are reasons to think that such behavior will 
play a particularly important role in the evolution of property.  Prop-
erty law has a greater tendency than many other areas of law to be-
come ossified and out of date, and it therefore has a greater need for 
occasional “shocks” to the system.  While we do not dispute the value 
of stability in property entitlements, both for the individual and for 
the market as a whole, the survival of this system depends on its ability 
to respond dynamically.  At such moments, property outlaws have 
played a crucial role, time and again, in drawing attention to the need 
for reform.  As we show, property outlaws offer two important sources 
of value.  First, they can sometimes contribute to efficient or justified 
forced transfers of entitlements, generating what we will call “redis-
tributive value.”  Second, protracted and pervasive property lawbreak-
ing produces important data about the location of possible injustice 
or inefficiency within the property status quo, generating what we will 
call “informational value.” 
In Part III, we offer a series of suggestions concerning how the law 
should respond to property outlaws.  Drawing on both deterrent and 
retributive theories of punishment, we argue, at the most general 
level, that in light of the importance of property outlaws to the evolu-
tion of property doctrine, the state’s response to outlaws should be 
structured in specific ways to ensure that people are not overdeterred 
from (or unjustly punished for) challenging the existing property re-
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gime.  As we show, advances in the technology of property rights en-
forcement have the potential to reduce the expected rewards of prop-
erty lawbreaking so greatly that the redistributive and informational 
value that might be generated by property outlaws is entirely lost.  We 
therefore propose a set of policy responses that lawmakers and law en-
forcers can use to balance property’s dual role as a source of stability 
and a locus of recurrent conflict, and to preserve space for the possi-
bility of productive forms of lawbreaking, while discouraging its more 
destructive forms. 
I.  PROPERTY OUTLAWS 
On November 20, 1969, in the early morning hours, a group of 
eighty-nine Native American activists landed on the federally aban-
doned property of Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay.21  They 
claimed the land “by right of discovery” and also under the terms of 
the Treaty of Fort Laramie, signed in 1868, which gave Native Ameri-
cans the right to unused federal government property that had previ-
ously been theirs.22  Their occupation became the longest Indian oc-
cupation of any federal facility, until the federal government forcibly 
removed fifteen remaining protesters nineteen months later.23  Al-
though the occupation did not result in a shift of title, it sparked a 
massive movement among Native Americans that focused on the tactic 
of property occupations to draw attention to Native American claims 
concerning property and discrimination.  From 1969 to the late 1970s, 
Native American activists carried out seventy-four occupations of 
property, including the Trail of Broken Treaties, the occupation of 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) headquarters in 1972, and 
Wounded Knee II in 1973.24
The actual number of property outlaw movements, both in the 
United States and abroad, is truly astonishing.  Countless groups, both 
well known and obscure, have resorted to illegal tactics to achieve 
their property goals.  In a number of cases they have been successful, 
obtaining for their participants the desired access, possession, or even 
title of property.  Whether they fail or succeed, outlaws reveal an es-
21 Troy Johnson et al., American Indian Activism and Transformation:  Lessons from 
Alcatraz, in AMERICAN INDIAN ACTIVISM:  ALCATRAZ TO THE LONGEST WALK 9, 27 (Troy 
Johnson et al. eds., 1997). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 29-30. 
24 Id. at 32-33. 
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sential ambiguity at the core of property law:  for the people occupy-
ing Alcatraz, property was both the object and the subject of their dis-
obedience—the instrumental tool upon which the protest was based 
as well as the proverbial “brass ring” they hoped to gain in the unlikely 
event that their actions succeeded.  Just as property law aims to en-
hance social stability by establishing a system of clear and fixed rules 
with respect to ownership, it also crucially motivates cultural and po-
litical forces that seek to contest and destabilize the status quo, creat-
ing chaos and confusion in the midst of seeming orderliness. 
Not all outlaw movements, however, are created equal in terms of 
their scope, aims, or effectiveness.  In this Part, we introduce three 
stories of property lawbreakers to emphasize the varying aims and in-
terests of property outlaws.  These examples are not meant to be ex-
haustive, or even representative, of the sheer variety of property  
lawbreakers that exist.  Rather, they simply are meant to serve as illus-
trations of one possible typology of the disobedience that frequently 
reappears within the history of property law. 
We divide lawbreakers into two primary categories, reflecting dif-
ferences in their goals and motivations.  Acquisitive outlaws seek to ob-
tain for themselves ownership of some property interest presently in 
the hands of another, whether that owner be the government or a pri-
vate party.  Expressive outlaws are not interested in obtaining property 
for themselves, but rather are concerned with influencing the ways in 
which current owners use or enjoy their property rights.  The latter 
often operate by refusing to give effect to the owner’s attempt to make 
the particular use of the property to which the expressive outlaw ob-
jects.  But their goal normally extends beyond the individual owner 
and includes a desire to communicate with the polity as a whole in or-
der to bring about systematic change in the content of ownership 
rights.  Because many outlaw movements actually represent a complex 
mixture of motives, we also discuss the hybrid category of intersectional 
outlaws. 
A.  Acquisitive Outlaws:  Squatters and Adverse Possessors  
in the American West 
1.  Land for Revenue Versus Land for Settlers 
The history of land law in the nineteenth-century American West 
is, in part, one of protracted conflict between those who held legal ti-
tle—whether Native American tribes, the federal government, or pri-
vate land speculators—and white settlers who resided on the land, of-
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ten without any formal legal entitlement.  This story is well known and 
has been ably narrated by a series of historians.25  Our goal in this sub-
section therefore will not be a comprehensive retelling.  Instead, we 
hope simply to bring out the ways in which this struggle replicates a 
pattern of legal change instigated by property outlaws, one that that 
has been repeated in a variety of guises. 
In this particular case, settlers created the impetus for legal 
change by running roughshod over established property laws, thereby 
creating for themselves communities governed by their own concep-
tion of just, albeit self-serving, property relations.  Although their ac-
tions were initially met with condemnation by the legal establishment, 
their persistent lawbreaking ultimately paid off.  Over the course of 
the nineteenth century, the law slowly but surely adapted itself to the 
reality the settlers had created on the ground. 
The nineteenth-century conflict between settlers and owners 
played out within the context of a larger policy debate between com-
peting visions of how to dispose of the vast western territories acquired 
by the United States.  By 1803, more than ninety percent of the na-
tion’s territory consisted of sparsely populated, wild lands, with large 
(and increasing) quantities under public ownership.26  Virtually all in-
volved in the discussion agreed that the ultimate goal of government 
policy should be to expeditiously transfer public lands to private own-
ership and to encourage settlement of what was, from the perspective 
of everyone but Native Americans,27 an unoccupied and unexploited 
continent.28  Despite these shared long-term goals, policymakers dis-
agreed over whether public lands should be used as a source of reve-
nue to help pay off the national debt, or as a reservoir of public lar-
25 For an extremely comprehensive account of the history of public land law, see 
PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (photo. reprint 1979) 
(1968). 
26 John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL 
L. REV. 816, 843-44 (1994). 
27 While the squatters vociferously defended their claims to the land, often in 
starkly moral terms, see infra note 32 and accompanying text, they felt no obligation to 
respect Native American title.  See infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
28 See Mary E. Young, Congress Looks West:  Liberal Ideology and Public Land Policy in 
the Nineteenth Century, in THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT:  ESSAYS IN HONOR 
OF PAUL WALLACE GATES 74, 110 (David M. Ellis ed., 1969) (describing the “liberal 
consensus,” which believed that the assignment of public property into private prop-
erty was critical to national welfare). 
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gess with which to create a nation of Jeffersonian small-holding prop-
erty owners.29
Policymakers who wanted to use public lands to generate revenue 
typically preferred to auction off public lands to speculators at rela-
tively high prices, with the understanding that the speculators, in turn, 
would divide the property into smaller parcels, which they would sell 
to settlers or lease to tenants for a profit.30  Policymakers who favored 
direct distribution of public lands to settlers justified their views in re-
publican terms, extolling the virtues of a nation of small property 
owners and warning of the consequences of widespread tenancy and 
concentrated, absentee ownership.  They therefore argued for the di-
rect sale of public land to actual settlers at low, fixed prices or, even 
better, the free distribution of land to those willing to work it.31
Unsurprisingly, the sympathies of the settlers themselves were with 
the latter camp.  Although their judgment no doubt was influenced by 
their own substantial financial interest in the outcome of the policy 
debates, settlers and their supporters tended to frame their views in 
strongly moral terms.  Every citizen, they argued, is entitled to own 
land, and the claims of those who actually work the land should take 
precedence over the fungible interests of absentee land speculators.32  
Settlers therefore demanded that the government recognize a right of 
“preemption,” which would entitle squatters on public land to pur-
chase the land they improved at low, fixed prices, or, at a minimum, 
to obtain the value of their improvements from those who purchased 
the land at auction.33
The center of national power was firmly planted in the already set-
tled lands of the east.  Consequently, the views of western settlers ini-
tially took a back seat to those who favored using public land to raise 
29 See GATES, supra note 25, at 145 (describing the ultimate decision to sell public 
lands at high prices to pay off the debt, rather than at low prices to facilitate the set-
tling of pioneers with low capital). 
30 See id. 
31 See id. at 170-71. 
32 See DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS 77 (1984) (quot-
ing an activist’s famous claim that “the land belongs to the people”); GATES, supra note 
25, at 170; Young, supra note 28, at 79 (explaining the theory that only settlers’ labor 
gives land value).  In his examination of the origins of frontier water laws, David 
Schorr has found a similar resort to moral claims.  See David B. Schorr, Appropriation as 
Agrarianism:  Distributive Justice in the Creation of Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3, 25-33 
(2005) (tracing Colorado water laws to Jacksonian populism and a moral emphasis on 
production). 
33 See GATES, supra note 25, at 219. 
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revenue.34  Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century land law, for 
the most part, provided for the sale of public lands at auction with 
relatively high minimum prices and large minimum tract sizes.35
In order to make public lands as attractive as possible to those 
bidding in the auctions, the federal government attempted to keep 
squatters off of public lands in advance of the sale.  To that end, Con-
gress enacted a series of laws criminalizing intrusion by settlers onto 
federally owned land.36  From time to time, the military was called in 
to remove squatters from federal lands.37  Despite all of this, settlers 
persisted in trespassing onto and improving government land.38
Faced with an official policy of hostility toward their presence and 
an inability to purchase land at an affordable price, squatters turned 
toward extralegal means to obtain the land they occupied.  They or-
ganized themselves into “settlers’ associations,” which served as quasi-
governments that squatters employed to protect their interests, both 
by lobbying state and federal governments and by threatening retribu-
tion against those who attempted to take title to squatter-occupied 
lands.39  When things got out of hand, squatters could count on their 
friends and neighbors on the local jury to acquit them.40  Groups of 
settlers attended land auctions in order to intimidate speculators’ 
agents from bidding on squatter-occupied land.41  Using these tactics, 
settlers were typically able to achieve what amounted to a de facto 
preemption right by “flouting [f]ederal law” that mandated competi-
tive bidding.42
34 See id. at 122. 
35 See id. at 122-31. 
36 In March 1804, Congress enacted a statute authorizing the army to forcibly eject 
squatters from public lands and imposing severe fines and even imprisonment on 
them.  Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 14, 2 Stat. 283, 289.  In 1807, as the squatter prob-
lem continued unabated, Congress made the penalties even more severe.  See Act of 
Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 46, 2 Stat. 445-46. 
37 See GATES, supra note 25, at 122. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 145-56; see also RICHARD WHITE, “IT’S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF 
MY OWN”:  A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 140-42 (1991) (explaining how farmers 
formed “claims clubs” and cooperated to protect their rights against speculators or 
“claim jumpers”). 
40 See GATES, supra note 25, at 154. 
41 See WHITE, supra note 39, at 140-42. 
42 GATES, supra note 25, at 161, 164; see also WHITE, supra note 39, at 141-42 (“Such 
extralegal modifications changed the [land] system more effectively than legal changes 
could have done.”). 
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2.  Legal Responses 
Eastern politicians condemned the squatters’ lawless “usurpation” 
of public lands and the “‘system of terror’ . . . ‘plunder, and perfidy’” 
they carried out in the face of Congress’s will.43  They accused squat-
ters of being “greedy, lawless land grabbers who had no respect for 
law, order, absentee ownership of property, and Indian rights.”44  
President James Madison issued a proclamation warning “‘unin-
formed or evil-disposed persons . . . who have unlawfully taken posses-
sion of or made any settlement on the public lands . . . forthwith to 
remove therefrom’ or face ejection by the army and prosecution for 
trespass.”45  And Henry Clay dismissed the squatters as a “lawless rab-
ble.”46
The dim view of squatters held by the eastern establishment was 
not shared by residents of the West.  Western public opinion, among 
squatters and nonsquatters alike, favored squatters over absentee land-
lords, public and private.47  Western residents voiced three broad ob-
jections to land speculators:  (1) speculators paid their local property 
taxes grudgingly, if at all; (2) they urged their agents to resist local 
public expenditures, no matter how necessary; and (3) they failed to 
improve their land, preferring to wait until the improvements made 
by others enhanced the value of their own property.48  This parasitic 
strategy meant that, in areas where large tracts of land were held by 
speculators, settlement and development were hindered, producing 
what one observer at the time referred to as a “speculators’ desert.”49
Over time, squatters were able to leverage their support within set-
tler communities to obtain the legal changes they demanded.  In part, 
this victory grew out of the sympathy that local residents and officials 
43 GATES, supra note 25, at 161, 164 (quoting statements by opponents of preemp-
tion). 
44 Id. at 223. 
45 FELLER, supra note 32, at 17 (quoting Madison’s proclamation, issued in De-
cember 1815) (alterations in original). 
46 GATES, supra note 25, at 233 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 1st Sess. 142, 
142-43 (1848)). 
47 See 8 REG. DEB. 2259, 2268-71 (1832). 
48 GATES, supra note 25, at 173; see also Henry Cohen, Vicissitudes of an Absentee 
Landlord:  A Case Study, in THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 28, at 
192, 215 (giving an example of an absentee landlord who made no contribution to de-
veloping the region). 
49 Letter from Jane Grey Swisshelm to the St. Cloud Democrat (Apr. 3, 1862), in 
CRUSADER AND FEMINIST:  LETTERS OF JANE GREY SWISSHELM:  1858-1865, at 153 (Ar-
thur J. Larsen ed., 1934). 
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had for the squatters and the ability of those officials to use local 
property laws to undermine the federal policy.  It also reflected the 
general helplessness of the federal government in the face of a con-
certed refusal to obey the law.  Failure by federal officials to recognize 
the reality of squatters’ power on the ground threatened to under-
mine general respect for law on the frontier.50  Ultimately, then, set-
tlers’ continued refusal to recognize the rights of absentee owners 
rendered the federal government’s pro-speculator stance untenable. 
Although local governments could not directly counter the fed-
eral policy of selling public lands to absentee speculators, they could 
support squatters by adapting local laws in ways that made it easier for 
squatters to dispossess private absentee owners.  According to histo-
rian Henry Cohen, “[a] kind of guerrilla warfare against absentee 
landlords was endemic in the West.”51  For example, local govern-
ments raised taxes on land to make it expensive for absentee land-
lords to hold land idle while they waited for land values to increase.52  
Local law also often required payment of taxes in specie while permit-
ting rent to be paid in depreciated paper currency.53  High taxes also 
made it relatively easy for local residents to obtain tax titles on absen-
tee-owned property.54  This was particularly true when, as sometimes 
happened, local officials refused to accept tax payments from the 
agents of absentee owners.55  Combined with liberalized adverse pos-
session statutes that shortened periods for transferring title and 
granted even more favorable treatment to those claiming under color 
of title, tax titles constituted a powerful tool in the hands of squatters 
on private land.56
State courts likewise may have pitched in on behalf of squatters.57  
As several scholars have observed, over the course of the nineteenth 
century, state property law was transformed by courts in ways that fa-
vored the actual occupants of land over absentee owners.58  John 
50 See GATES, supra note 25, at 235 (noting that “[r]espect for the law was declin-
ing”). 
51 Cohen, supra note 48, at 202. 
52 See id. at 204-05. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. at 202; see also GATES, supra note 25, at 267. 
55 See GATES, supra note 25, at 267. 
56 See Cohen, supra note 48, at 201; see also GATES, supra note 25, at 267-68. 
57 See Cohen, supra note 48, at 203 (noting that absentee owners took great care 
“to stay out of state courts,” which often sympathized with local settlers). 
58 See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860, at 32-34 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1977) (“[P]riority [of development] became 
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Sprankling has, in a series of articles, documented the variety of ways 
in which nineteenth-century courts modified the common law in or-
der to encourage intensive uses of wild lands, uses that invariably fa-
vored local residents over distant speculators.59  Most significantly, in 
the context of adverse possession, Sprankling argues, courts loosened 
the requirements for the intensity of the activity on the basis of which 
possessors could assert ownership.  As applied to wilderness land, 
these changes eviscerated the requirement that the possessor’s activity 
be sufficiently permanent and visible so as to put the true owner on 
notice that someone else was making use of his property.60
The liberalized approach to adverse possession was a valuable le-
gal weapon in the hands of squatters in the nineteenth-century 
American West, particularly because the American law of adverse pos-
session has not traditionally inquired into the good faith of adverse 
possessors.61  Indeed, when jurisdictions have deviated from this gen-
the dominant doctrine of property law in the early stages of American economic 
growth.”); Sprankling, supra note 26, at 844 (explaining that a shift in the American 
courts from formalism to instrumentalism emphasized land development). 
59 See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 519, 523 (1996) (proposing that nineteenth-century judges sought to fash-
ion property law in a way that would “encourage national development”); Sprankling, 
supra note 26, at 816 (arguing that the modern doctrine of adverse possession evolved 
as part of “a prodevelopment nineteenth century ideology that encourages and legiti-
mates economic exploitation”); see also Schorr, supra note 32, at 25-26 (arguing that 
nineteenth-century Colorado law was designed to favor the “actual settler” over “absen-
tee speculators and corporations controlled by eastern and European investors”). 
60 Sprankling, supra note 59, at 538-40.  See generally Sprankling, supra note 26 
(elaborating on his thesis about adverse possession). 
61 See, e.g., 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.1, at 755 (1952) (reviewing the ori-
gin and history of adverse possession law); Percy Bordwell, Disseisin and Adverse Posses-
sion, 33 YALE L.J. 1, 10 n.78 (1923) (observing that the majority position among U.S. 
jurisdictions is not to require good faith on the part of the adverse possessor).  This 
point has no bearing on, and is not affected by, the well-known debate between R.H. 
Helmholz and Roger Cunningham over the significance of good faith in modern ad-
verse possession caselaw.  See R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 
WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 331-32 (1983) (arguing that, in contrast to the dominant view that 
“[i]t matters not what the motives or the state of mind of the possessor are,” the case-
law “clearly show[s] that the trespasser who knows he is trespassing . . . is less likely to 
acquire title” than the good faith adverse possessor); Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse 
Possession and Subjective Intent:  A Reply to Professor Helmholz, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 58 
(1986) (arguing that “there is no tenable basis for [Professor Helmholz’s] broad con-
clusion” that caselaw consistently considers “the ‘good faith’ or ‘bad faith’ of the ad-
verse claimant”); R.H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent:  A Response to Professor Cun-
ningham, 64 WASH U. L.Q. 65 passim (1986) (responding to, and disputing, Professor 
Cunningham’s claims). 
 Even if Helmholz is correct that subjective intent has become a relevant inquiry in 
adverse possession cases, he limits his claims to “recent cases,” published between 1966 
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eral stance, they often have done so to require that the adverse posses-
sor act in bad faith—that is, with the knowledge that the land she oc-
cupies is not her own.  This counterintuitive approach, embodied in 
the so-called “Maine Rule,” at one time enjoyed “considerable sup-
port,” but has more recently fallen from grace.62  The rule strongly fa-
vors squatters over other sorts of untitled land users, a position that 
may have made it an attractive rule for Maine to adopt as it struggled 
with its own absentee owner problem and competed for settlers with 
the western frontier during the middle decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury.63
It is possible that the adoption of these and similar legal innova-
tions favoring squatters explains why many easterners at the time re-
garded westerners as “having no respect for private property and as 
being ever ready to strain and distort the law to strike at nonresi-
dents.”64  Nevertheless, confronted with an utter inability to protect 
absentee owners or to enforce prohibitions against squatting on fed-
eral land, the federal government slowly but surely began to alter its 
policies over the middle decades of the nineteenth century, moving 
away from the use of public land for revenue and toward the direct 
distribution of land to actual settlers. 
The first concessions to illegal squatters were a series of retroac-
tive preemption laws passed repeatedly during the first half of the 
nineteenth century.65  Perhaps more significantly, however, the tone 
of federal policy began to shift markedly under the Jacksonian presi-
dencies of the 1830s.  Jackson himself referred to “nonresident pro-
and 1983.  Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, supra, at 333.  Nothing in 
his analysis casts doubt on the accuracy of the scholarly consensus that the “older 
cases” unanimously agreed that the “‘claim of right’ [necessary for an adverse posses-
sor to prevail] is equally efficacious whether it is asserted in ‘good faith’ or ‘bad faith.’”  
Cunningham, supra, at 23. 
62 William Sternberg, The Element of Hostility in Adverse Possession, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 207, 
213-14 (1932).  The principal alternative to the Maine Rule was not a rule requiring 
that the adverse possessor occupy the land in good faith, but rather the so-called “Con-
necticut Rule,” which holds that the adverse possessor’s state of mind is irrelevant to 
the adverse possession inquiry.  Id. at 214-15. 
63 See David C. Smith, Maine and Its Public Domain:  Land Disposal on the Northeastern 
Frontier, in THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 28, at 113, 114, 119-
22 (describing Maine’s efforts to lure settlers to its northern frontier and the limiting 
effects of absentee ownership on its population growth). 
64 GATES, supra note 25, at 268. 
65 See, e.g., id. at 162 (observing that Congress enacted twenty-four special preemp-
tion acts before 1820 and fifteen between 1820 and 1837, all of which were retroactive 
in effect). 
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prietorship” as “one of the greatest obstacles to the advancement of a 
new country” and, in his 1836 Specie Circular, sought to deter specu-
lation in federal lands by requiring payment for the purchase of those 
lands in specie only.66  President Van Buren reaffirmed this shift in 
policy in his first annual message to Congress, when he observed that 
“selling [public] lands for the greatest possible sum of money, without 
regard to higher considerations,” was not the proper goal of federal 
land policy.67
But the true victory for squatters came in 1841, when Congress 
enacted the first generally applicable and prospective preemption 
statute for surveyed federal lands.68  In creating such a broad preemp-
tive right, the federal government, in effect, abandoned its longstand-
ing position that squatting on public lands was illegal and should be 
discouraged or punished.  Over the subsequent years, the 1841 pre-
emption statute was expanded to cover both surveyed and unsurveyed 
land.69  The federal embrace of squatters’ rights reached its apogee 
with the 1862 Homestead Act, which provided for the free acquisition 
of federal land by those who met the statute’s five-year residency and 
improvement requirements.70
The transformation of the image of squatters from the shameless 
lawbreakers and usurpers reviled by eastern elites into the revered 
pioneers of American mythology is nothing if not ironic.  But the 
squatters’ influence on American land law is undeniable.  Their per-
sistent and acquisitive lawbreaking raised the political profile of con-
flicts over how to dispose of the massive quantities of public land ac-
quired by the United States government during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, and it ultimately led to the resolution of the con-
flict in their favor. 
66 Id. at 175. 
67 Martin van Buren, State of the Union Address (Dec. 5, 1837), available at 
http://www.thisnation.com/library/sotu/1837mvb.html. 
68 See Act of Sept. 4, 1841, ch. 16, § 10, 5 Stat. 453, 455 (authorizing squatters “to 
enter with the register of the land office . . . any number of acres not exceeding one 
hundred and sixty . . . upon paying to the United States the minimum price”). 
69 See Act of June 2, 1862, ch. 94, § 1, 12 Stat. 413, 413 (providing that “when un-
surveyed lands are claimed by preemption, notice of the specific tracts claimed shall be 
filed within six months after the survey has been made”). 
70 See Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 392, 392 (entitling squatters “to en-
ter one quarter section or a less quantity of unappropriated public lands”). 
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B.  Expressive Outlaws:  The Civil Rights Movement 
1.  The Lunch Counter Sit-in Movement 
Prior to the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement was largely focused 
on achieving legal change through a sophisticated litigation program 
in the federal courts directed by the NAACP.  John Lewis, who made 
his start in public life as a student leader of sit-ins in Nashville, charac-
terized the NAACP-led strategy as relying on “a handful of lawyers 
[working] in a closed courtroom.”71  Students in Greensboro, North 
Carolina, however, dramatically shifted the focus of the movement 
when they began sitting in at segregated lunch counters in February 
1960—protests that were quickly replicated by student groups across 
the South.72  Within weeks, students were trespassing at segregated 
lunch counters in copycat actions in nearly three dozen southern cit-
ies.73  They were well organized, nonviolent, and persistent.74
The sit-in movement falls squarely within our discussion of inten-
tional property lawbreaking intended to bring about larger changes in 
existing property laws.  Throughout the South, the segregation of pri-
vately owned places of public accommodation, such as the Wool-
71 JOHN LEWIS WITH MICHAEL D’ORSO, WALKING WITH THE WIND:  A MEMOIR OF 
THE MOVEMENT 114 (1998); see also ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND:  A HISTORY 
OF AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 37 (1990) (noting that “[s]ince its founding in 
1910,” the NAACP and its “predominantly middle-class, professional leadership had 
fought its most protracted struggles in court chambers and congressional anterooms”). 
72 The Greensboro sit-ins were not the first time intentional trespass had been 
employed in the Civil Rights Movement.  Civil rights groups had experimented with 
the tactic a generation earlier.  Clusters of sit-ins also had erupted during the 1950s, 
albeit without the national media attention that catapulted the Greensboro sit-ins to 
iconic status.  See ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT:  
BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 188-94 (1984) (“During the late 1950s 
activists associated with direct action organizations began experimenting with the sit-in 
tactic.”).  The earlier sit-ins had established the property right of owners to exclude 
selectively on the basis of race.  See, e.g., Solicitor Says Race Incidents Unnecessary, GREENS-
BORO DAILY NEWS, Feb. 10, 1960, at A4 (describing a 1957 sit-in at a North Carolina ice 
cream parlor).  The Greensboro sit-ins were different both because of the national at-
tention they received and because, as a consequence of that attention, they inspired 
countless sit-ins across the South in the weeks that followed.  See, e.g., First Sitdown 
Staged in Deep South, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Feb. 26, 1960, at A3; Negroes’ Protests Still 
Spreading, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Feb. 12, 1960, at A10. 
73 See JACK M. BLOOM, CLASS, RACE, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 159 (1987) 
(“By the end of February [1960], thirty-two cities in North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia, Tennessee, Florida, Maryland, Kentucky, and Alabama had experienced sit-
ins and other demonstrations protesting racial restrictions.”). 
74 See LEWIS WITH D’ORSO, supra note 71, at 93-107 (describing the organization of 
the Nashville Student Movement). 
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worth’s lunch counters targeted by the Greensboro students, was not 
accomplished by mandate of state or local law, as is sometimes sug-
gested.75  Instead, black patrons were excluded as a matter of local 
“custom,” that is, through owners’ private exercise of their common 
law property right to exclude.76  By disobeying store owners’ instruc-
tions to leave the premises, the black students participating in lunch-
counter sit-ins were, like the squatters in the American West, inten-
tionally disregarding the very property rights they sought to change. 
That the sit-ins were primarily expressive can hardly be ques-
tioned.  The goals of the sit-in participants would not have been satis-
fied had they simply been allowed to eat at the lunch counters where 
they were sitting, without larger changes prohibiting the maintenance 
of segregated lunch counters more generally.  Instead, the sit-ins were 
aimed at achieving broad legal transformation of the social meaning 
of public accommodation, one that would permanently rearrange the 
property rights of all owners, for the benefit of all black citizens—
whether or not they had participated in the sit-ins. 
The expressive nature of the sit-ins is illustrated further by the 
symbolic force participants attributed to the act of lawbreaking itself.  
Many of the participants in the sit-ins spoke about the deep signifi-
cance of their protests, independent of any legal change they might 
be instrumental in bringing about.  One Greensboro demonstrator, 
for example, later said of the first day of the sit-ins:  “I probably felt 
better that day than I’ve ever felt in my life.  I felt as though I had 
gained my manhood . . . .”77  Unsurprisingly, then, historians have de-
scribed the protests in plainly expressive terms.  William Chafe, for 
example, described the protests as “a new language.”78  “Moreover,” 
he continued, “the language communicated a message different from 
that which had been heard before.  A direct connection existed be-
tween style and content.  In an almost visceral way, the sit-ins ex-
pressed the dissatisfaction and anger of the black community toward 
white indifference.”79
75 See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 72, at 197 (“In the South during the 1950s segrega-
tion laws prohibited blacks and whites from eating together.”). 
76 See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 271-78 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (pro-
viding a review of cases where “the testimony of corporate officers shows that the rea-
son [for segregation] was either a commercial one or, which amounts to the same 
thing, that service to Negroes was not in accord with local custom”). 
77 WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES & CIVIL RIGHTS:  GREENSBORO, NORTH CARO-
LINA, AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 116 (1980). 
78 Id. at 139. 
79 Id. 
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The initial reaction to the sit-ins among mainstream civil rights 
leaders and elites within the black community was largely one of dis-
approval.  Some black professionals, put off by the protesters’ disre-
gard for the law—a tactic that they thought likely to prove counter-
productive—were “slow to support the students.”80  And the NAACP, 
which was, as a general matter, “hostile to mass action, and especially 
to breaking the law,” initially refused to support the sit-in movement.81  
After hearing about the Greensboro sit-ins, Thurgood Marshall 
stormed around the room proclaiming . . . that he did not care what 
anyone said, he was not going to represent a bunch of crazy colored stu-
dents who violated the sacred property rights of white folks by going into 
their stores or lunch counters and refusing to leave when ordered to do 
so.
82
Reaction among many southern whites, who had long believed 
and insisted that southern blacks were content with the segregated 
status quo, was even more hostile.  Governor Luther Hodges of North 
Carolina, for example, called the sit-ins “counterproductive and a 
threat to law and order.”83  “I have no sympathy whatsoever,” he de-
clared, “for any group of people who deliberately engage in activities 
which any reasonable person can see will result in a breakdown of law 
and order, as well as interference with the normal and proper opera-
tion of a private business.”84  Governor Ernest F. Hollings of South 
Carolina lashed out at the protesters, who, he said, “think they can 
violate any law, especially if they have a Bible in their hands.”85  South-
ern politicians denounced the sit-in protesters for their conduct on 
80 BLOOM, supra note 73, at 171. 
81 Id. at 172; see also CHAFE, supra note 77, at 117 n.* (“The national NAACP criti-
cized the sit-in tactic and refused legal or moral support for some time.”); MORRIS, su-
pra note 72, at 198 (“The national office of the NAACP and many conservative minis-
ters refused to back the Greensboro sit-ins.”). 
82 Mary L. Dudziak, Working Towards Democaracy:  Thurgood Marshall and the Consti-
tution of Kenya, 56 DUKE L.J. 721, 763-64 (2006) (quoting Derrick Bell, An Epistolary Ex-
ploration for a Thurgood Marshall Biography, 6 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 51, 55 (1989)); see 
also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Seeking Redress in the Streets:  The Student Movement’s 
Challenge to Pragmatism and Liberalism, 1960-1961, at 9 (2006) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors). 
83 CHAFE, supra note 77, at 120. 
84 Guy Munger, Sit-In Protests Are Assailed by Governor, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, 
Mar. 11, 1960, at A1. 
85 WEISBROT, supra note 71, at 24. 
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the floor of both the House86 and the Senate.87  In countless letters to 
the editor, southern whites deplored the sit-in participants as lawless 
violators of private property rights.88  As one letter (characteristically) 
put it, 
[t]hose who invaded private property in violation of the regulations of 
the owners are the violators of our oldest and most time-honored laws 
and should be dealt with as lawbreakers.  
 Those who want to make a protest against the regulations of the 
owners have a perfect right to do so, but such protests should be made 
through the proper channels and within the law.
89
White moderates in the South, while expressing sympathy with  
the protester’s goals, likewise disapproved of their violation of prop-
erty rights and called for protesters to express their grievances by less 
confrontational means.90  The moderate Greensboro Daily News, for ex-
ample, attempted to weave a middle path, disapproving of the sit-in 
participants’ unlawful tactics while criticizing business owners who 
welcomed black shoppers throughout their stores only to exclude 
86 See, e.g., 106 CONG. REC. 4, 5211 (1960) (statement of Rep. Forrester, Ga.) 
(“These [sit-ins] have caused fights, riots, and near riots.”). 
87 Senator McClellan, of Arkansas, argued that the sit-in demonstrators were “stir-
ring up bad feeling and tension and hatred between the races,” and he used their ac-
tions as a reason to oppose the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1960.  106 CONG. REC. 6, 
7764 (1960). 
88 See, e.g., Eugene A. Hood, Letter to the Editor, Police Protection, GREENSBORO 
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 15, 1960, at A6 (condemning the Greensboro police for failing to 
enforce property rights in the face of sit-ins); W.N. Jefferies, Letter to the Editor, It Is 
Disgusting, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Mar. 18, 1960, at A8 (“It is disgusting that the 
white citizens of the State of North Carolina will even consider ‘negotiations’ with 
these arrogant lawbreakers and trespassers who are ruining private businesses.”); Let-
ter to the Editor, A Christian Movement?, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Feb. 17, 1960, at A8 
(calling the sit-in participants “covetous[],” “selfish,” and unchristian); Marian S. Pat-
terson, Letter to the Editor, Work of the Devil, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Feb. 22, 1960, 
at A4 (calling sit-in participants “rioters” and the sit-ins “the work of the devil”); Reads-
ville Reader, Letter to the Editor, Lost a Friend?, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Feb. 18, 
1960, at A6 (“Those seeking equal rights at the lunch counter, in my opinion, went 
about it in a way of the belligerent.”). 
89 T.W. Chandler, Letter to the Editor, Un-American?, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, 
Feb. 24, 1960, at A8; see also id. (“Those who show so much concern about the rights of 
the invaders of private property apparently have no concern whatsoever about the 
rights of those who own property, which to me is a strange, un-American and unchris-
tian attitude.”). 
90 See CHAFE, supra note 77, at 126. 
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them from sit-down lunchcounter service.91  “The right to private 
property is a precious one,” its editors said in an April 1960 editorial: 
It ought not to be chipped away, even in what may be considered a 
righteous cause.  Once weakened in one area, it becomes subject to at-
tack in others, and precedents designed for good purposes may later be 
used for objectionable or evil ones.  This newspaper has joined Governor 
Leroy Collins and other thoughtful Southerners in questioning the fair-
ness of inviting the Negro into variety stores and soliciting his trade, and 
when he has bought his merchandise then declining to let him sit down 
on a stool for a cup of coffee.  But we have also recognized, with the 
courts, that a private business has, and ought to have under our laws, the 
right to operate as it sees fit, in a discriminatory fashion or otherwise.
92
Former President Harry Truman, using more colorful language, 
concurred, observing that “[i]f anyone came into my store and tried 
to stop business, I’d throw him out.  The Negro should behave himself 
and show he’s a good citizen.”93  Asked about the protests during a 
news conference at the height of the sit-ins, President Eisenhower 
equivocated, saying that, while he sympathized “with the efforts of any 
group to enjoy the rights . . . of equality that they are guaranteed by 
the Constitution,” equality should be pursued only “in a perfectly legal 
way.”94
2.  Legal Responses 
Hundreds of students who participated in the sit-ins were arrested 
and charged, typically with criminal trespass.95  In some jurisdictions, 
such as Georgia and Virginia, where applicable criminal statutes did 
91 See, e.g., MILES WOLFF, LUNCH AT THE FIVE AND TEN:  THE GREENSBORO SIT-INS:  
A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 82 (1970) (noting that “the editorial pages of [local pa-
pers] supported the students, although not without some reservations”); Editorial, Of 
Civil Rights and Civilities, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Mar. 2, 1960, at A6 (“Somewhere a 
Southern community must find a way to deal with civilities as well as civil rights.  Such 
an answer will not be found while the management is under the gun.  It will be found 
only where both sides are able to sit down and work out an answer unimpeded by the 
threat of force or the worry of economic reprisal.”). 
92 Editorial, Lunch Counters and Private Property, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Apr. 23, 
1960, at A6. 
93 WOLFF, supra note 91, at 115. 
94 Transcript of Eisenhower’s News Conference on Domestic and Foreign Matters, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1960, at 16. 
95 See, e.g., 26 Sitdowners Given Suspended Sentences, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Apr. 
5, 1960, at A5; 43 Students Convicted in Raleigh, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Mar. 29, 1960, 
at A1; Judge Finds 22 Guilty of Sitdown Trespass, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Mar. 3, 1960, 
at A1; Two Sentenced for Trespassing, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Apr. 27, 1960, at A4. 
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not exist, legislatures quickly enacted laws making it a crime “to refuse 
to leave an establishment when requested to do so by its operator.”96  
The new laws were described as efforts to protect property rights 
against the depredations of the sit-in protesters.97  Courts also used 
their power to issue injunctions backed by contempt sanctions to sup-
plement existing laws.98  And, in the deep South, protesters frequently 
were brutalized, both by police and by counterprotesters.99
Despite this predictable legal (and extralegal) opposition to their 
tactics, the sit-ins accomplished a variety of things.  First, a number of 
merchants in cities affected by the sit-ins, and by the consumer boy-
cotts they often inspired among sympathizers, responded by voluntar-
ily ending the practice of segregated lunch counters.100  The sit-ins put 
particular pressure on national companies, such as Woolworths, who, 
despite their willingness to serve blacks at their lunch counters in 
northern states, acquiesced in segregationist norms at their stores in 
the South, even in the absence of any legal compulsion to do so.101  Af-
ter seven months of protests, Woolworth’s shifted away from a policy 
of blind deference to “local custom” and became one of the first 
lunch counters in Greensboro to offer integrated service.102  “[B]y 
September 1961, restaurants in 108 southern or border cities had 
ended racial segregation, as a result of the sit-ins.”103  Typical in this 
96 Negroes Plan Tests on Legal Fronts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1960, at E8; see also Anti-
Sitdown Bills Passed, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Feb. 25, 1960, at B14 (describing three 
trespassing bills passed by the Virginia Senate prohibiting “any person who has been 
forbidden to do so from going into or staying on property” after they had been given 
notice). 
97 See Stricter Laws of Trespass Approved, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Feb. 26, 1960, at 
A3 (“[The laws] would protect the rights of the private property owner to conduct his 
business as he might legally choose. . . . [T]he property owner could serve either or 
both races segregated or integrated as he saw fit.”). 
98 See MORRIS, supra note 72, at 247 (describing, as an example, Judge J. Robert 
Elliott’s “sweeping injunction, which barred Albany’s Negroes from unlawful picketing, 
congregating or marching in the streets, and from any act designed to promote 
breaches of the peace”). 
99 See WEISBROT, supra note 71, at 39 (referring to the “use of chains, knives, and 
attack dogs” to quiet antisegregation protesters). 
100 See, e.g., id. at 39 (“On May 10 four theaters and six lunch counters opened 
their doors to blacks.”). 
101 See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 271-78 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (list-
ing refusals by several companies in southern communities to serve blacks at their 
lunch counters). 
102 WOLFF, supra note 91, at 167-73. 
103 ARTHUR I. WASKOW, FROM RACE RIOT TO SIT-IN, 1919 AND THE 1960S:  A STUDY 
IN THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE 228 (1966). 
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regard was Winston-Salem, North Carolina, where merchants voted 
unanimously on May 23, 1960, to integrate their lunch counters.104  
Even retailers in segregationist strongholds like Birmingham, Ala-
bama, proved susceptible to the pressure of the sit-in tactic, agreeing 
to desegregate their facilities months before the passage of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act.105
Second, the sit-ins helped to disabuse white southerners of the 
view that blacks were satisfied with the segregated status quo.106  Con-
fronted with the sit-ins, many white southerners initially continued to 
doubt that blacks were dissatisfied, arguing instead that the protests 
were surely the work of outside agitators.107  But as the protests spread 
and gained strength, the truth of black anger at their second-class 
status became undeniable.  In a letter to the editor, one white south-
erner explained how the protracted protests had opened his eyes to 
the injustice of commercial segregation: 
 For many years, while working every day in downtown Greensboro, I 
have enjoyed the privilege of eating a well-balanced mid-day meal in one 
of the lunch counters or restaurants in the business district. . . . The 
term “have enjoyed” is used advisedly.  The pleasure of dining in my ac-
customed manner has recently been much diminished.  That is because 
the lunch counter sit-down protests have brought to my attention in 
sharp focus an injustice that I formerly thought of, when at all, only 
vaguely. . . . If there is anything Christ-like, charitable or just about pro-
hibiting a fellow man to eat, publicly, in any other than a vertical posi-
tion, I challenge the most avid of segregationists to point it out.
108
104 See Lunch-Counter Mixing Is Voted in Winston, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, May 24, 
1960, at A1. 
105 See MORRIS, supra note 72, at 271 (reporting that on May 7, 1963, Birmingham 
businessmen reached a compromise regarding integration). 
106 See CHAFE, supra note 77, at 61 (describing Greensboro school board chairman 
John Foster’s belief that most blacks were also doubtful about the merits of integra-
tion). 
107 See WOLFF, supra note 91, at 66-67; see also Mrs. T.F. Webster, Letter to the Edi-
tor, Folly of Their Ways, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Apr. 4, 1960, at A8 (“Although these 
demonstrating students steadfastly declare this to be a spontaneous move, I am in-
clined to believe they have been indoctrinated, brainwashed and regimented by Negro 
leaders of their race from the pulpit on down through many organizations, mostly 
originating in the North . . . .”). 
108 James E. Brown, Sr., Letter to the Editor, An Injustice, GREENSBORO DAILY 
NEWS, Feb. 27, 1960, at A6. 
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Moreover, prior to the protests, many white politicians overesti-
mated white enthusiasm for segregated facilities.109  Despite predic-
tions of doom, however, the Greensboro Daily News reported that the in-
troduction of integrated lunch-counter service in Winston-Salem, 
North Carolina in May 1960 “took place quietly.”110  On the first day 
of integrated service, “[b]usiness appeared to be about normal . . . on 
a warm day when shoppers must have welcomed a convenient cool 
drink.”111  By the end of 1961, it was increasingly difficult to hold on 
to the illusions, either of black acquiescence in, or of widespread 
white insistence on, segregated dining facilities, and, as a conse-
quence, Miles Wolff says, “[m]any white southerners were getting an 
entirely new picture of the Negro.”112
Third, by refusing to be bound by property laws that ostensibly 
permitted merchants to exclude them on the basis of race, the pro-
testing students demonstrated to local authorities their need for black 
cooperation in the preservation of private property rights.  The dis-
ruption a few students were able to produce illustrated how even a 
small number of persistently uncooperative people can substantially 
undermine the ability of the most determined state to enforce estab-
lished property rights.  In his memoirs, John Lewis described how 
Nashville police were overwhelmed by a few hundred student protest-
ers.  “They couldn’t deal with the numbers they were facing,” he said, 
“[a]nd there was no more room at the jail.”113  Aldon Morris tells a 
similar story about Martin Luther King’s 1963 Birmingham campaign:  
“Bull Connor and his political officials also felt pressure, because the 
jails were filling up.”114  Retailers across the South complained about 
the effects of the sit-ins on their bottom line, due both to the boycotts 
organized by the protesters and their sympathizers and to the hesi-
tance of white shoppers to frequent the store for fear of disorder.115
Finally, by taking the fight for civil rights out of the professional-
ized realm of civil litigation, the students succeeded in making it into 
109 See CHAFE, supra note 77, at 79 (“The notion of an angry white crowd about to 
rebel appears to have been as much a political creation of [North Carolina Governor 
Luther] Hodges as a fearsome social reality.”). 
110 Stores Begin Desegregated Lunch Service, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, May 26, 1960, 
at A1. 
111 Id. 
112 WOLFF, supra note 91, at 150. 
113 LEWIS, supra note 71, at 108. 
114 MORRIS, supra note 72, at 267. 
115 See WOLFF, supra note 91, at 171-74; MORRIS, supra note 72, at 269. 
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a mass movement, thrusting the civil rights question to the top of the 
nation’s political agenda.116  Whereas President Eisenhower distanced 
himself from the protesters’ lawbreaking, presidential candidate John 
Kennedy gave them his unqualified support, a move that injected civil 
rights into the heart of the 1960 presidential election and set the stage 
for the passage, after Kennedy’s assassination, of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.117  Title II of that law prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
race in “any place of public accommodation,” which it defines broadly 
to include everything from hotels to movie theaters to neighborhood 
hamburger joints.118  The statute, a direct response to the sit-in pro-
tests, substantially curtails the common law right of shop owners to 
exclude on whatever ground they see fit.119
C.  Intersectional Outlaws:  Contemporary Urban Squatters 
1.  Urban Squatters 
The decades after World War II saw a massive migration of capital 
and people out of America’s cities and into its suburbs.120  This popu-
lation shift, far from being purely an accident of market forces, was 
actively encouraged and, indeed, subsidized by the federal govern-
ment.121  Through its creation of the interstate highway system and the 
discriminatory policies of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
which would not guarantee mortgages in urban or racially integrated 
neighborhoods, government policy both lured and pushed investment 
capital out of inner cities and into outlying areas.122  Following the 
path laid by the FHA, private mortgage lenders simply refused to lend 
money for the construction or upkeep of properties within many ur-
ban neighborhoods.123
116 See BLOOM, supra note 73, at 165. 
117 See WEISBROT, supra note 71, at 45, 87 (noting that “Kennedy’s presidency—and 
his martyrdom—had made civil rights an issue no successor could safely defuse”). 
118 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. 2, § 201, 78 Stat. 241, 243. 
119 See WASKOW, supra note 103, at 231. 
120 See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER:  THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 190-218 (1985). 
121 See id. at 206 (noting that “[Federal Housing Administration] programs has-
tened the decay of inner-city neighborhoods by stripping them of much of their mid-
dle-class constituency”). 
122 See id. at 208 (discussing the FHA’s concern with “inharmonious racial or na-
tionality groups” within neighborhoods) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
123 See id. at 217. 
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In some cases, the owners of urban residential properties did not 
respond to this capital drought by simply selling their real estate.  In 
order to maximize the return on their investment, they engaged in a 
practice called “milking,” taking advantage of favorable tax treatment 
and extracting rents from tenants while investing as little money as 
possible in the upkeep of their properties.124  In the most run-down 
neighborhoods, the final stage of this process was often either “arson-
for-profit” or the sale of the property to speculators with little interest 
in rehabilitating the dilapidated buildings.125  In many cases, however, 
the owner simply abandoned his decrepit property, in which case it 
typically ended up in government hands after a tax foreclosure.126
In the 1970s and 1980s, an epidemic of urban property abandon-
ment led to a dramatic expansion of government-owned properties in 
cities across the country.  By the 1980s, for example, New York City 
and Philadelphia each owned thousands of vacant buildings seized 
from delinquent taxpayers.127  These derelict properties became zones 
of criminality.128  Crack houses and shooting galleries attracted drug 
users, dealers, and prostitutes, whose activities terrorized and blighted 
entire neighborhoods.129  Landlord abandonment therefore had the 
perverse effect of exacerbating the very urban ills on which subse-
quent abandonment was predicated.  The result was an ever-widening 
zone of urban decay and dysfunction.130
As the federal government did with its public lands in the nine-
teenth century, city governments attempted to quickly return this now 
publicly owned, abandoned property to the private sector by auction-
ing it to the highest bidder.  In so doing, they hoped both to raise 
revenue and to foster private development that would, it was argued, 
increase the urban tax base.131  All too often, however, the highest 
bidder was a speculator who quickly allowed the property to fall back 
into tax arrears.  In New York City, for example, in 1979 approxi-
mately ninety percent of auctioned properties were delinquent on 
124 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MELE, SELLING THE LOWER EAST SIDE:  CULTURE, REAL 
ESTATE, AND RESISTANCE IN NEW YORK CITY 188-94 (2000) (describing the process of 
disinvestment and abandonment in the New York’s Lower East Side). 
125 Id. at 192-94. 
126 Id. at 191. 
127 See Eric Hirsch & Peter Wood, Squatting in New York City:  Justification and  
Strategy, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 605, 610 (1988). 
128 MELE, supra note 124, at 197. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 194. 
131 See id. at 204-06; Hirsch & Wood, supra note 127, at 610. 
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property taxes within one year of their sale.132  When they were not 
auctioning it off to speculators, city governments seemed unable to 
figure out what to do with the property, often simply holding it in its 
dilapidated state, even in the face of strong local demand for low-
income housing.133  In Philadelphia, the city’s program for distribut-
ing abandoned, city-owned houses to “homesteaders” was riddled by 
corruption and inefficiency and ended up being used to funnel 
houses toward well-connected speculators.134
A federally funded pilot homesteading program was initiated in 
1974, but it was small and primarily geared toward members of the 
middle class.135  The statute creating the program authorized the De-
parment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to transfer fed-
erally owned, unoccupied dwellings over to local homesteading pro-
jects.  However, the statute somewhat schizophrenically indicated that, 
in designing their rules for eligibility, those projects were to weigh 
both homesteaders’ need for housing and their ability to bear the fi-
nancial burdens of rehabilitation.136  These dual and contradictory 
considerations reflected disagreement among the program’s design-
ers over the question whether homesteading should be used primarily 
to rehabilitate housing and boost local property tax receipts, or in-
stead to provide housing for the poorest citizens.137  In its earliest 
years, the program helped rehabilitate only a handful of houses, most 
of which were occupied by people whose income placed them solidly 
in the middle class. 
In the meantime, a consensus was forming among residents of 
blighted communities that absentee ownership was a source of 
132 Stephen Katz & Margit Mayer, Gimme Shelter:  Self-Help Housing Struggles Within 
and Against the State in New York City and West Berlin, 9 INT’L J. URBAN & REG’L. RES. 15, 
25 (1985). 
133 See Seth Borgos, Low-Income Homeownership and the ACORN Squatters Campaign, in 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 428, 433-35, 438-39 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 
1986). 
134 Id. at 436-38. 
135 The federal program was based on section 810 of the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974.  See Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633, 734 (1974) (requiring 
that special consideration be given to a homesteader’s capacity to make the required 
improvements to the property, a criterion that ultimately tipped the balance of the 
program in favor of moderate-income families); see also Seth Borgos, The ACORN Squat-
ters’ Campaign, 15 SOC. POL’Y 17, 19 (1984) (explaining that the federal homesteading 
program was having little impact on abandonment and the need for housing). 
136 88 Stat. at 734. 
137 See Borgos, supra note 135, at 19 (“The inevitable tension between the ‘housing 
need’ criterion . . . and the ‘capacity to repair’ criterion . . . was left unresolved.”). 
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neighborhood problems, and that conditions could be improved by 
transferring ownership from absentee landlords, the city, or specula-
tors to local residents.138  Neighborhood activists and advocates for 
low-income housing in cities across the country organized protests 
aimed at pushing governmental owners of abandoned urban proper-
ties to seek ways to convert those properties into housing for the poor.  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when conventional protests proved 
ineffective, several groups, most prominent among them the Associa-
tion of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), initi-
ated squatting campaigns to attract attention to their demands.139  
Unlike the squatters of the nineteenth century, who were motivated 
almost exclusively by a desire to acquire property for themselves, the 
urban squatters of the late twentieth century acted out of an amalga-
mation of motives, not least of which was a desire to express their op-
position to the government’s failure to provide adequate low-income 
housing in the cities.140
These hybrid motives were reflected in a particularly clear way in 
ACORN’s tactics.  ACORN carefully selected squatters who were inter-
ested in becoming homeowners, but who could not afford to purchase 
housing on the open market.141  ACORN warned squatters that their 
actions were illegal, though “morally justifiable,” and that there was 
no guarantee they would end up owning the home in which they 
squatted.142  ACORN required squatters to sign a “squatter’s contract” 
in which they pledged to participate in “meetings, rallies, and other 
activities” organized by ACORN to pressure the city to reform its 
homesteading program.143  Squatters also had to obtain signatures 
from seventy-five percent of the neighbors of the abandoned property 
to demonstrate neighborhood support for their action.144  Finally, on 
the day the squatting was to begin, ACORN always alerted the media 
138 See MELE, supra note 124, at 203. 
139 See id. at 206; Borgos, supra note 133, at 435. 
140 See Hirsch & Wood, supra note 127, at 613-14 (explaining how ACORN organ-
ized squatting in New York City in order to force officials to negotiate a solution to the 
housing shortage); James F. Clarity, Philadelphia’s Poor Taking over Houses To Fight City 
Decay, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1977, at 1 (describing Philadelphia’s “tacit approval” of 
squatting in abandoned housing to address the housing crisis and prevent the poor 
from being pushed out of certain areas). 
141 See Borgos, supra note 133, at 434-35. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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and held a rally, which often featured local ministers and elected pub-
lic officials.145
2.  Legal Responses 
The official responses to the urban squatting movements varied 
widely.  Patricia Harris, President Carter’s HUD Secretary, described 
squatters in Philadelphia as “no better than shoplifters.”146  The presi-
dent of the Philadelphia City Council called the squatting movement 
the “beginning of anarchy.”147  Many mayors denounced squatters and 
refused to deal with them.148  Moreover, squatters often were arrested 
and their homes demolished.149  Seth Borgos describes the hostile re-
action of most public officials to ACORN’s 1982 squatting campaign: 
City and federal authorities cracked down hard in some locations.  
Squatters were arrested in Pittsburgh and St. Louis; a HUD Area Office 
manager led a midnight raid on a squatter’s house in Dallas; the St. 
Louis Land Reutilization Authority filed a $500,000 civil suit against 
ACORN and the leaders of its squatting group.
150
In many cases, however, squatters were able to get government 
owners to grant title in the occupied housing to squatters.151  Half of 
the 200 squatters who participated in Milton Street’s 1977 squat in 
HUD-owned housing in Philadelphia, for example, obtained title to 
the properties they occupied.152
145 See id.  Not all urban squatting movements were as overtly expressive in their 
practices.  Some movements, such as the “Homes Not Jails” (HNJ) movement in San 
Francisco, often engaged in covert squatting that simply aimed to get the homeless in-
doors.  See ANDERS CORR, NO TRESPASSING!  SQUATTING, RENT STRIKES, AND LAND 
STRUGGLE WORLDWIDE 20 (1999) (“This dual covert and public strategy allows HNJ to 
immediately provide housing for homeless people . . . .”).  Other squatters, particularly 
those in continental Europe or those in North America influenced by the European 
squatting tradition, viewed squatting almost as a form of artistic expression rather than 
a form of overtly political dissent.  See, e.g., FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
ILLEGAL KNOWLEDGE, CRACKING THE MOVEMENT:  SQUATTING BEYOND THE MEDIA 29-
45 (Laura Martz trans., Autonomedia 1994) (1990) (“Squatters were artists because 
they moved into empty space to play in it, and on no account to ‘furnish’ it.”). 
146 Borgos, supra note 133, at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
147 Id. 
148 See id. at 439 
149 See, e.g., Hirsch & Wood, supra note 127, at 613-14 (describing New York City’s 
arrest of eighteen squatters and demolition of their building in 1985). 
150 Borgos, supra note 133, at 439. 
151 See id. at 433. 
152 Id. 
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In an urban parallel to the experience of nineteeth-century squat-
ters on the American frontier, some squatting campaigns led to the 
creation or expansion of city-run homesteading programs targeting 
low-income residents.  New York City, for example, ultimately re-
sponded to illegal squatting movements by establishing a legal system 
for urban homesteading on abandoned, city-owned properties.153  In 
New York’s Lower East Side, for example, twenty-eight buildings were 
fully renovated and acquired by tenants through the city’s homestead-
ing program.154  Similarly, ACORN’s 1979 squatting campaign in 
Philadelphia led to the reform of that city’s troubled urban home-
steading program and inspired similar squatting efforts across the 
country.155
ACORN’s 1982 squatting campaign sought to shift federal policy 
toward an exclusive focus on low-income housing within the federal 
homesteading program.156  The visibility of ACORN’s protests led to 
congressional hearings, and in 1983, the federal program was reori-
ented toward lower-income homesteaders.157  The federal effort re-
mained small, though, and never accounted for more than a tiny per-
centage of federal housing efforts.158
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the urban squatting move-
ments, however, was in the domain of public opinion.  As a method of 
protest, urban squatting was extremely photogenic.159  Squatters’ ac-
tivities consistently attracted media attention, most of it favorable.160  
The image of squatters attempting to reclaim abandoned property 
through their own labor was appealing to American audiences, not-
withstanding a general political conservatism in the early 1980s that 
153 See Hirsch & Wood, supra note 127, at 615 (detailing “the creation of dozens of 
new units of housing for the low-income residents of East New York”); see also MALVE 
VON HASSELL, HOMESTEADING IN NEW YORK CITY, 1978-1993:  THE DIVIDED HEART OF 
LOISAIDA 4, 21-25 (1996) (“In the early 1980s, the New York City Department of Hous-
ing Preservation and Development accepted and incorporated the Urban Homestead-
ing Program . . . .”). 
154 See VON HASSELL, supra note 153, at 26. 
155 See Borgos, supra note 133, at 435-37. 
156 See id. at 439-41 (noting that ACORN’s advocacy led to the introduction of leg-
islation in Congress to reform federal housing programs). 
157 See Housing & Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. III, § 
301, 97 Stat. 1196 (1983) (amending the U.S. Housing Act of 1937). 
158 See William A. Rohe, Expanding Urban Homesteading, 57 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 444, 
445 (1991). 
159 See Borgos, supra note 133, at 442. 
160 See id. 
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typically manifested itself as hostility toward poverty-relief programs.161  
Even politicians who opposed urban squatters have acknowledged the 
romantic power of their actions.162  Urban squatters were, therefore, 
extremely effective at keeping the problem of low-income housing on 
the political agenda, winning a few modest legislative victories along 
the way, at a time when the tables were stacked heavily against them. 
II.  WHY PROPERTY OUTLAWS? 
We are obviously not the first to observe the important role of in-
tentional lawbreaking in fostering legal change.  Legal theorists have 
long left some space for the occasional disorder created by conscien-
tious civil disobedience.  The many discussions of intentional law-
breaking within legal philosophy reflect three broad approaches:  one 
rooted in the dignity of individual conscience, one oriented toward 
the correction of imperfections in the majoritarian political process, 
and one celebrating a pluralistic conception of legal interpretation.  
Two shortcomings of this literature, however, are of particular interest 
to this paper.  First, these discussions typically fail to distinguish 
among the various substantive areas of law on which the mechanisms 
of intentional lawbreaking might operate.  Second, they tend to over-
simplify the nature of disobedience by disfavoring what we are calling 
“acquisitive” disobedience, in large part because of their focus on the 
lawbreaker’s subjective state of mind as crucial to the justification of 
the lawbreaking.  In this Part, we address the first of these issues.  In 
the next Part, we address, among other things, the significance (and 
at times insignificance) of the lawbreaker’s subjective state of mind in 
evaluating the proper legal response to lawbreakers. 
Ronald Dworkin, who has offered one of the most influential ac-
counts of civil disobedience, has made a powerful argument for its 
(limited) legitimacy, based on the power of individual conscience.  He 
suggests that the operation of self-interested motives necessarily calls 
into question the justification for breaking the law.  Dworkin argues 
that lawbreaking can be justified, at times, when it is undertaken in 
order to protect a person’s sense of integrity, as when the law requires 
people to perform acts that they view as deeply immoral, or when law-
161 See id. 
162 See Thomas J. Leuck, Police Evict Squatters from Three City-Owned Tenements in the 
East Village, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1996, at B3 (quoting Mayor Rudolph Giuliani as com-
plaining about the “whole romantic thing about squatters” and arguing that squatters 
were essentially “cheat[ers]” who were “trying to chisel”). 
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breaking is employed as a means of expressing the injustice of an ex-
isting law.163  He distinguishes these two motives for lawbreaking from 
conduct that is aimed at merely expressing or hindering the foolish-
ness of a particular law, which he views as more difficult to justify.164  
Moreover, he distinguishes all three sorts of conscientious lawbreak-
ing from “ordinary criminal activity motivated by selfishness or anger 
or cruelty or madness,” which he says is always wrong.165
In contrast to Dworkin’s conscience-centered account of justified 
disobedience, some scholars have focused on the instrumental role of 
disobedience as a tool to challenge the inertia of the political system 
that impedes legal change.  In a recent essay in the Yale Law Journal, 
Daniel Markovits sets forth a justification that is more expansive than 
Dworkin’s, one based not on the governing role of individual con-
science, but on the nature of governance itself.  His paper valuably 
highlights the institutional role of intentional lawbreaking as a tool for 
exposing and overcoming inertia within democratic processes.166  
Markovits views inertia as an inescapable feature of democracy, one 
that is necessary for the cultivation and reproduction of democratic 
engagement.167  He argues that, through the practice he terms “de-
mocratic disobedience,” civil disobedients can overcome that inertia 
by using disobedience to bring outmoded laws to the attention of 
lawmakers and the electorate, forcing onto the agenda issues that 
might otherwise go undetected.168
Finally, in his classic Harvard Law Review foreword, Robert Cover 
takes an even broader approach, describing some lawbreaking as part 
of a process of decentralized legal interpretation through which dis-
senting groups pursue their own normative visions by structuring their 
lives around their own particular legal understandings.169  According 
163 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 108-10 (1985). 
164 See id. 
165 Id. at 105; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 365, 372 (3d prtg. 1972) 
(arguing that “civil disobedience cannot be grounded solely on group or self-interest” 
and observing that it should not be used to challenge economic or social policies, 
which are too closely bound up with self-interest); MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS:  
ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP 20 (1970) (contrasting justifiable civil 
disobedience with “frivolous or criminal disobedience” not based on “morally serious” 
objections). 
166 Daniel Markovits, Essay, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L.J. 1897, 1934-48 
(2005). 
167 See id. at 1921-28, 1934-35. 
168 See id. at 1938-39. 
169 See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword:  Nomos 
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
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to Cover, the private legal conceptions of these dissenting groups are, 
at least as an initial matter, no less “law” than the official legal under-
standings enshrined in the formal law of the dominant community.170  
It is possible, Cover argues, that lawbreakers and judges alike “are all 
engaged in the task of constitutional understanding,” and their dis-
tinctive perspectives “make us realize that we cannot pretend to a uni-
tary law.”171  In contrast to Dworkin’s state-centered conception of civil 
disobedience as an exceptional case of justified deviation from official 
versions of the law, and to Markovits’s discussion of disobedience as a 
mechanism for vindicating subsumed majoritarian impulses, Cover 
views conscientious disobedience as an example of faithful commit-
ment to a dissenting minority’s own understanding of law. 
Applying this conception, Cover describes the Greensboro sit-in 
protesters not as lawbreakers so much as a group of people “con-
form[ing] its public behavior to its own interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.”172  According to Cover, that behavior does not occur in a vac-
uum.  By choosing to honor their commitment to an unofficial 
version of law, the sit-in protesters remained true to their normative 
community while also communicating to those in officialdom a force-
ful message of dissent.  Equally important, in a manner not possible 
through any other means of legal discourse, they forced public offi-
cials make a choice as to the strength of their own commitments to 
the official legal status quo—a choice that, in the case of the 1960 sit-
ins, some officials answered by embracing the protesters’ legal inter-
pretation.173
While these three accounts offer generalized conceptions of the 
role of disobedience within our democratic political system, they fail 
to take specific account of the peculiar role of property in disobedient 
dissent.  We argue, for reasons that are ultimately different from the 
justifications offered by Dworkin, Markovits, and Cover (though per-
haps closest to Cover’s), that the law should be careful not to protect 
property rights in such a way as to preclude outlaws from productively 
violating existing official legal norms.  We also seek to add a further 
refinement to their justifications by focusing on the unique advan-
170 See id. at 15-19. 
171 Id. at 33. 
172 Id. at 47. 
173 See, e.g., City of Raleigh v. Forbes (Wake County Super. Ct., Apr. 22, 1960), cited 
in 5 CIV. LIBERTY DOCKET 68 (June 1960) (reversing the convictions of forty-three pro-
testers arrested for trespassing on a private stretch of sidewalk outside a shopping cen-
ter); see also Cover, supra note 169, at 47-48. 
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tages that property lawbreaking offers to private citizens who are disen-
franchised from institutionalized structures.  Outlaws play a recurrent 
role in vindicating rights, overcoming inertia, and fostering normative 
diversity within the area of property law.  Moreover, by creating an in-
formal space for actively reevaluating and challenging dominant legal 
interpretations, they help catalyze formal changes when law is based 
on outdated assumptions or has otherwise failed to give due regard to 
the rights or interests of some segment of the community.  In focusing 
on the particular value of lawbreaking for the development of prop-
erty law, however, we do not deny that disobedience can be (and has 
been) used effectively to express political dissent about any number of 
questions. 
Our argument for the special significance of property lawbreaking 
proceeds in four stages:  (1) first, we observe the (subjective and ob-
jective) importance of property in people’s day-to-day lives; (2) next, 
for reasons related to its importance, we argue that property doctrines 
and distributions have a particularly strong tendency toward inertia 
and ossification; (3) somewhat paradoxically, however, despite its ap-
parent stability, violations of property laws are typically seen as less 
culpable than other categories of criminal acts; and (4) because of 
property’s blend of importance, stability, and violability, property law-
breaking acquires a unique communicative power to reimagine our 
relationships with the material world and with each other, and to pro-
vide an informal forum for the airing of conflicts over resources be-
tween owners and nonowners, which the law can eventually shift to 
accommodate. 
A.  Important Role of Property in People’s Lives 
Tangible and intangible property laws play a vitally important role 
in shaping people’s lives.  Hegelian theorists, such as Margaret Jane 
Radin, have thoughtfully elaborated theories asserting that property 
ownership is uniquely essential to the construction of personal iden-
tity.174  The control we enjoy over our property develops our capacity 
to act as autonomous beings.175  Moreover, our public exhibition of 
174 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 
(1982) (arguing that “to achieve proper self-development . . . an individual needs some 
control over resources in the external environment”). 
175 See id. at 972-73. 
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such control permits us to communicate that autonomy to our fellow 
citizens.176
One need not fully embrace Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, or go as 
far as Radin in asserting a connection between property and personal 
identity, to appreciate the unique value of property in the construc-
tion and experience of our social reality.  Ownership of land and the 
structures attached to land provide the spaces and places in which we 
carry out our social existence and clarify the divisions of labor, re-
sponsibility, and authority necessary for the very conduct of human 
society.  Accordingly, property rights and the social norms that ac-
company (and are often reinforced by) property ownership play an 
important role in ordering our interactions with other human beings.  
As Nicholas Blomley has put it, “[t]he environment of the everyday 
is . . . propertied, divided into both thine and mine and more gener-
ally into public and private domains, all of which depend upon and 
presuppose the internalization of subtle and diverse property rules 
that enjoin comportment, movement, and action.”177
Crucially, this importance of property for human beings points in 
several directions at once.  On the one hand, it suggests a need to 
forcefully protect existing property entitlements.178  On the other 
hand, the centrality of property to the satisfaction of fundamental 
human needs in turn creates a strong impetus for those excluded 
from participation in the system of ownership to challenge both exist-
ing property rules and established property entitlements.179
For example, those who are utterly excluded from access to the 
social benefits of private ownership, such as the very poor and the 
homeless, find themselves extraordinarily isolated from much of the 
social and commercial activity that most of us take for granted.180  This 
176 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 353-57, 372-75 (1988) 
(discussing “Hegel’s thesis . . . that by appropriating, owning, and controlling objects, a 
person can establish his will as an objective feature of the world”); Peter G. Stillman, 
Property, Freedom, and Individuality in Hegel’s and Marx’s Political Thought, in NOMOS 
XXII:  PROPERTY, 130, 136-40 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) 
(similar). 
177 Blomley, supra note 9, at 131. 
178 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 174, at 1007-08 (suggesting that courts ought to pro-
tect personal property more forcefully than development rights or commercial plans). 
179 See Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property:  Castles, 
Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 310 (2006) (quoting a 
University of Texas economist as saying that he favored private property so much that 
he “want[ed] everyone . . . to have some”). 
180 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295, 
318 (1991) (arguing that because society makes freedoms dependent on having prop-
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isolation, rooted ultimately in our system of property distribution, can 
cause enormous psychological, and even physical, harm.181  The isolat-
ing and disabling effects of exclusion from participation in a property 
system, however, mean that those on the outside looking in will often 
have few means to communicate their dissent beyond the simple act 
of taking or occupying. 
This duality of stability and conflict is further complicated by the 
simultaneous over- and underinclusiveness of ownership as the crucial 
link between property and identity.  Not all property owners feel the 
same expressive and interactive link between property, ownership, 
and identity, a factor that directly implicates the productive role of the 
lawbreaker in shifting entitlements.182  Vast numbers of property own-
ers (publicly traded corporations and their shareholders, for exam-
ple) feel no essential connection to a great deal of their owned prop-
erties.  Conversely, many nonowners feel strong connections to many 
things they do not own but come into intimate contact with for any 
number of reasons.183  This mismatch underlies the ambiguous role of 
the property outlaw and sets the stage for productive disobedience. 
B.  Property’s Conservatism and Stability 
In part because of its importance, property law is unusually resis-
tant to legal change.  Indeed, central to the ability of the institution of 
property to carry out its functions are the stability and predictability 
that it fosters for both owners and nonowners alike.  As Abraham Bell 
and Gideon Parchomovsky have argued, “the institution of property is 
designed to create and defend the value that inheres in stable owner-
ship.”184  As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have argued, fixed, sta-
erty on which to exercise those freedoms, any ban on public activities has dispropor-
tionate implications for the freedom of the homeless). 
181 See CLAUDE S. FISCHER, TO DWELL AMONG FRIENDS:  PERSONAL NETWORKS IN 
TOWN AND CITY 252-53 (1982); AMITAI ETZIONI, Liberals and Communitarians, in A RE-
SPONSIVE SOCIETY:  COLLECTIVE ESSAYS ON GUIDING DELIBERATE SOCIAL CHANGE 127, 
140 (1991). 
182 See, e.g., George Kateb, The Night Watchman State, 45 AM. SCHOLAR 816, 824-25 
(1976) (reviewing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)) (observing 
that property owners do not have “nerve endings in every dollar of [their] estate[s]”). 
183 Participants in the sit-down strikes in the 1930s at General Motors (and their 
sympathizers) frequently emphasized that, as workers, their interest in the company’s 
property was superior to the property rights of shareholders.  See Robert Morss Lovett, 
A G.M. Stockholder Visits Flint, NATION, Jan. 30, 1937, at 123, 123-24. 
184 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 551 (emphasis added); see also CAROL M. 
ROSE, Seeing Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION:  ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, 
  
1134 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1095 
 
ble property rules provide informational benefits, not just for the 
owner, but for the entire community that orders itself around those 
entitlements.185  In addition, as Radin has observed, stable property 
rights help individuals develop their identities and carry out their life 
plans.186
Almost by definition, then, property law resists changes to its con-
tours for the very reason that change, as such, strikes at what decision 
makers typically view as one of its core traits.  Indeed, American prop-
erty law is full of doctrines whose principal purpose appears to be the 
hindrance of nonconsensual alterations in existing property alloca-
tions and entitlements.  Laws governing contract, fraud, theft, and 
trespass wrap existing property entitlements in a blanket of public and 
private legal protection.  And takings law, particularly the doctrine of 
regulatory takings, has the effect of making it more difficult for the 
government to rearrange or redefine existing property rights.  A regu-
latory taking can be found only when there has been some change in 
property law.187  By requiring compensation for some such changes, 
takings law serves as a check on political property reform, a function 
that has endeared it to libertarians as a legal vehicle for hindering  
activist government. 
Similarly, property doctrine demonstrates a pervasive tendency to 
favor first-in-time property users.  When two litigants have more or 
less equivalent claims, property doctrine almost reflexively favors the 
prior user, appropriator, or occupant.188  Likewise, the conclusion that 
a plaintiff has “come to a nuisance,” although not an iron-clad de-
fense, often makes it harder (or at least more expensive189) for that 
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 267, 272 (1994) (“[D]uration is an important element 
in making a claim property, as opposed to a merely temporary usufruct.”). 
185 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law 
of Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill 
& Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 778-79 
(2001). 
186 Margaret Jane Radin, Speech, The Colin Ruagh Thomas O’Fallon Memorial Lecture 
on Reconsidering Personhood, 74 OR. L. REV. 423, 429-31 (1995). 
187 See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 1-5, 
11-12 (2003); id. at 11 (“Regulatory takings claims are all about change.”). 
188 See, e.g., Ralph W. Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 MICH. L. REV. 
405, 406 (1924) (noting that competing claims are settled on the basis of time, not no-
tice). 
189 See Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706-08 (Ariz. 1972) 
(holding that a developer who came to a nuisance could enjoin the nuisance but had 
to indemnify the property owner). 
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plaintiff to obtain relief.190  Accordingly, the rule has the effect of pro-
viding a qualified grandfather protection for preexisting property 
uses. 
Finally, although not a legal protection, the so-called endowment 
effects and status quo biases described by behavioral economists sug-
gest that people, in general, will be willing to pay more to avoid part-
ing with property in their possession than they will to acquire new 
property.191  Applied to processes for change in property law and dis-
tributions, this insight suggests that, all things being equal, people 
who benefit from existing property regimes will tend to resist changes 
in that regime more forcefully than others will push for their modifi-
cation.  When combined with the obvious advantages that current 
property owners have over nonowners in the political process, en-
dowment effects likely exert a conservative influence that helps to 
make property law resistant to political change.  As a result of these 
mutually reinforcing conservative tendencies, official property doc-
trine is especially unlikely to keep pace with the shifting conditions of 
the society that hosts them. 
C.  Nonviolent Property Crimes as Less Serious  
Than Other Sorts of Crimes 
At the same time that property is considered to be so sacred, so 
revered, within our legal system, it is ironically also considered to be 
less inviolable than other forms of law.  Even those who are conscien-
tiously opposed to violence as a means of political expression are usu-
ally willing to violate property laws in order to draw attention to their 
grievances.192  Like an effigy, property is an effective target of protest 
because of its visible, often physical, identification with the owner or 
the prevailing legal regime.  But, Hegelian hyperbole aside, property 
190 See, e.g., Escobar v. Cont’l Baking Co., 596 N.E.2d 394, 398 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1992) (“‘No one can move into a quarter given over to foundries and boiler shops and 
demand the quiet of a farm.’” (quoting Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 104 N.E. 371, 
373 (Mass. 1914))); Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 638 (N.D. 1992) (“[A]nyone 
who comes to a nuisance ‘has a heavy burden to establish liability.’” (quoting Jerry 
Harmon Motors, Inc. v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass’n, 337 N.W.2d 427, 432 
(N.D. 1983))); see also W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 88, at 630 (5th ed. 1984) (listing the priority of the alleged nuisance as a fac-
tor to be considered in determining whether the use is in fact a nuisance). 
191 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326 (1990). 
192 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 165, at 24 (describing the traditional opposition of 
theorists of civil disobedience to any coercion beyond the violation of trespass laws). 
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is decidedly not the person.  Accordingly, nonviolent violations of 
property rights constitute a broadly acceptable means of communicat-
ing strong moral disapproval.  The sit-in and the picket are therefore 
favorite tools of those seeking nonviolently to change the behavior of 
the property owner. 
Perhaps for similar reasons, the hierarchy of values placing bodily 
injury over harm to property forms the basis for the Model Penal Code’s 
treatment of the doctrine of necessity.  As we discuss at length below, 
that doctrine justifies violation of criminal laws undertaken in order 
to avoid greater harms.193  The doctrine therefore raises the crucial 
question how to weigh various categories of harms.  In discussing ne-
cessity, the commentary to the Model Penal Code makes clear that harm 
to persons should always be given more weight than harm to prop-
erty.194  Property might be harmed to avoid death or bodily injury, but 
the opposite should never be permitted. 
Finally, our moral intuitions make us more willing to excuse the 
hungry man who quietly sneaks a loaf of bread from a grocery store 
than someone faced with the same dilemma who satisfies his needs by 
threatening a passerby.  Criminal laws affirm this intuition by treating 
simple theft as less serious than robbery.195  The reason lies in a broad 
consensus that the act of surreptitiously taking someone’s property is 
less blameworthy than doing so in a way that threatens bodily harm.  A 
related intuition may also underlie the common law definition of bur-
glary, which requires that the defendant enter someone’s dwelling at 
night with the intent to commit a felony.196  The twin requirements 
that the invaded structure be a dwelling and that the invasion occur at 
night may reflect efforts to isolate those invasions in which the occu-
pant is probably present, confusion heightened, and bodily injury 
more likely to result.197  In light of the apparent consensus that viola-
tions of property rights are less serious than bodily harm, it is not sur-
prising that nonowners, disregarded by the political process but 
acutely aware of the shortcomings of the dominant legal regime, have 
193 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962); see also infra Part II.C\(2). 
194
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 1; see also Larry Alexander, Lesser Evils:  A Closer 
Look at the Paradigmatic Justification, 24 J.L. & PHIL. 611, 613 (2005). 
195 See Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law:  The Case for a Criminal 
Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1219-26 (1994). 
196 State v. Hudson, 165 A. 649, 650 (R.I. 1933). 
197 See Joshua Getzler, Use of Force in Protecting Property, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
131, 143 (2005) (“Night-time intruders can more likely expect to confront the inhabi-
tants, and a prepared and watchful intruder might easily prevail against sleepy and sur-
prised dwellers.”). 
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frequently perceived property disobedience to represent an accept-
able means for altering the status quo. 
We are under no illusions that property outlaws will always pursue 
ends that we consider good or worthy.  Intentional lawbreaking has 
been used in the defense of oppression and discrimination just as it 
has been used to foster liberation and equality.  The nature of prop-
erty lawbreaking suggests that it will be used by nonowners more than 
owners and by those isolated from the majoritarian process more than 
by those well connected to the levers of power.198  But this does not 
guarantee that it will be directed toward progressive ends.  Nine-
teenth-century squatters, for example, frequently dispossessed Native 
Americans of their land even as they clamored for recognition of their 
own informal property rights.199  Similarly, racist property owners con-
tinue to break the law and exclude people from their public accom-
modations on the basis of race,200 just as the civil rights protesters dis-
sented from the pre-Title II status quo by forcing themselves onto 
segregationist property, in violation of trespass laws recognizing in 
owners an unqualified right to exclude.  While our own political pro-
clivities lead us to view civil rights lawbreaking more sympathetically 
than segregationist lawbreaking, we believe that both lawbreakers 
qualify as “property outlaws.”  We intend our discussion to encompass 
both actors whose ends we share and those whose ends we find repre-
hensible.  It is likely the case, however, that the legal responses we dis-
cuss in Part III will have different impacts on different sorts of prop-
erty outlaws, based on differences in the objective circumstances and 
aims of the outlaws and in the democratic response to their activities. 
D.  The Communicative Abilities of Property Lawbreaking 
Property’s combination of importance, rigidity, and violability 
gives property lawbreaking a unique communicative power.  Prop-
erty’s importance and rigidity mean that property law will often fall 
out of step with the values of the community it serves.  But, paradoxi-
cally, its simultaneous importance and violability will also combine to 
198 Of course, owners sometimes also engage in outlaw tactics.  See, e.g., Rapanos v. 
United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2214 (2006) (deciding a case in which a property owner 
backfilled his wetlands, allegedly in violation of federal law). 
199 See, e.g., STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND:  LAW AND 
POWER ON THE FRONTIER 242 (2005) (discussing the encroachment on Navajo prop-
erty by white trespassers). 
200 See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger:  The Discourse of Fingerprinting 
as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 127-28 (1987). 
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encourage dissidents to resort to lawbreaking to register their strong 
dissent. 
The power of this dissent takes two forms.  First, the willingness to 
break the law signals the intensity of the dissenting position.  As Cover 
put it: 
The community that disobeys the criminal law upon the authority of its 
own constitutional interpretation . . . forces the judge to choose between 
affirming his interpretation of the official law through violence against 
the protesters and permitting the polynomia of legal meaning to extend 
to the domain of social practice and control.  The judge’s commitment 
is tested as he is asked what he intends to be the meaning of his law and 
whether his hand will be part of the bridge that links the official vi-
sion . . . with the reality of people in jail.
201
Cover’s observation, however, conflates the intensity signaled by a will-
ingness to endure (or mete out) criminal punishment with a second, 
deeper source of lawbreaking’s communicative power. 
The intensity of the dissent communicated by the lawbreaker (or 
the commitment signaled by the law enforcer) is, of course, commu-
nicated whether the protester objects to the very law being broken or 
to some other law.  But if dissident legal interpretations are to per-
form the role of exposing unjust, inefficient, or outdated legal norms, 
they must sometimes be acted out in practice and not merely be the 
subject of abstract discussion, even discussion that is powerfully ac-
companied by the exclamation mark of lawbreaking.  As one observer 
noted during the 1960 sit-ins, “[n]o argument in a court of law could 
have dramatized the immorality and irrationality of [segregated lunch 
counters] as did the sit-ins.”202
There is a difference between talking about something and being 
confronted with an actual example of it.  In a different context, John 
Hart Ely, quoting Alexander Bickel, hinted at the common-sense epis-
temological reasons for this difference between mere discussion and 
actual confrontation: 
[T]here are reasons for supposing that our moral sensors function best 
under the pressure of experience.  Most of us did not fully wake up to 
the immorality of the war in Vietnam until we were shown pictures of 
Vietnamese children being scalded by American napalm. . . . “The effect 
[of watching vicious white supremacists spewing racist epithets at black 
201 Cover, supra note 169, at 47-48. 
202 CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM:  THE ORGANIZING TRA-
DITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE 78 (1995) (internal quotation marks 
and footnote omitted). 
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children] must have been something like what used to happen to indi-
viduals (the young Lincoln among them), at the sight of an actual slave 
auction . . . .”
203
Property law deals with tangible (and intangible) realms that 
touch on basic necessities and entitlements.  In breaking those laws, 
outlaws are able to offer us a concrete vision of their alternative con-
ception of the law.  The property outlaw therefore provides the offi-
cial decision maker with actual, rather than hypothetical, circum-
stances under which to evaluate the degree of her commitment to the 
status quo.  Discussions about dissenting legal interpretations, even 
those backed by the forceful message of civil disobedience, leave 
much to the imagination.  The relative violability of property laws 
means that property outlaws can sometimes actually live out their al-
ternative conception of property relations by violating the law in the 
very way they would like to see it changed.  Their actions can reverse 
the operation of the status quo bias and force officials and members 
of the public to confront an actual instance (as opposed to an abstract 
concept).  Both of these effects give them an exceptional ability to 
push those in power toward a different conclusion than might have 
been expected based on the political currents that prevailed before 
they acted.204
The importance of being able to conjure an alternative vision of 
legal possibility through the violation of property laws should not be 
understated.  It can be all too simple to reject or judge an abstraction.  
But our generalized ethical commitments are often incomplete or in-
determinate.  They may well be poor predictors of our actual moral 
judgments when confronted with specific instances of dissenting legal 
interpretations being lived out in their full human richness.205
Thus, whites in the 1960s South, who might have expressed oppo-
sition when abstractly questioned in advance about integrated lunch 
203 John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-—Forward:  On Discovering Funda-
mental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 35 (1978) (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH 267 (1962)). 
204 In many ways, then, property outlaw behavior is the private law analog to what 
Heather Gerken has, in the public law context, called “dissenting by deciding.”  
Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1754-59 (2005).  In 
both cases, the acting out of legal dissent provides decision makers with an especially 
vivid understanding of the alternative legal conception that the dissenter is inviting her 
to embrace. 
205 Cf. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS:  LUCK AND ETHICS IN 
GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 300-01 (1986) (“Principles . . . fail to capture the fine 
detail of the concrete particular, which is the subject matter of ethical choice.”). 
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counters, sometimes reacted to the student sit-ins in ways that were 
unexpected, perhaps even to themselves.  For example, in response to 
her observation of black students being turned away from a lunch 
counter in Raleigh, one “elderly white woman of the old school” said:  
“They have no business refusing such nice, polite young people.”206  
Even the segregationist Richmond News Leader found its preconceived 
notions of black and white challenged by the sit-in protesters.  It gave 
the following account of one of the sit-ins: 
 Here were the colored students, in coats, white shirts, ties, and one of them 
was reading Goethe and one was taking notes from a biology text.  And here, 
on the sidewalk outside, was a gang of white boys come to heckle, a ragtail 
rabble, slack-jawed, black-jacketed, grinning fit to kill, and some of them, God 
save the mark, were waving the proud and honored flag of the Southern 
States in the last war fought by gentlemen.  Eheu!  It gives one pause.207
The concrete living out of an alternative legal conception by 
property outlaws can undermine opposition to reform that may be 
based on irrational prejudice and untested presuppositions.  At the 
outset of the sit-in protests in the South, the Wall Street Journal editorial 
page warned its readers of the evils of civil rights legislation that would 
go beyond the recognition of equal public rights and seek “to compel 
immediate social integration.”208  The proposed legislation, it pre-
dicted, “is doomed to failure. . . . Such enforced togetherness amounts 
to regimentation, an invasion of individual rights.”209  It was not until 
black southerners simply took for themselves the right to sit at the 
same lunch counters as whites, forcing togetherness in the absence of 
legal protection (indeed, in direct opposition to the owners’ legal 
right to exclude), that the segregationists’ predictions of doom began 
to be debunked.  In over one hundred cities across the South, lunch 
counters were desegregated in response to the sit-ins, three years prior 
to the passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act, in many cases without 
the violent white reaction predicted by naysayers at the Wall Street 
Journal and elsewhere.  The success of that experience likely helped 
smooth the path for the passage of Title II and undermined argu-
ments that “enforced togetherness” was doomed to failure. 
206 WOLFF, supra note 90, at 152. 
207 James Kilpatrick, RICHMOND DAILY NEWS, Feb. 22, 1960. 
208 Some Racial Facts and Fallacies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1960, at 8. 
209 Id. 
  
2007] PROPERTY OUTLAWS 1141 
 
III.  RESPONDING TO PROPERTY OUTLAWS 
Until now, we have focused on the productive role of the law-
breaker in catalyzing evolution within property law.  At this point, we 
would like to expand our discussion of the outlaw to focus on her oc-
cupation of the important intersection between property law and 
criminal law.  Inasmuch as the property lawbreaker plays an integral 
part in forcing the evolution of property law, she also faces a substan-
tial risk of punishment, the default state response to intentional law-
breakers.  Given the important position that outlaws have occupied in 
the evolution of property law, however, we believe that it is essential 
for the law to retain a certain flexibility in its response to them.  Al-
though our focus in this discussion is on criminal enforcement of 
property law, the same general observations would appear to apply to 
noncriminal enforcement through sanctions such as punitive damages 
and fines.  Many of the prescriptive insights gleaned from a close 
analysis of criminal law translate to the civil context as well by encour-
aging the law to separate the productive from the unproductive ele-
ments of lawbreaking. 
For the purposes of our analysis, we will accept the common char-
acterization of the dominant theories of punishment as either broadly 
deterrent or retributive.210  By the former, we mean theories that are 
utilitarian in their orientation and that view the purpose of punish-
ment as yielding optimal levels of criminality by creating disincentives 
that self-interested potential criminals will take into account in decid-
ing whether the possible rewards of a criminal act outweigh the risk of 
punishment.211  By the latter, we refer to theories that identify the 
purpose of punishment as rooted in moral theories about culpability 
and just desert.212  While we decidedly do not intend to take sides as 
between these two approaches, our description of the appropriate le-
gal response to property outlaws must vary depending on which the-
ory one prefers.  Our argument is premised on the general notion 
that certain categories of property outlaws are less culpable (or, in de-
terrent terms, create less social harm, or perhaps even create some so-
cial benefits) than ordinary criminals.  Accordingly, we analyze a vari-
210 See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 591, 594 (1996). 
211 See id. at 602; see also Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Re-
morse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 105 (2004). 
212 See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 211, at 107; Kahan, supra note 210, at 601-
02. 
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ety of ways in which both deterrent and retributive theories of pun-
ishment can (and at times actually do) take into account the produc-
tive aspects of lawbreaking in order to preserve the inherent dyna-
mism that lawbreaking introduces within property law.213
A.  Property Outlaws in Deterrent and Retributive Perspectives 
1.  Deterrent Theories of Punishment 
In the classic view, the ultimate goal of deterrent punishment 
ought to be something very close to zero incidence of the proscribed 
criminal behavior.214  Some contemporary theorists have suggested a 
similar goal, at least as an (admittedly impossibly expensive) ideal.215  
Most recent utilitarian discussions, however, have abandoned the goal 
of zero crime in favor of punishment that seeks to achieve an “opti-
mal” level of crime by forcing criminals to internalize the social costs 
of crime, including both the harm to victims and the costs of law en-
forcement.216  These approaches treat the question of punishing crime 
as “a generalization of the economist’s analysis of external harm or 
diseconomies.”217 Typically, the process of calculating the optimal 
level of utilitarian punishment is described as one involving some 
variation on a mathematical calculation linking, among other things, 
213 This risk is present whether one adopts a more formalist approach in which the 
outlaw is viewed as having broken an existing legal rule, with the law sometimes chang-
ing in response, or a more pluralist approach in which, as Cover might have said, the 
outlaw (or perhaps, for the pluralist, the “alt-law”), merely insists upon her own inter-
pretation of the extant law, which the organs of official legal interpretation sometimes 
adopt as their own.  Within the formalist framework, we would describe the law as hav-
ing adopted a new rule in response to the outlaw’s defiance of the old one.  Within a 
pluralist framework, we would describe the alt-law as having provided the occasion for 
official clarification of an ambiguous legal norm.  In both cases, however, the out-
law/alt-law faces the same risk of punishment should she find herself on the losing side 
of the argument.  Accordingly, whether styled as outlaw or alt-law conduct, our point 
about the need for flexibility in the (official) law’s response remains the same. 
214 See Keith N. Hylton, Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution, 27 RAND J. 
ECON. 197, 198 (1996). 
215 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Crimes, Kickers, and Transaction Structures, in NOMOS 
XXVII,  supra note 176 at 314 (“It would be nice if we could impose sanctions on crimi-
nal mischief such that the actor’s expected marginal cost of engaging in criminality 
was set equal to his expected marginal gain so that each criminal would have no good 
reason for preferring criminal activity to a non-criminal alternative.”). 
216 See Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII, supra 
note 176 at 292-93. 
217 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 201 (1968). 
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the likelihood that a criminal will be caught with an aggregation of 
the harm to victims and enforcement costs generated by the sort of 
criminality in which she is engaged.218
Our argument is that these calculations, whether framed in terms 
of general or specific deterrence, fail to consider or recognize the 
productive informational and redistributive potential of some kinds of 
legal transgression in spurring property law’s evolution.  By overlook-
ing this potentially useful function, deterrent models of punishment 
are likely to call for levels of punishment that overdiscourage or pre-
clude certain forms of lawlessness without recognizing that some ele-
ments of property lawbreaking may be more socially productive than 
others.  Further, the general tendency of criminal law to overdeter 
property crimes is exacerbated when the technology of property law 
enforcement dramatically improves.  Under such circumstances, levels 
of punishment that may have been appropriate at a time when the ac-
tivity in question was relatively difficult to detect are especially likely to 
prove excessive. 
What is the value of property lawbreaking that deterrent theorists 
have overlooked?  Two categories are particularly significant.  First, 
there may in certain situations be value in the outlaw’s directly redis-
tributive conduct.  We refer to this broad category of utility gains as 
“redistributive value.”  As scholars have observed, property law con-
tains several doctrines that permit forced transfers under certain cir-
cumscribed conditions where they are especially likely to be effi-
cient.219 Second, in cases of persistent, widespread lawbreaking, 
citizen behavior communicates vital information to the state, indicat-
ing that some element of a property law may be out of date or unjust 
in some respect that the political process has ignored.  We refer to this 
signaling function provided by outlaw conduct as its “informational 
value.”  The information generated by outlaw conduct can, under the 
right circumstances, convince the state to reevaluate its commitment 
to an unjust status quo. 
218 See id. at 201; Hylton, supra note 214, at 198-99; A. Mitchell Polinksy & Steven 
Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. 
REV. 880, 880 (1979). 
219 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM 98-100 (2003) (explain-
ing the private necessity doctrine); Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass:  The Case for 
“Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2006) (arguing that ad-
verse possession should be understood as a “doctrine of efficient trespass”). 
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2.  Retributive Theories of Punishment 
In contrast to the forward-looking utilitarian approach, the re-
tributive position centers not on the consequences of outlaw conduct 
but rather on the punishment the offender deserves in light of the 
moral character of his conduct.220  As Michael S. Moore has put it, 
“[r]etributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral 
culpability of those who receive it.  A retributivist punishes because, 
and only because, the offender deserves it.”221  From a broadly retribu-
tive point of view, the argument that certain categories of property 
outlaws should be tolerated (or subject to reduced sanctions) by the 
state relies on two intuitions:  first, that as a general matter, those who 
nonviolently break property laws are less morally culpable than other 
types of lawbreakers; and second, that the violation of outdated laws 
or of laws that perpetuate unjust distributions of property is less 
blameworthy than other criminal acts and may even at times be justi-
fied.  The first intuition is already embodied, albeit incompletely, in 
the criminal law, which tends to treat crimes against persons as much 
more serious than similar crimes against property.222  The second in-
tuition, which is similarly appealing, has not been as robustly incorpo-
rated into existing law. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that retributive theorists would 
be far more interested in the (re)distributive justice of property out-
law behavior than in its information value.  After all, the notion of in-
formational value resonates more strongly with the consequentialist 
focus of deterrence theorists.  Nevertheless, as we argue below, assum-
ing a degree of punitive indeterminacy within retributive systems of 
punishment, the informational value generated by property outlaws 
can be relevant within retributive theories as well. 
220 The “retributive” category obviously includes an enormous diversity of ap-
proaches to criminal punishment.  For our limited purposes, we intend the category to 
refer broadly to all nonutilitarian approaches. 
221 Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARAC-
TER, AND THE EMOTIONS:  NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 (Ferdinand 
Schoeman ed., 1987). 
222 See supra Part I.C. 
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B.  The Types of Outlaws Revisited 
1.  Acquisitive Outlaws 
a.  Acquisitive Outlaws in Deterrent Perspective 
In the forward-looking prism of deterrence, the law is rightfully re-
luctant to incentivize disorder by loosening the punitive sanctions as-
sociated with property lawbreaking.  In the absence of high transac-
tion costs, utilitarians generally regard encroachments on property 
rights as socially wasteful rent seeking.  Indeed, this analysis forms the 
principal basis for the most common utilitarian arguments against 
theft.223  Nevertheless, the case for involuntary transfers of property 
can be quite strong when there is reason to believe that the law-
breaker places a higher value on the property in question than the 
true owner and there is some obstacle to a consensual transfer be-
tween the parties.  People who have nothing (or very little) will have 
limited means to express in market transactions the value they place 
on shifts in entitlements.224  Consequently, involuntary transfers may 
be one of the few options available to them.  The difficulty lies in 
identifying situations where the lawbreaker truly does value the prop-
erty more than the owner and in which the long-run effects of permit-
ting occasional violations of the default rule against involuntary dis-
possession will not swamp the benefits created by permitting the 
transaction.225
Adverse possession law provides a useful illustration of this tension 
at work.  In that context, the lawbreaker’s long-term use (and im-
provement) of the property, combined with her risk of civil and 
criminal sanctions, will in many cases constitute strong prima facie 
evidence that she places an exceptionally high value on the prop-
223 See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. 
ECON. J. 224, 231 (1967) (“The theft itself is a pure transfer, and has no welfare cost, 
but the existence of theft as a potential activity results in very substantial diversion of 
resources to fields where they essentially offset each other, and produce no positive 
product.”); see also Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In:  Economists and Benefits from Crime, 13 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 225, 227-28 (1993) (explaining and expanding upon Tullock’s 
argument). 
224 See Stewart Schwab, Coase Defends Coase:  Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do 
Not, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1178-79 (1989) (reviewing RONALD COASE, THE FIRM THE 
MARKET AND THE LAW (1988), and discussing wealth effects). 
225 See Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case 
Against Theft, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON., 364, 370 (1997). 
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erty.226  When these factors are coupled, as adverse possession re-
quires, with a lackadaisical response by the true owner, the law 
achieves a high degree of confidence that the possessor values the 
property more than its absentee owner.  The relative ease with which 
property owners can protect their rights and the heavy burdens placed 
on adverse possessors diminish the ancillary costs of creating such a 
mechanism for forced transfers. 
But situations in which the rigorous requirements for adverse pos-
session are met are not the only circumstances where the law might be 
justified in inferring that the lawbreaker places a higher value on 
property than its true owner does and in which the ancillary effects of 
recognizing the lawbreaker’s claim fail to tip the balance.  Traditional 
adverse possession law gains confidence from the failure of the true 
owner to step forward and enforce her property rights, thereby indi-
cating that she places abnormally low value on the property.  Compa-
rable confidence may arise, however, when there is good reason to 
think that the nonowning claimant values the property at an abnor-
mally high level in the absence of any countervailing evidence that the 
true owner places similarly exceptional value on the property.  This 
might occur, for example, when the distribution of property rights is 
extremely skewed, the true owner is very wealthy, the acquisitive out-
law is very poor, and the presence of other conditions, like survival or 
a broader conception of necessity, weigh in favor of a legal reevalu-
ation of entitlements.  On a cold night, at least as a purely subjective 
matter, the homeless man almost certainly values the sheltered en-
trance to a large shopping center more highly than even the most at-
tentive owners value their right to exclude him.  He simply cannot 
communicate his preference in a way intelligible within a system of 
monetary valuation and consensual transactions.  Under these and 
similar circumstances, utilitarian considerations would seem, as a 
prima facie matter, to call for the law to at least temporarily accom-
modate itself to the demands of the nonowner. 
Apart from the direct redistributive value that results from certain 
involuntary transfers, pervasive and persistent acquisitive outlaw con-
duct can generate important and valuable information about the exis-
tence of possibly inefficient legal allocations of property rights.  Con-
centrations of lawbreakers clustered around discrete legal 
entitlements might suggest that transaction costs or wealth effects are 
standing in the way of what would otherwise be an efficient transfer of 
226 See Fennell, supra note 219, at 1040. 
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rights.  In England, for example, it was common in the twentieth cen-
tury for outdoors enthusiasts to trespass on private land as they “ram-
bled” over the countryside.  Such acquisitive outlaw conduct went on 
for decades, sometimes accompanied by expressive (or intersectional) 
forms of disobedience, until it caught the attention of the Labour 
Party, which ultimately responded by altering the nature of landown-
ers’ rights to exclude ramblers from “open” rural lands that did not 
implicate concerns for privacy.227  Particularly when their conduct is 
pervasive and protracted, acquisitive outlaw behavior generates an in-
formational value above and beyond any redistributive value it may 
have.  This informational value, however, has been largely disregarded 
in utilitarian discussions of nonconsensual transfers. 
Of course, in the case of acquisitive outlaws, the quality of that in-
formation is undermined by the self-interested nature of the outlaw’s 
behavior.  In the context of market transactions, an offer to give some-
thing up in order to consummate the purchase gives us fairly reliable 
information about the value the acquiring party places on a shift in 
legal rights, though this information is distorted by wealth effects.228  
In the case of a forced transfer, however, we cannot tell from the out-
law’s conduct the extent to which she values a shift in entitlements, 
whether for the limited purpose of the specific transaction in question 
or more broadly through systematic legal change.  The truth of two 
(at least) plausible assumptions, however, would reinforce the infor-
mational value of persistent, widespread outlaw conduct.  First, in a 
well-functioning society, it is likely that most citizens possess an intrin-
sic willingness to obey the law, a willingness that is particularly pro-
nounced when the law faithfully reflects broadly shared values.229  And 
227 For a detailed discussion of the history of the British “right to roam” move-
ment, see generally MARION SHOARD, A RIGHT TO ROAM (1999), and STEPHENSON, su-
pra note 2. 
228 Ronald Dworkin highlights the problems posed by this measure of value when 
he poses the hypothetical of a “poor, sick man [who] needs medicine and is therefore 
willing to sell a favored book, his sole source of pleasure, for the $5 the medicine costs.  
His neighbor is willing to pay $10 to have the book . . . because he is the famous (and 
rich) grandson of the author, and if he autographs the book he can sell it for $11.”  
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 286-87 (1986). 
229 See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION:  TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 58-
63, 77 (1988) (arguing that the public choice school fails because its model does not 
adequately account for internalized values and moral commitments); TOM R. TYLER, 
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 65 (1990) (“People clearly have a strong predisposition 
toward following the law.”); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE:  
THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 97 (1973) (“[T]he bulk of the population . . . 
have introjected the moral norms of their society [and] cannot commit crimes because 
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this seems true irrespective of the private gains citizens might derive 
from breaking the law, particularly when they perceive that the law is 
fair and is widely obeyed by their fellows.230  This assumption is not 
meant to deny the reality that some people may actually resemble the 
Holmesian “bad man.”  For these, cold considerations of deterrence 
will be paramount.231  Barring a widespread breakdown in the social 
order, however, most people will opt for market mechanisms of ac-
quiring property and widespread lawlessness will convey important in-
formation.  Second, consistent with the findings of behavioral econo-
mists, most people are less eager to pursue someone else’s property 
than they are to keep something they already possess.232
The combination of these two factors suggests that, as an initial 
matter, the behavioral balance is tipped in favor of departing from ex-
their self-concepts will not permit them to do so.”) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotations omitted); Ronet Bachman et al., The Rationality of Sexual Offending:  Testing a 
Deterrence/Rational Choice Conception of Sexual Assault, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 343, 367 
(1992) (“We found that when the male’s behavior in the scenario was thought to be 
morally wrong, our respondents were unaffected by instrumental concerns of 
cost/benefit.”); Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to 
Morality:  Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 579 
(1996) (“[M]oral rules narrow the range of behavioral preferences by prescribing 
some as sacred. . . . When moral obligations weaken, compliance is based on perceived 
incentives and costs.”); Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of Criminal Deterrence, 41 
AM. SOC. REV. 442, 455 (1976) (“‘Strongly socialized’ individuals . . . are less likely to 
engage in all types of offenses than individuals who are less morally committed. . . . 
[T]he threat of punishment is a more important factor in preventing the individual 
who is less morally committed from becoming involved in serious criminal activities 
than in preventing those who are more morally committed from becoming so involved, 
since the latter are not inclined to become seriously involved anyhow.”); Bradley R.E. 
Wright et al., Does the Perceived Risk of Punishment Deter Criminally Prone Individuals?  Ra-
tional Choice, Self-Control, and Crime, 41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 180, 184 (2004) 
(“A restaurant owner can sell more prime rib by lowering its price, but not to vegetar-
ian patrons.”).  The empirical evidence in support of this particular view of the effect 
of criminal deterrence is, as with virtually every other theory of criminal deterrence, 
unsettled.  See Wright et al., supra, at 189 (“It is clear that the position of classical deter-
rence theory that criminal motivation is constant is untenable, yet the exact causal sig-
nificance of motivation still is not clear.”).  Nevertheless, our view is at least a plausible 
one.  See id. at 205-06 (acknowledging that the authors’ research is consistent with re-
search showing that the deterrent effect of threats is irrelevant when moral beliefs are 
strong). 
230 See TYLER, supra note 229, at 22; Kahan, supra note 210, at 603-04 (discussing 
the ways in which criminal law affects preferences for obedience to the law). 
231 See Wright et al., supra note 229, at 205-06 (“[V]iewing criminal behavior as 
costly and risky most deterred study members low in self-control and high in self-
perceived criminality.  In fact, at sufficiently low levels of criminal propensity, these 
threatened punishments may have no deterrent effect at all.”). 
232 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
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isting allocations of property only through legal, market-based trans-
actions.  That bias in turn suggests that when large numbers of people 
persistently engage in illegal actions aimed at shifting property enti-
tlements away from the status quo, they are likely to be acting in re-
sponse to fairly powerful incentives or objections.  Widespread failure 
to resort to the market within a particular subgroup, or an intentional 
and coordinated strategy to shun the market, will therefore often sug-
gest some sort of market failure or widely perceived injustice.233
None of this discussion is meant to suggest that we are unmindful 
of the potential costs involved.  As rule utilitarians have frequently 
pointed out, any government decision to permit violations of general 
laws against forced transfers risks creating negative spillover effects 
that could easily swamp out any short-term gains achieved by a specific 
forced redistribution.  The long-term negative side effects of permit-
ting the activities of individual acquisitive outlaws could take several 
forms:  first, permitting outlaws to either temporarily or permanently 
retain the property they seize might well encourage property owners 
to resort to violence to protect their property from the poor or to re-
duce productive investment in their property out of fear of losing it;234 
second, tolerating forced acquisitions in one case might erode the 
general deterrent effect of the criminal law and encourage further ac-
quisitive behavior in broadly analogous situations by opportunists with 
less compelling claims than the original lawbreakers;235 and, third, 
permitting lawbreakers to profit from their actions could more gener-
ally undermine respect for the rule of law.236
233 Tom Tyler has argued in a similar vein that willingness to break the law corre-
lates strongly with views about the justice of society’s distribution of wealth as well as 
views about legal legitimacy.  TYLER, supra note 229, at 96, 107-08. 
234 In part, this failure to invest might result from something analogous to the 
“demoralization” that Frank Michelman famously identified as one of the likely conse-
quences of uncompensated government takings.  See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Util-
ity, and Fairness:  Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).  In part, however, it might also result from genuine 
uncertainty about the contours of property rights within a regime that would ratify the 
actions of acquisitive outlaws.  See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Prop-
erty, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 69, 88-91 (2005). 
235 See Southwark v. Williams, 2 All E.R. 175, 179 (A.C. 1971) (arguing that permit-
ting forced transfers based on claims of need would lead to claims by “others who 
would imagine that they [are] in need” or who “would invent a need” in an attempt to 
fit themselves within the rule). 
236 Id. at 180 (arguing that “in the interest of law and order itself,” courts must 
adopt a narrow interpretation of the necessity doctrine). 
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Of particular concern is the possibility that, over the long run, the 
general deterrent effects of permitting certain forced transfers will 
generate harmful feedback effects that actually magnify the harm 
caused by the illegal act, repercussions that would minimize the possi-
bility that ratifying the forced transfer could be utility maximizing.  
For example, numerous adherents to the “Broken Windows” theory of 
criminal behavior have repeatedly hypothesized about the crime-
amplifying effects of visible disorder.237  Permitting some forced trans-
fers might conceivably contribute to such a feedback process, espe-
cially if the forced transfers were concentrated around neighborhoods 
already suffering from the effects of pervasive disorder. 
Although these effects raise serious concerns and should not be 
treated lightly, none of them rules out in advance the possibility that if 
the utility gain from a forced transfer is great enough for a large 
enough number of people, legalizing certain categories of forced 
transfers, temporarily or permanently, can be a desirable solution.  As 
Frank Michelman has observed, the nature and extent of owners’ be-
havioral responses to “forced sharing” raise difficult empirical ques-
tions that cannot be determined a priori through abstract model-
ing.238  In other words, in cases of extreme want, it is possible that 
237 The Broken Windows thesis was first raised in James Q. Wilson & George L. 
Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29 ( “[I]f a window in a 
building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be bro-
ken. . . . [O]ne unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so break-
ing more windows costs nothing.”).  The body of literature supporting the thesis is 
large, rapidly growing, and somewhat controversial.  See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DIS-
ORDER AND DECLINE 9-14 (1990) (discussing how crime can be caused by disorder); 
Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces:  Of Panhandlers, Skid 
Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171, 1182 (1996) (arguing that pub-
lic crime and public begging will lead to disorder through additional crime); Nicole 
Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1083 (2005) (arguing that elimi-
nating disorder will curb crime as people see others behave lawfully); Dan M. Kahan, 
Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 394 (1997) (conclud-
ing that a major factor in a person’s decision to commit a crime is whether other peo-
ple are committing crimes).  But see Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Win-
dows:  New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
271, 314-16 (2006) (concluding, after empirical analysis, that increased police atten-
tion to eliminate disorder and misdemeanor violations does not reduce crime); Ber-
nard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject:  A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of 
Deterrence, the Broken Window Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 291, 386-89 (1998) (stating that the Broken Windows policy in New York 
has not played a significant role in reducing crime rates). 
238 Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV, 
supra note 176 at 26-27; see also Smith, supra note 234, at 89 (“Ultimately, of course, the 
size of these various effects is an empirical question . . . .”). 
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permitting forced transfers to go forward will enhance utility, even 
over the long run. 
Further, if the pressure for the particular type of forced transfer 
within a community is broad enough, legalizing the transfer may in-
crease order and respect for the rule of law and for property rights by 
bringing the official law into greater conformity with people’s sense of 
justice and fairness.239  For example, among squatting communities in 
the American West, the perception that federal land policy was pat-
ently unfair and unworthy of obedience threatened to undermine 
squatters’ respect for the rule of law more broadly.240  Bringing the law 
of land distribution into conformity with the widely held views of the 
local community—by ratifying squatters’ (illegal) appropriations—
converted a group of outlaws into a group with something at stake in 
protecting the (modified) property system. 
A similar intuition appears to underlie the arguments made by 
Hernando de Soto with respect to the benefits of granting title to 
squatters in Lima, Peru.241  In Peru, where the mass of people are cut 
off from property ownership by their own poverty, residents have fre-
quently resorted to concerted land invasions to occupy underutilized 
land, both public and private.242  As de Soto observes, “people are ca-
pable of violating a system which does not accept them, not so that 
they can live in anarchy but so that they can build a different system 
which respects a minimum of essential rights.”243  De Soto observes 
that 69 of 100 houses built in Lima in 1985 were constructed on 
unlawfully occupied land.244  Under the circumstances de Soto de-
scribes of widespread rejection of the existing distributive order, rati-
fying the conduct of property outlaws—or accommodating them by 
creating a formalized process by which they can accomplish the goal 
of ownership—is ultimately an order-enhancing, not an order-
destroying, strategy. 
239 See TYLER, supra note 229, at 96, 107-08 (noting that fair procedures have a le-
gitimizing effect on legal authorities); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 229, at 220-21 
(noting that the threat of punishment for behavior widely viewed as justified within a 
particular community can lead to an overall deterioration of respect for the rule of 
law). 
240 See GATES, supra note 25, at 235 (stating that, during the 1830s, squatters were 
indirectly encouraged to take more land when the government forgave past squatters). 
241 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH:  THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE 
THIRD WORLD 23-26 (1989). 
242 Id. at 19-22. 
243 Id. at 55. 
244 Id. at 23. 
  
1152 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1095 
 
For the same reason, how others respond to a system of forced 
sharing will depend on the precise means by which that sharing is ac-
complished.  Not all lawbreaking, even of the acquisitive (or intersec-
tional) variety, need contribute to a sense of widespread disorder that 
would undermine broader crime-control efforts.  Unlike broken win-
dows, an act of appropriation may actually contribute to visible order.245  
Squatters in the American West created elaborate (and ordered) sys-
tems of informal law to protect their investments should their legality 
some day be recognized.246  Similarly, de Soto has observed that organ-
ized squatters in Peru often keep meticulous land records indicating 
who “owns” which parcel and take great pains to defend their infor-
mal property rights against owners and “ordinary criminals.”247  The 
highly organized nature of much urban squatting in the United States 
in the 1980s likewise may well have worked to displace the preexisting 
disorder generated by extensive urban abandonment.248  Urban squat-
ters were fixing broken windows, not breaking them.249  It is perhaps 
for this reason that neighborhood residents were typically supportive 
of squatting efforts, notwithstanding their illegality.250
b.  Acquisitive Outlaws in Retributive Perspective 
It is commonplace within theories of civil disobedience to distin-
guish between conscientious disobedients who violate laws with the 
self-conscious purpose of drawing attention to the injustice of the laws 
they oppose and mere criminals motivated by greed or selfishness.  
Dworkin’s theory of civil disobedience, for example, actively privileges 
245 See Kahan, supra note 237, at 369 (emphasizing that it is “visible” disorder that 
undermines community efforts to control crime).  Property owners’ responses to such 
appropriation, however, might well contribute to such visible signs of disorder. 
246 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW:  RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 
25-26 (4th ed. 2006) (quoting JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF 
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 3-5 (1956)). 
247 DE SOTO, supra note 241, at 27-29. 
248 See, e.g., MELE, supra note 124, at 197 (observing that abandoned urban proper-
ties became zones of criminality); Borgos, supra note 133, at 428-29, 433-36 (describing 
neighborhood support for ACORN Housing’s squatting actions, which helped to clean 
up otherwise derelict housing). 
249 A similar story can be told about the Green Guerrillas, 1970s activists who tres-
passed on abandoned, rubble-strewn properties in New York City to create community 
gardens.  See MELE, supra note 124, at 208-10; Liz Christy Community Garden, 
http://www.lizchristygarden.org  (last visited March 23, 2007) (describing the creation 
of one community garden in New York by the Green Guerrillas). 
250 See MELE, supra note 124, at 208 (noting that squatters and homesteaders en-
joyed community support). 
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conscientious lawbreakers (who overlap substantially with our own 
category of expressive lawbreakers) over other types of criminals.251  
Indeed, for him, the principal difference between the most justified 
and least justified forms of civil disobedience turns on the degree of 
intensity with which the disobedient citizen views the law as unjust.252  
Accordingly, on his view of civil disobedience, many of the people we 
have called acquisitive lawbreakers would not fare particularly well.  
Their subjective motivation, while often a mystery, frequently appears 
to be little more than a self-interested desire to acquire property rights 
currently in the hands of others. 
The central message sent by the acquisitive lawbreaker’s actions is 
that another person owns something that she wants (or needs) for 
herself but that she will not (or cannot) purchase in a voluntary trans-
action.  In most cases, this desire for the property of another will be 
unworthy and unjustified, and society correctly responds to the law-
breaker’s behavior by punishing her for her transgression.  But, as we 
have shown, at times external conditions might call into question, or 
at least lead us to soften, our reflexive tendency to penalize the law-
breaker. 
In contrast with Dworkin, we believe that the justification of an act 
of acquisitive lawbreaking can turn on the objective content of the law 
and the facts on which the law itself operates, and not just on the sub-
jective attitude of the lawbreaker herself.  In so doing, we draw on a 
long, though neglected, tradition within western thought.  Early 
Christian thinkers, for example, viewed the failure of the rich to share 
with the poor as tantamount to theft.253  Thomas Aquinas built on this 
tradition, arguing that when a poor person takes what he needs from 
the “superabundance” of another, he is simply taking that to which he 
is already morally entitled and, as a consequence, he does not commit 
the crime of theft.254  Indeed, in the thirteenth century, canon lawyers 
believed that the destitute were permitted to complain to their bishop 
when local elites failed to comply with their duty to share their re-
251 See DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 163, at 108-10; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 206-16 (1977). 
252 DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 163, at 107-08. 
253 See CHARLES AVILA, OWNERSHIP:  EARLY CHRISTIAN TEACHING 55 (1983). 
254 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE II-II, at Q. 66, art. 7, reprinted in 
ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS 187 (William P. Baumgarth & Richard J. Regan eds., 
1988) (“It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and use another’s property in 
a case of extreme need because that which a man takes for the support of his life be-
comes his own property by reason of that need.”). 
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sources with the poor.255  The bishop could then compel the wealthy 
to give alms, using the threat of excommunication if necessary.256  
More recently, Jeremy Waldron has endorsed a redistributive princi-
ple that “[n]obody should be permitted ever to use force to prevent 
another man from satisfying his very basic needs in circumstances 
where there seems to be no other way of satisfying them.”257  And 
within modern criminal law, analogous intuitions appear to underlie 
the justificatory doctrine of necessity, although in practice the doc-
trine has been so hemmed in by qualifications and exceptions as to 
make it virtually inoperative in circumstances of economic need.258
It is important to note that, unlike the dominant theories con-
cerning civil disobedience, the subjective attitude of the acquisitive 
outlaw with respect to the justice of the violated law is not the most 
relevant factor in this analysis.  Calling the lawbreaker’s action an act 
of selfishness, even if true, does not necessarily undermine its justifi-
cation under these necessity inquiries.  Instead, what matters is 
whether, as a question of objective distributive justice, she took what 
she badly needed from the superabundance of another in such a way 
that her actions avoided an even greater evil.  Someone in dire need is 
certainly not justified in taking from someone else in dire need.  The 
outlaw’s subjective view regarding the objective injustice of the exist-
ing property distribution, however, is not the crucial factor.259
There are, obviously, many pragmatic reasons for preferring legis-
lative solutions to distributive problems over the often unreflective 
self-help of the acquisitive outlaw.260  From a retributive point of view, 
these consequences are not an appropriate consideration in answer-
ing the narrow question of the justice of an individual outlaw’s behav-
ior when the legislature has failed to act.  All things being equal, how-
ever, even a nonutilitarian could favor the rectification of the injustice 
that justifies the outlaw’s behavior through the most efficient means 
255 See JEAN PORTER, NATURE AS REASON:  A THOMISTIC THEORY OF THE NATURAL 
LAW 357 (2005). 
256 See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS:  STUDIES ON NATURAL 
RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625, at 69-72 (1997). 
257 JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS:  COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 240-41 
(1993). 
258 See infra notes 318-332 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations on 
the doctrine of necessity). 
259 This is not to say that the lawbreaker’s subjective intent is absolutely irrelevant.  
See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Lesser Evils and Justification:  A Less Close Look, 24 LAW & 
PHIL. 681, 701-04 (2005) (discussing the problem of mistaken necessity). 
 260  See WALDRON, supra note 257, at 243-45. 
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possible.261  Accordingly, even a nonutilitarian can appreciate the in-
formational value generated by acquisitive outlaws, because the in-
formation they generate might point toward previously overlooked 
distributive injustices in need of legislative attention. 
Even assuming the justice of acquisitive actions under the most ex-
treme circumstances of need, the more interesting question is 
whether there is an argument that the category of justified acquisitive 
conduct extends beyond the situation of the person in immediate 
need of sustenance for her physical survival.  We limit ourselves to the 
observation that there are plausible theories of distributive justice that 
would be amenable to permitting some additional room for self-help 
beyond the extreme case of, say, imminent starvation.  In large part, 
the question turns on the breadth of one’s definition of “necessity.”  
Many people would admit the validity of some acquisitive actions in 
order to fulfill basic human needs but then argue for an extremely 
narrow understanding of “need” as encompassing only those items 
necessary to sustain physical survival.262  In an affluent society like 
ours, the number of people who might need to engage in criminal 
violations of property laws in order to stave off imminent physical 
harm attributable to poverty is likely to be very small, though not triv-
ial.263  And in a highly unequal developing world society, the numbers 
will be even larger.264
261 See id. at 244 (“The welfare state is a way of ensuring that no one should ever be 
in such abject need that he would be driven to violate otherwise enforceable rules of 
property.”). 
262 This is apparently also the position of the Catholic Church.  See Catechism of 
the Catholic Church para. 2408, available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ 
catechism/p3s2c2a7.htm#II (last visited March 23, 2007) (stating that it is not a viola-
tion of the Seventh Commandment to steal property in cases of urgent necessity). 
263 A search of public records and news reports for the past decade turns up nearly 
100 reported homeless deaths from exposure, a figure that almost certainly under-
counts the actual number.  See Spreadsheet of Homeless Deaths (on file with authors).  
For newspaper articles describing deaths of homeless persons due to exposure, see 
Juliet V. Casey, Homeless in Las Vegas:  On a Mission of Mercy, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 15, 
2005, at 1B; Greg Garland, Two Homeless Dead After Overnight Exposure, BALT. SUN, Dec. 
4, 2005, at B1; Helping the Helpless, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 7, 2005, at B8; Robert F. 
Moore & Bill Hutchinson, The Killer Chiller, DAILY NEWS (New York), Jan. 19, 2005, at 5; 
Michelle O’Donnell & Anahad O’Connor, Wind and Cold Are Blamed in Three Deaths, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, at B1; Paul Rubin, Crying Shame, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Oct. 6, 
2005, available at http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/Issues/2005-10-06/news/ 
feature_print.html; Annie Sweeney, Lightning Strikes Thrice as Weather Gets Weird, CHI-
CAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at 8; Pamela White, Ominous Forecast:  Rising Homeless-
ness, Falling Temps, and Looming Deaths, BOULDER WEEKLY, available at http:// 
www.boulderweekly.com/archive/11290/controversy.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
264 See, e.g., DE SOTO, supra note 241, at 19-22. 
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But many theorists have argued for a broader understanding of 
needs.  Thinkers as diverse as Aristotle,265 Adam Smith,266 John Ryan,267 
and, more recently, Amartya Sen268 have, for example, agreed that the 
category of human needs extends well beyond the basket of goods 
necessary to stave off starvation and exposure.  In particular, they have 
focused on the intuition that, as social animals, human beings’ legiti-
mate “needs” include the property necessary to facilitate a minimally 
acceptable degree of participation in the social life of their respective 
communities.269  Given the differences in material circumstances of 
various communities and, accordingly, the different material precon-
ditions for effective social participation, this understanding of neces-
sity is likely to yield different concrete definitions of need for differ-
ently situated societies.270
As Smith put it in his Wealth of Nations, the category of “neces-
saries” includes “whatever the custom of the country renders it inde-
cent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without.”271  
Smith gives the example of leather shoes, a commodity that might be 
viewed as a luxury or perhaps as an eccentricity in other cultures, but 
that was a minimum requirement for even the most basic level of so-
cial respectability in Smith’s England.272  Building on Smith’s cultur-
ally relative definition of needs, Sen has proposed a definition of pov-
erty that considers the material commodities necessary to permit a 
person to both survive physically and to participate, at least at some 
minimal level, in the life of the community.273
265 See Martha Nussbaum, Nature, Function, and Capability:  Aristotle on Political Distri-
bution, in OXFORD STUDIES IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 145, 149-50, 157 (Julia Annas & 
Robert H. Grimm eds., Supp. 1988) (describing Aristotle’s view that all people should 
be given the necessary resources to “liv[e] well”). 
266 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, at Bk. V, ch. ii, pt. 2 (Edwin Cannan 
ed., Random House 1937) (1776) (arguing that an increase on taxes of necessary items 
must be accompanied by an increase in wages to compensate). 
267 JOHN RYAN, A LIVING WAGE 72-74, 126-27 (1906). 
268 See AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES, AND DEVELOPMENT 325-45 (1984) (de-
scribing the merits of an absolutist approach to poverty). 
269 See WALDRON, supra note 257, at 246-47 (arguing that there may be a moral 
duty for welfare provision). 
270 See id. at 247 (“The goods . . . that are necessary for basic interaction with oth-
ers may vary from society to society; but it may well be true that in each society those 
goods are so important to the social side of human existence that men and women 
will . . . strive for them . . . .”). 
271 SMITH, supra note 266, at 821. 
272 Id. at 822. 
273 SEN, supra note 268, at 336-37. 
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If we employ this metric while shifting our attention away from 
subsistence economies, the commodities necessary to participate 
minimally in the life of a community are likely to expand.274  Pre-
sumably in some communities, a loin cloth, some tools or weapons, 
and a makeshift shelter would be sufficient to be a member of the 
community in good standing.  A comparable list for life in the twenty-
first century United States would include substantial quantities of 
clothing, a fairly sophisticated shelter with indoor plumbing and ac-
cess to various utilities (electricity, gas, telephone service), a series of 
functional household appliances, and an effective means of transpor-
tation.275
As a community becomes more affluent, the list of commodities 
needed to participate in community life tends to expand.  This is why 
items that were once regarded as luxuries, such as indoor plumbing, 
are now considered to be minimal requirements of habitability and 
why, notwithstanding its onetime status as a luxury item, we are justi-
fied in continuing to refer to housing that lacks indoor plumbing 
(and even to much housing that has it) as unacceptably “poor.”276
To a limited extent, existing law recognizes the importance of this 
expanding list.  For example, landlord-tenant law permits tenants to 
engage in self-help, through, for example, refusing to pay rent or de-
ducting the cost of certain essential repairs from rent, when landlords 
fail to maintain properties at an adequate level.277  And the circum-
stances that would justify such a refusal to pay rent encompass features 
274 See id. at 336 (“For a richer community . . . the nutritional and other physical 
requirements . . . are typically already met, and the needs of communal participa-
tion . . . will have a much higher demand in the space of commodities and that of re-
sources.”); see also Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property:  A Renewed 
Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1261 (2005) (urging that the level of 
resources necessary to enjoy the opportunities associated with freedom “may vary 
enormously from society to society”). 
275 For an example of the “necessity” of telephone service, see Julia Sommerfeld, 
Voice-mail Service for Homeless Will Expand, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 8, 2003, at B3. 
276 This explains why arguments that the poor are materially well off in compari-
son to the poor of the last century often come off as incurably obtuse.  In addition, the 
notion of a shifting list of commodities necessary to participate in community life is 
consistent with the observations by behavioral economists that people exhibit strong 
preferences regarding their relative position in society with respect to certain “posi-
tional goods” such that they are willing to forego a degree of absolute consumption in 
order to retain a favorable relative ranking.  For a clear summary of this finding, see 
Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses, 95 AM. 
ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 137, 137 (2005). 
277 See SINGER, supra note 246, at 716-18 (discussing actions tenants are entitled to 
take when landlords fail to maintain their property). 
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of residential property, such as running water and heat, that would 
have been viewed as housing luxuries a century ago.278  Unfortunately, 
the legal protection of an individual’s ability to affirmatively receive 
most of these services is inadequately protected by existing law.279
Extending Sen’s context-specific definition of “need” to the ques-
tion of self-help, one could plausibly argue that the propertyless per-
son is entitled to take for herself from the property of others reaches 
somewhat beyond that necessary to sustain physical existence and in-
cludes at least some of those commodities needed to permit a mini-
mal participation in the life of the community.  This assertion sounds 
fairly radical in the abstract.  Nevertheless, doctrines like the implied 
warranty of habitability, adverse possession, and necessity suggest that 
self-help redistribution is already accepted, in a circumscribed way, by 
current property doctrine.  As we discuss at greater length below, we 
are not necessarily calling for the creation of new legal categories so 
much as the expansion of existing tools.  The necessity doctrine, for 
example, need not encompass every element of the expanded list of 
needs.  After all, on most accounts, the entitlement protected by the 
doctrine does not guarantee the right to avoid any need at all, but 
only “dire” or some similarly qualified need.  Still, a broader under-
standing of human need would justify expanding the prerequisites for 
an assertion of necessity beyond a showing of imminent physical 
harm. 
2.  Expressive Outlaws 
a.  Expressive Outlaws in Deterrent Perspective 
Expressive outlaws present utilitarian theorists with a different cal-
culus, in large part because of the relative modesty of their demands.  
They do not seek to take possession of someone else’s property for 
themselves.  Indeed, because expressive outlaws are not attempting to 
acquire property for themselves, they have fewer incentives—aside 
from a desire to express their legal preferences—to engage in the 
lawbreaking activity to begin with.  As Eric Kades has argued, their 
278 See id. at 715 (describing circumstances that can give rise to this right of self-
help). 
279 The protection provided by landlord-tenant law, for example, only applies to 
parties who have already successfully established a contractual landlord-tenant rela-
tionship.  It says nothing about an affirmative entitlement to any of these goods apart 
from such a preexisting relationship. 
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willingness to risk injury or jail in order to express their dissent there-
fore suggests that they place an exceptionally high value on changing 
the legal status quo.280  Moreover, the visibility they bring to what may 
have been a sublimated legal disagreement (for example, the myth of 
black acquiescence in the private segregation of the Jim Crow South) 
means that their activities generate information for those in political 
power.  And, unlike acquisitive outlaw conduct, this information is not 
tainted by the same degree of material self-interest.281  Finally, because 
expressive outlaws are typically organized, their activities may not con-
tribute to the same extent as decentralized acquisitive outlaw behavior 
to an increase in visible disorder that could undermine respect for the 
rule of law among the general population.  The lunch-counter sit-in 
protesters, for example, were nothing if not orderly, as even some of 
their opponents conceded.282
But a rigorous examination of the expressive outlaw requires rec-
ognition of a paradoxical caveat:  to legitimize, ex ante, the law-
breaker’s activity would radically undermine the expressive message 
itself.283  That is, part of the message is intrinsically tied to its status as 
disobedience; to legitimize the disobedience would therefore dilute, 
and even counteract, the message’s vitality.284  Accordingly, while we 
advocate a reevaluation, ex post, of the proper level of punishment of 
expressive outlaws, we remain cognizant of the expressive value that is 
generated by the lawbreaker’s willingness, ex ante, to accept punish-
ment, and thus are reluctant to advocate a prospective rule change. 
Given the intrinsic link between the illegality of their conduct and 
the quality of the information that conduct sends, it is not clear that 
generally applicable and substantive legal accommodation is a desir-
able response to expressive outlaws, even from the point of view of the 
outlaws themselves.  It is therefore not surprising, for example, that 
many of the lunch counter sit-in protesters specifically wanted to be 
jailed and in some cases even objected when judges proposed to sus-
280 See Kades, supra note 17, at 22-25. 
281 See id. 
282 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
283 See Kades, supra note 17, at 22-25. 
284 See id.; Steven M. Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom, Note, The State Made Me Do It:  
The Applicability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1189-91 
(1987) (arguing that legitimizing civil disobedience through the necessity defense may 
rob it of the “strategically important” symbolism associated with accepting punish-
ment). 
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pend their sentences.285  The converse was also true, and opponents of 
civil rights were sometimes eager to avoid enforcing the law against 
protesters in order to deny them the platform created by acts of civil 
disobedience.286  As Kades correctly puts it, “[i]f it is the illegal nature 
of civil disobedience that grabs the attention of the rulers, then elimi-
nating all sanctions will render the tactic less effective.”287  However, as 
Kades further points out, this logic does not preclude substantially 
lightening the punishment meted out to expressive outlaws.288  Ex-
pressive lawbreakers do appear to generate less social harm than the 
typical criminal.  Any utilitarian accommodation of expressive outlaws 
would, however, seek to minimize harm to property owners, while pre-
serving the expressive value of the disobedience itself. 
b.  Expressive Outlaws in Retributive Perspective 
The retributive justification for expressive violation of criminal 
laws is, to a certain extent, less controversial than the case for acquisi-
tive outlaws.  As Dworkin puts it, “Americans accept that civil disobe-
dience has a legitimate if informal place in the political culture of 
their community.”289  Much of the standard rationale for tolerating 
classic manifestations of civil disobedience stems from a widespread 
recognition of the importance of conscience to individual autonomy.  
Dworkin, for example, argues that lawbreaking is most easily justified 
when it is expressive of the view that one is being compelled by the law 
to perform what one conscientiously believes to be a deeply immoral 
or unjust act.290
Daniel Markovits goes further than Dworkin, arguing that inten-
tional lawbreaking can be acceptable even in the absence of strongly 
held belief in the deep injustice of existing law.  Indeed, he argues 
that outlaw behavior is “an unavoidable, integral part of a well-
285 See Two Sentenced for Trespassing, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Apr. 27, 1960, at A4; 
see also LEWIS & D’ORSO, supra note 71, at 110 (describing the strategic importance of 
actually going to jail rather than paying a fine). 
286 Kades tells the story of one southern mayor who “secretly paid Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s fine for trespass, and busted him from jail against his will.”  Kades, supra 
note 17, at 35 n.99. 
287 Id. at 35. 
288 See id. at 29-36. 
289 DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 163, at 105. 
290 See id. at 107-14 (contrasting “integrity-based” civil disobedience, which most 
agree justifies law breaking, with “justice-based” and “policy-based” civil disobedience, 
which are more problematic). 
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functioning democratic process” when it is employed to expose and 
overcome “democratic deficits” caused by inertia built into the de-
mocratic political process.291  Consistent with his majoritarian theory 
of legal obligation, Markovits limits the scope of permitted “democ-
ratic disobedience” to situations in which the act of legal defiance ex-
presses a view that has “significant support among the citizenry” but 
that has been held in check by the inertia of the democratic proc-
ess.292  Disobedience that lacks such majoritarian support cannot per-
sist in the face of a clear expression of majority support for the legal 
status quo.293
Although we welcome Markovits’s broader view of the acceptable 
scope of expressive lawbreaking, we would go still two steps further.  
In our view, expressive lawbreaking represents an important part of 
the political process even in the absence of the democratic deficits 
that arise when the law fails to reflect already-existing majority senti-
ment.  Instead, we view such lawbreaking as having as a legitimate goal 
the creation of majority sentiment where none existed before.  As 
Cover understood, allowing groups concretely to live out their alterna-
tive legal conceptions uniquely fosters the normative diversity that is 
essential to life in a free society.294  Though not all such expressive 
lawbreaking need ultimately be embraced by the official lawmakers, 
its social value provides a reason to create space for such expression, 
at least to a certain extent.  By living out an alternative vision of legal 
possibility, lawbreaking can help to overcome what might be called 
“imaginative deficits” that may well prevent majorities from embrac-
ing previously unexplored shapes that law might take.  As we have al-
ready argued, the ability of lawbreaking to demonstrate the range of 
imaginative legal possibilities beyond the parameters of existing de-
mocratic debate is particularly (though not exclusively) strong for 
those who intentionally violate property laws (as opposed to other 
sorts of laws).  This is because, as a result of its subject matter, viola-
tions of property law have a unique ability to demonstrate in a very 
concrete way alternative conceptions of legal possibility.295
Even beyond its imaginative power, however, the formal ratifica-
tion of concerted illegality can play an important role in protecting 
291 Markovits, supra note 166, at 1927-36. 
292 Id. at 1938-39. 
293 Id. at 1941. 
294 Cover, supra note 169, at 15-17, 32-35. 
295 See supra Part II.D. 
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minorities against majoritarian tyranny.  When a minority group dem-
onstrates the intensity of its preference for legal change through an 
embrace of illegality in the face of a policy supported by only the most 
apathetic of majorities, fairness arguably favors legal change, notwith-
standing the persistent absence of majority support for affirmatively 
implementing such a change.  Under these circumstances, the best so-
lution might be to put the strength of majority sentiment to the test 
(that is, to gauge its ability to overcome the inertial forces Markovits 
describes) by providing the opportunity for legislative override of the 
requested legal accommodation.  Such a move would reverse the di-
rection of the inertial forces to determine whether mildly favorable 
majority sentiment can summon up the energy to reassert itself in fa-
vor of the old rule.296
It is important to note that a significant part of the reduced cul-
pability associated with expressive disobedience, at least as compared 
with revolutionary action, stems from the civil disobedient’s implicit 
affirmation of the democratic legal system through her voluntary 
submission to criminal punishment for her unlawful acts.  In other 
words, expressive outlaw conduct affirms the authority of the com-
munity’s legal system even as it forcefully challenges one particular 
aspect of that system.  However, while it is seems clear that expressive 
lawbreakers are less blameworthy than other sorts of criminals, it is 
not clear that the proper response to their reduced culpability is a 
complete elimination of criminal liability, as opposed to, for example, 
reduced punishment or targeted relief after the fact.  We will discuss 
several possible responses the law might have to the conduct of ex-
pressive outlaws in Part III.C. 
3.  Intersectional Outlaws 
a.  Intersectional Outlaws in Deterrent Perspective 
By definition, intersectional outlaws demonstrate features charac-
teristic of both expressive and acquisitive outlaws, for better and for 
worse.  For example, like acquisitive outlaws, their desire to actually 
obtain possessory or quasi-possessory interests for themselves gives in-
tersectional outlaws an incentive to search for owners who place a low 
value on excluding people from engaging in the sorts of uses that in-
tersectional outlaws value.  On the other hand, their desire to make 
296 Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 16-30 (1982) 
(describing strategies for coping with “legal petrification”). 
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an expressive impact can sometimes push intersectional outlaws to 
seek out property owners likely to raise vociferous and visible objec-
tions to their activities.  Accordingly, in some situations, evaluating the 
utility gain, if any, from granting intersectional outlaws the property 
interest they seek will require the same analysis that would be used for 
acquisitive outlaws.  In other cases, those from which intersectional 
outlaws derive the greatest expressive impact, the analysis of the gain, 
if any, will proceed along the lines used for expressive outlaws. 
When it comes to the spillover effects of tolerating outlaw behav-
ior, intersectional outlaws demonstrate the same bifurcation.  On the 
one hand, their interest in enjoying the property entitlement they 
seek to change makes their less expressive conduct somewhat more 
sensitive than that of expressive outlaws to the potentially negative 
side effects caused by toleration of outlaw behavior.  That is, reduced 
state repression of the self-interested component of intersectional 
lawbreaking may substantially increase the incentives of other inter-
sectional and acquisitive outlaws to engage in the same behavior.  On 
the other hand, the more focused, coordinated, and expressive their 
interest in opposing particular property entitlements, the more likely 
intersectional outlaws are to resist state enforcement of existing prop-
erty rights. 
When expressive outlaw conduct is combined with circumstances 
suggesting an efficient forced transfer, there seems to be little reason 
to treat intersectional outlaws differently than acquisitive outlaws un-
der analogous circumstances.  On the other hand, they may be enti-
tled to more favorable treatment, particularly when the intersectional 
outlaw undertakes self-help redistribution on behalf of a third party.  
Such a Robin Hood-style outlaw arguably provides all the utility gains 
of justified self-help redistribution while, because she will not person-
ally profit from the redistribution, also providing high-quality infor-
mation about the intensity of her commitment to a shift in the legal 
status quo. 
b.  Intersectional Lawbreakers in Retributive Perspective 
From a retributive point of view, intersectional outlaws present the 
same interesting hybrid of the two primary categories of property out-
laws.  However, to the extent that intersectional outlaws’ expressive 
activity is acquisitive, its expressive component does not substantially 
alter the analysis under the redistributive principle discussed above.  
The fact that an action is expressive does not entitle an acquisitive out-
law to appropriate the necessities of others, or to acquire others’ sur-
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plus property for nonessential purposes.  In addition, the more the 
motive of the acquisitive behavior moves away from satisfying immedi-
ate needs (either of the intersectional outlaw or of others), and the 
more it moves towards the expressive end of the spectrum, the less 
likely it is that the “speaker” will be entitled to avoid (or be interested 
in avoiding) some criminal sanctions for her conduct. 
C.  Legal Responses to Property Outlaws 
Our principal purpose in this Article has been to highlight the 
importance of certain categories of intentional property lawbreaking 
to the process of property law’s evolution.  In particular, we wanted to 
bring to the forefront two neglected values generated by some inten-
tional property lawbreaking—what we have called lawbreaking’s redis-
tributive value and its informational value.  Given the power of these 
two values, we argue for a reconfiguration of sanctions in certain con-
texts.  This does not mean that sanctions are always (or even usually) 
inappropriate; indeed, as we have already argued in the context of our 
discussion of expressive outlaws, their willingness to face the imposi-
tion of legal penalties is part and parcel of the outlaw’s expressive 
force. 
We are concerned that, in its strategies of punishment, the law 
may aim to preclude too much property lawbreaking.  As we have ar-
gued, the law must take into account the possible socially productive 
nature of some property lawbreaking, not just its social costs.  In fact, 
total deterrence does not appear to be the goal of most contemporary 
theorists.297  Moreover, at least in practice, the degree and likelihood 
of punishment for most property law violations have left sufficient 
play in the joints of the system to permit some kinds of intentional 
lawbreaking to lead to significant legal change. 
The dynamically evolving technologies and strategies of law en-
forcement, however, constantly threaten to remove the needed flexi-
bility within the enforcement of property laws.  In crafting their re-
sponses to property outlaws, decision makers must therefore pay 
careful attention to these shifts in the technology or strategy of law en-
forcement that dramatically increase the risks of property lawbreak-
ing.  When enforcement becomes cheap, easy, and pervasive through 
the advent of new technology, preexisting legal responses can easily 
297 See supra note 216 and accompanying text (noting theorists’ desire not to over-
deter property crimes because such crimes may be socially productive). 
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become excessive; particularly in cases where the law previously en-
gaged in only sporadic enforcement.  If too effective at deterring 
crime, inadvertently harsh (or definite) sanctions can stamp out the 
information benefits that result from some property lawbreaking.  In 
short, dramatic improvements in the ability to detect and punish 
property lawbreaking have the ability to shift the potential outlaw’s 
calculus in significant ways, not all of which are socially beneficial. 
This focus on the possible improvements in the technology of 
property enforcement to suppress productive lawbreaking is particu-
larly crucial in the context of intellectual property, where the tech-
nology (and policy) of property enforcement is presently experienc-
ing revolutionary change.  But our point is a general one that, as our 
discussion of adverse possession below demonstrates,298 applies with 
equal force in the context of tangible property.  Of course, there are 
reasons to doubt that the deterrent force of some criminal punish-
ments, such as those accompanying most trespass statutes, could pos-
sibly be excessive because they are misdemeanors accompanied in 
practice (at least in this country) by relatively light punishments.299  In 
some cases, however, even nonviolent trespassing protesters have been 
made to suffer harsh penalties through creative prosecution.300  In 
other instances, particularly those involving expressive behavior, in-
junctions and contempt sanctions have dramatically increased the 
penalties for even minor property crimes.  In addition, the ancillary 
effects of criminal convictions of any sort, such as reputational and 
professional harm, can magnify the force of even minor criminal sanc-
tions.301  Finally, outside of the specific context of trespass, punish-
ment for minor property crimes can, with the application of “three 
strikes” laws, RICO, and similar laws targeting organized or repeat of-
fenders, lead to the imposition of harsh sentences that might cause 
298 See infra Part III.C(1)(a)(1). 
299 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.10, 140.15 (McKinney 1999) (defining most 
criminal trespass violations as misdemeanors in New York). 
300 In the United Kingdom, nonviolent trespassers advocating the “right to roam” 
were, in one famous case, sentenced to over a year in prison through the creative use 
of criminal statutes.  See HOWARD HILL, FREEDOM TO ROAM 67-68 (1980).  Even mis-
demeanor criminal trespass can carry sentences of up to a year in prison.  See N.Y. PE-
NAL LAW § 70.15.  And protesters convicted of trespassing on federal military installa-
tions can be sentenced to up to six months in federal prison.  18 U.S.C. § 1382 (2000). 
301 Cf. Coleman, supra note 215, at 337 (discussing the powerful deterrent effect of 
probation). 
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even someone in the most dire and uncontroversial situation of neces-
sity to think twice before violating the property rights of others.302
When confronted with a pattern or movement of pervasive and 
protracted property lawbreaking, legislators and prosecutors can re-
spond by ratcheting up penalties in an effort to get ahead of the de-
terrence curve.  That increased repression often takes the form of en-
hanced sentences, but it can also occur by means of increased 
certainty of law enforcement, as prescribed, for example, by the social 
influence theory of criminal behavior.303  Although the strategies of 
heightened penalties and heightened enforcement are not inherently 
inconsistent, they are often presented as alternatives.304  A third possi-
bility, typically overlooked, is to ratify pervasive property lawbreaking 
through legal accommodation. 
We suspect that most legislators unthinkingly favor the option of 
increased repression, primarily in the form of longer sentences, over 
the possibility of legal reform such as increased economic redistribu-
tion.305  This is certainly the correct response under many circum-
stances.  Some norms are sufficiently important and entrenched that 
their violation should not be tolerated.  Moreover, the avarice of some 
people means that a certain level of property crime will persist, no 
matter how just society’s wealth distribution.  Much of the conduct 
that contributes to such background levels of crime is typically unjusti-
fied and is unlikely to convey much useful information.  Nevertheless, 
our analysis counsels against the common knee-jerk tendency toward 
ever higher penalties and instead encourages lawmakers to consider 
the possibility that spikes or concentrations of property lawbreaking 
may, at times, provide a reason to reevaluate society’s commitment to 
property law’s status quo.  Extremely high penalties, combined with 
the unpredictability of the criminal justice system, can make the cost 
of engaging in even justified outlaw conduct too high for most peo-
302 In California, for example, petty theft can be punished as a felony if the defen-
dant has a prior conviction for the crime, and any felony (including such elevated 
“petty theft” convictions) can count as a third strike.  See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 
63 (2003).  In the Andrade case, the defendant, who had a history of committing prop-
erty and drug crimes, was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison after being 
caught attempting to steal videotapes valued at roughly $150.  Id. at 66-67 (describing 
Andrade’s offense and punishment level). 
303 See Kahan, supra note 237, at 377-82. 
304 See id. at 382 (presenting certainty of enforcement and severity of punishment 
as components of an optimal-balance model). 
305 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 229, at 221. 
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ple.306  While they may prevent crime, high penalties can stifle the 
democratic deliberation generated by property lawbreaking—
deliberation that is essential to property’s evolutionary dynamism. 
The social influence approach of increased law enforcement, 
which advocates an engagement with both the “price” of crime and its 
social meaning, presents more of a puzzle for our analysis.307  Propo-
nents of this school of thought often favor a higher certainty/lower 
penalty strategy of criminal punishment.308  Our analysis lines up with 
the prescriptions of the social influence theory, at least to an extent,309  
but we are also cognizant of the potential chilling effect on justified 
lawbreaking of frequent, albeit low-level, punishment endorsed by the 
high certainty/low penalty strategy.  A proper concern with the im-
portance of permitting some leeway for productive and justified law-
breaking suggests the need to retain a degree of flexibility within 
strategies aimed at aggressively eliminating disorder; in some cases 
even counseling in favor of justifying intentional underenforcement. 
While we believe that property outlaws are sometimes justified in 
their conduct and can offer society valuable information about ineffi-
ciencies or injustices in the property system, the unlawful nature of 
their behavior is cause for concern.  In part, this concern stems from 
the likely uneven and potentially unfair effects of outlaw behavior on 
property owners and third parties.  If legal reform is left to the indi-
vidual actions of property outlaws, it is unlikely that the losses imposed 
on property owners will be fairly distributed.  Because criminals typi-
cally operate in their own neighborhoods, the result might be actions 
by property outlaws that perversely make the situation of the poor as a 
whole even worse. 
In part, however, this concern also stems from the dangers that 
criminal behavior poses to the well-being of outlaws themselves.  By 
engaging in illegal behavior, even if justified, property outlaws take 
substantial risks.  In light of the potential that property owners and 
their sympathizers will engage in violent self-help, they risk their physi-
cal safety.  In addition, they risk being burdened by substantial fines, 
306 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 218, at 880-81, 884-85 (noting the potential 
unfairness of fining individuals “far in excess of the external cost they impose on soci-
ety”). 
307 See generally Kahan, supra note 237, at 349-52 (presenting the “social influence” 
theory of deterrence). 
308 See id. at 379 (indicating that a “high-certainty/low-severity strategy . . . is more 
likely to generate a low crime-rate equilibrium”). 
309 See id. at 382. 
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imprisonment, or social stigma.  While their actions may be useful in 
highlighting areas of needed legal reform, it would be wrong to con-
clude that the existence of property outlaws (that is, of people whose 
interests are so ignored by the lawmaking process that they view law-
breaking as the surest way to satisfy their needs) is a matter of indif-
ference. 
A concern with both the unfair potential burdens on property 
owners and on property outlaws themselves suggests that lawmakers 
should aim to limit resort to criminal conduct as a tool of legal evolu-
tion to those situations in which it seems most clearly justified.  More-
over, they should favor the affirmative creation of effective alternative 
means for potential outlaws to express opposition to the legal status 
quo.  With these qualifications in mind, we divide our suggested legal 
responses to outlaw behavior into two categories of paired alternatives, 
each category corresponding to one of the two principal values we 
view as being created by property outlaws.  Viewing outlaws’ redis-
tributive and informational value through the bifurcated lens of out-
law actions and possible alternatives to such actions yields four possi-
ble strategies (apart from merely increasing repression).  In response 
to outlaws’ redistributive value, the state may either (a) ratify outlaws’ 
forced transfers, or (b) increase systems of government-sponsored re-
distribution.  In response to outlaws’ information value, the state may 
either (a) incorporate the information generated by outlaw behavior 
into the political process through deliberative feedback mechanisms, 
or (b) increase subsidies of noncriminal substitutes to outlaw behav-
ior. 
Each of these pairs represents a set of (admittedly imperfect) sub-
stitutes.  Increased governmental redistribution will tend to reduce 
the need for reliance on forced transfers and on expensive and unre-
liable procedural mechanisms for weighing the justifications for such 
transfers after the fact.310  Similarly, increased subsidization of speech 
that is subversive of the status quo reduces the pressure to engage in 
illegal expressive conduct to draw attention to groups’ complaints.  
Conversely, however, in the absence of the state’s willingness to create 
and adequately fund viable alternatives to outlaw conduct, we can ex-
310 See WALDRON, supra note 257, at 244-45 (noting that the “welfare state is a way 
of ensuring that no one should ever be in such abject need that he would be driven to 
violate otherwise enforceable rules of property”). 
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pect continued or increased reliance on lawbreaking.311 These two 
strategies, however, are not mutually exclusive. 
1.  Responding to Property Outlaws’ Redistributive Value 
a.  Ratifying Certain Forced Transfers 
When confronted with acquisitive property outlaws, one option 
available to the legal system is to ratify their acquisitive action by 
granting the outlaw title to the property.  To a limited extent, the law 
already ratifies a number of forced transfers through the doctrines of 
adverse possession and necessity.  These two doctrines, however, have 
failed to keep pace with changes in the technology of property en-
forcement and with our society’s expanding definition of needs, the 
consequence of which has been an artificial narrowing of their appli-
cation. 
i.  Adverse Possession 
The doctrine of adverse possession permits a trespasser who 
makes sufficiently open and notorious use of someone else’s property 
for a specified period of time to obtain title ownership to that land.312  
In most cases, state law permits even the knowing trespasser (or so-
called “bad faith” adverse possessor) to take advantage of this doc-
trine.313  Although not a criminal law doctrine, adverse possession ul-
timately converts someone who would otherwise qualify as a criminal 
trespasser into an owner. 
Lee Fennell has called bad faith adverse possession a case of “effi-
cient trespass,”314 but “efficient theft” would be a better term.  The 
end result of adverse possession is not merely permission to continue 
trespassing on another’s property without being able to exclude the 
true owner herself, as one would expect from a theory of efficient 
trespass.  Nor is it merely an option to purchase the property through 
the reduction of the owner’s protection from a property rule to a li-
ability rule.  Instead, the result of successful adverse possession is an 
outright involuntary transfer of property rule protection, in the form 
311 See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 4-6, 
33-41 (1993) (suggesting that the relief system reinforces market incentives). 
312 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 10 (2002). 
313 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
314 Fennell, supra note 219, at 1038. 
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of fee simple ownership, from the true owner to the unlawful posses-
sor. 
Under certain circumstances, a forced transfer can be justified in 
utilitarian terms, as we have already observed.  And, as Fennell has 
persuasively argued, the broad contours of adverse possession law 
seem to be well crafted to isolate a category of situations in which we 
can have a great deal of confidence that such transfers are efficient.  
But the doctrine can also be justified in nonutilitarian terms.  The in-
tentional adverse possessor, or squatter, has typically been someone 
without much property but with a great deal of time and a willingness 
to invest substantial labor in improving the unoccupied property of 
another.  In addition, she seeks to put the property in question (real 
estate) to valuable use, either for the provision of the shelter or to 
pursue her livelihood.  Finally, the property must be sufficiently un-
important to its owner that she permits an interloper to intrude on 
her property and occupy it for a lengthy period of time, typically seven 
to ten years. 
One could justify the legal ratification of intentional adverse pos-
session by applying something like the nonutilitarian principle we 
have previously discussed in relation to the retributive response to ac-
quisitive outlaws:  it is not wrong to appropriate someone else’s sur-
plus property in order to provide for one’s own need when viable le-
gal alternatives are not available. The application of this 
nonconsequentialist principle would seem to track fairly closely the 
acquisitive outlaw behavior most strongly justified by utilitarian the-
ory.  This principle, of course, generates substantial epistemological 
problems when it comes to determining whether its conditions are ac-
tually satisfied.  Adverse possession gets around these problems by 
adopting onerous conditions that ensure its application will be radi-
cally underinclusive. 
It is true that the adverse possession doctrine does not on its face 
pay much attention to the “need” of the adverse possessor, but when 
applied to the bad faith adverse possessor, that need will very likely be 
manifest.  With the exception of boundary disputes, it seems unlikely 
that many of the property-rich will have either the time or inclination 
to intentionally adversely possess someone else’s land.  And the status 
of the property in question as “surplus” property of the true owner is 
also likely to be satisfied when the owner cannot be troubled to assert 
her property rights within the prescribed period of time. 
In the past, the doctrine of adverse possession has served a fairly 
important redistributive function and constituted a significant threat 
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to absentee ownership.315  Its significance in recent years, however, 
has declined to such an extent that it is now plausibly described as 
merely a mechanism for clearing titling errors and resolving inconse-
quential border disputes.316  This diminished role for adverse posses-
sion is the natural result of reductions in the cost of property surveil-
lance that make it cheaper for property owners to oust potential 
adverse possessors and, consequently, diminish the incentives for po-
tential adverse possessors to seek out property to possess in the first 
place.  All things being equal, improvements in the technology for en-
forcing property rights make the category of adverse possession even 
more radically underinclusive than it would already otherwise be.  
Owners need not expend much energy monitoring their property, 
and prospective squatters are confronted with a miniscule likelihood 
of successfully obtaining title. 
These observations suggest that, as the technology of property 
monitoring has improved, property law should have responded by eas-
ing the requirements for adverse possession.  Because the behavioral 
requirements of adverse possession continue to serve the purpose of 
putting reasonably attentive owners on notice that their property is 
occupied by another, the most straightforward way to respond to the 
technological advances in property surveillance would be simply to 
reduce the period of time for which the adverse possessor must pos-
sess the property.  Although seven years may have been a fair period 
of time to require of an adverse possessor in the nineteenth-century 
west, when a trip from the east to the west coast and back could take 
months, one to two years would seem to be more than sufficient to 
protect the interests of even moderately vigilant property owners in 
this era of six-hour transcontinental flights and telecommunication.  
The case for such a reduction in the time period required for adverse 
possession seems particularly strong in the context of urban proper-
ties, where it is virtually impossible for even the most careless owner 
not to notice an adverse possessor’s use of her land.317
315 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 48, at 201-04 (describing title defects stemming 
from adverse possession in land owned by a prominent absentee landlord in the nine-
teenth century). 
316 See KEVIN GRAY & SUSAN FRANCIS GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW § 6.39, at 372 
(4th ed. 2005) (“Statistically the most significant adverse possessor is one who claims 
that a minute sliver of land formally titled in his neighbour has been inaccurately 
fenced in his own favour or has been the subject of a mistaken double conveyance to 
himself.”). 
317 It almost goes without saying that the position we advocate in this paper is in-
consistent with a recent and much-noted decision of the European Court of Human 
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ii.  Necessity 
The doctrine of necessity permits nonowners to trespass on, and 
under certain circumstances even to appropriate, the property of oth-
ers in order to avoid a grave harm.318  In the criminal context, the ba-
sic insight of the doctrine, which is recognized in nearly every state 
and federal court in the country, is that a person should not be pun-
ished for being forced by circumstance to choose between two evils, 
the lesser of which involves breaking the law.319  Although it varies sig-
nificantly by jurisdiction, the criminal defense of necessity has tradi-
tionally been understood to justify the defendant’s otherwise unlawful 
appropriation of the property of another when (1) the defendant’s 
illegal conduct was committed to avoid a significant evil; (2) the de-
fendant reasonably believed that her actions were necessary to avoid 
this evil; (3) the defendant had no alternative legal means of prevent-
ing this harm; and (4) the evil sought to be avoided is greater than the 
harm expected to result from the defendant’s criminal conduct.320
This doctrine can be fairly easily justified in utilitarian terms.  But 
it can also be explained in terms similar to the nonconsequentialist, 
redistributive principle we have been discussing.  Like adverse posses-
sion, however, the doctrine of necessity creates substantial epistemo-
logical problems, to which the law has responded by couching the 
doctrine in qualifications that end up making it profoundly underin-
clusive.321
Rights, holding that the operation of U.K. adverse possession law (in a case involving 
“bad faith” adverse possession) violated the rights of property owners.  See J.A. Pye (Ox-
ford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02, slip op. (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 15, 
2005) (on file with authors).  Nevertheless, that decision is fundamentally correct in its 
rejection of the nonredistributive justifications offered for the radical consequences of 
adverse possession.  Explanations based on adverse possession’s tendency, for example, 
to clear uncertain title simply fail to explain the actual operation of the doctrine under 
circumstances, such as those in Pye, in which there is no uncertainty as to title. 
318 See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 219, at 98-100 (illustrating the effect of private 
necessity on ownership rights); Smith, supra note 234, at 89-91 (describing “the right of 
one facing necessity” as a situation in which it would make sense to “delineate a stand-
alone right to engage in self-help”). 
319 See Shaun P. Martin, The Radical Necessity Defense, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1527, 1532 
(2005) (“The necessity defense . . . has long been a part of Anglo-American jurispru-
dence.”).  But see 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 124(a), at 45 (1984) 
(stating that only half of American jurisdictions recognize the necessity defense). 
320 Martin, supra note 319, at 1535-36. 
321 See id. at 1567-89 (describing the requirements for the necessity doctrine to ap-
ply:  imminence, causation, and the absence of legal alternatives). 
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In its traditional formulation, necessity doctrine falls squarely 
within the circumstances that approximate those in which we have ar-
gued that acquisitive outlaw behavior would be justified:  situations in 
which someone in need nonviolently takes what he needs from the 
surplus (or, to use Aquinas’s formula, “superabundance”) of another.  
The conduct of many squatters, both those of the nineteenth-century 
American West and in many parts of the developing world today, as 
well as those in the modern urban context, would appear to fall within 
the boundaries of this defense.  In addition, many of the behaviors of 
homeless people that have been criminalized by local governments in 
recent years fit comfortably within this broader understanding of the 
doctrine of necessity.322  Our analysis suggests not only that such con-
duct should be immune from sanction but that efforts to interfere 
with behavior necessary for survival, such as panhandling and sleeping 
in public, may well give rise to a civil remedy.323
Many courts, however, have interpreted the necessity defense in 
an artificially narrow way that would restrict it to extremely unusual 
circumstances, such as natural disasters.  Several courts, for example, 
have held that, as a categorical matter, the doctrine is not available 
when the evil the defendant seeks to avoid is caused by economic 
forces alone.324  Our analysis rejects these narrow reconstructions of 
the defense and would require courts to treat economic necessity in 
precisely the same way that they treat necessity caused by natural disas-
322 See Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral:  Homelessness and Its Criminalization, 14 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 16-26 (1996) (discussing cities’ efforts to criminalize survival 
behavior by the homeless). 
323 See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 188-89 (Vt. 1908) (allowing a cause of ac-
tion against a dock owner whose servant unmoored a boat that had docked in an 
emergency, resulting in injuries to those in the boat); EPSTEIN, supra note 219, at 98-
100 (“The owner who casts away the stranger in need can be sued for the harm that 
follows . . . .”).  This does not necessarily mean that governments cannot seek to relo-
cate such behavior.  See Ellickson, supra note 237, at 1219-26 (describing potential zon-
ing laws a city could use to restrict panhandling to certain areas).  But if those restric-
tions have the effect of making it too difficult (or impossible) for the homeless to 
satisfy their needs, the necessity doctrine would justify their violation. 
324 See, e.g., State v. Gann, 244 N.W.2d 746, 752-53 (N.D. 1976) (rejecting an argu-
ment based on economic duress); Harris v. State, 486 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1972) (“Economic necessity is no justification for a positive criminal offense.”); 
State v. Moe, 24 P.2d 638, 640 (Wash. 1933) (“Economic necessity has never been ac-
cepted as a defense to a criminal charge.”); see also Martin, supra note 319, at 1588 
(stating that “several courts” have held that the necessity doctrine cannot be invoked 
when the harm is economic, and citing cases in support); Michelle Conde, Comment, 
Necessity Defined:  A New Role in the Criminal Defense System, 29 UCLA  L. REV. 409, 421-22 
(1981) (describing as a rationale for limiting the necessity defense the fear that per-
mitting it encourages others to engage in similar unlawful conduct). 
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ters.  In a predominantly market-based economy that relies almost ex-
clusively upon consensual transactions to get property from one per-
son to another, economic necessity can be as dire an evil as catastro-
phic flooding.325  Moreover, as in the case of natural disasters, third 
parties who assist those in situations of necessity should also be enti-
tled to take advantage of the defense.326
In one Texas case, for example, a woman was charged with welfare 
fraud when she made false statements about her income while trying 
to obtain welfare assistance.327  The woman had unlawfully obtained 
work while receiving welfare benefits in order to supplement her wel-
fare income to provide food for her children.  Her lawyer proffered 
the testimony of several experts to the effect that the defendant’s 
children were suffering from malnutrition prior to her attempt to 
supplement her income and that the state welfare benefits available to 
the defendant were inadequate to provide for herself and her chil-
dren.328  The trial court refused to allow the defendant to present the 
evidence to the jury, and the defendant was convicted.329
In Southwark v. Williams,330 a 1971 case involving urban squatters in 
London, the court endorsed an equally narrow interpretation of the 
necessity doctrine.  The case involved homeless families that had been 
living on the streets of London and that had, with the assistance of an 
urban squatting advocacy group, nonviolently occupied an abandoned 
home that was owned by the Borough of Southwark.  When the Bor-
ough brought suit to oust them from possession, the defendants pled 
the defense of necessity.  The court categorically rejected the de-
fense’s applicability, arguing in sweeping terms that necessity could 
325 See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992) 
(“An individual who loses his home as a result of economic hard times or physical or 
mental illness exercises no more control over these events than he would over a natu-
ral disaster.”); see also RYAN, supra note 267, at 297-98 (quoting approvingly the Comte 
de Mun, who stated that the laborer is exploited and not completely free “in a regime 
which puts [her] life at the mercy of supply and demand”). 
326 The argument on behalf of the right of third parties to intervene appears to 
follow from the logic of the necessity defense.  And, indeed, Aquinas argued in favor of 
the justification of such intervention.  See AQUINAS, supra note 254, at II-II, at Q. 66, art. 
7 (“In a case of a like need, a man may also take secretly another’s property in order to 
succor his neighbor in need.”). 
327 Mayfield v. State, 585 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see also J. Thomas 
Sullivan, The Defense of Necessity in Texas:  Legislative Invention Comes of Age, 16 HOUS. L. 
REV. 333, 346-47 (1979) (summarizing Mayfield). 
328 Sullivan, supra note 323, at 346-47. 
329 Id. 
330 (1971) 2 Eng. Rep. 175 (A.C.). 
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never be used outside the context of imminent threats to physical 
safety caused by environmental calamities and the like:  “[W]hen a 
man, who is starving, enters a house and takes food in order to keep 
himself alive[, our] English law does not admit the defense of neces-
sity.  It holds him guilty of larceny.”331  The court’s justification rested 
entirely on the long-term spillover effects of a broad necessity defense 
on public order and the security of property.  “If homelessness were 
once admitted as a defense to trespass,” the court implausibly argued, 
“no one’s house could be safe.”332
The court’s concern for the security of homeownership was need-
lessly alarmist in the context of a case about homeless urban families 
occupying abandoned and derelict housing.  There is no reason why 
the necessity doctrine cannot be tailored to steer its beneficiaries to-
ward underutilized, abandoned, or other obviously neglected prop-
erty.  Nevertheless, the court’s concern with long-term consequences 
flowing from a broad definition of necessity is a reasonable one. 
The negative spillover effects of recognizing such a defense, how-
ever, would be limited by the fact that few criminal cases go to trial.  
Even for those that do, necessity would, for the most part, be defined 
only after the fact by a jury (or judge) whose decision is not binding 
on future courts or juries.333  Moreover, in a society in which most 
people perceive the system of social welfare to be adequate to provide 
for the needs of the poor, few factfinders would be willing to con-
clude that acquisitive outlaw conduct was justified in any but the most 
extreme circumstances.  While permitting a greater number of defen-
dants to argue the necessity defense would marginally raise the cost of 
law enforcement and might yield a slightly lower conviction rate for 
331 Id. at 744. 
332 Id. 
333 Under certain circumstances, or even in entire categories of cases, dire need 
might be so clear as to justify a judge in granting prospective injunctive relief or de-
termining that enforcement of a particular law would, as a matter of law, violate the 
principle of necessity.  A similar intuition may lie behind the conclusions of some 
courts that the enforcement of laws prohibiting unavoidable behavior by the homeless, 
such as sitting or sleeping in public, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment.  See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 
1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[E]nforcement of section 41.18(d) at all times and in all places 
against homeless individuals who are sitting, lying, or sleeping in Los Angeles’s Skid 
Row because they cannot obtain shelter violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause.”); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992) 
(“[A]rresting the homeless for harmless, involuntary, life-sustaining acts such as sleep-
ing, sitting, or eating in public is cruel and unusual.”). 
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property crimes, it is unlikely that these effects would encourage many 
people to undertake additional criminal actions. 
The impact of broadened consideration of necessity by juries 
could be diminished even further if the defense were styled as an ex-
cuse or mitigation, rather than as a justification.  Characterizing ar-
guments beyond the traditionally narrow limits of the necessity doc-
trine—as excuses or as factors to consider in mitigation of the 
prescribed punishment, rather than outright justifications—would 
soften the impact of the shift we are proposing.  It would permit 
judges and juries to view the role that economic need played in the 
defendant’s decision to violate the law outside of the confines of the 
traditional necessity defense without confining their options to the 
binary choice of conviction or exoneration. 
Obviously, the jury is a less than perfect mechanism for democ-
ratic feedback.  Juries are small and are usually not representative of 
the electorate as a whole.  Nevertheless, they are the only direct point 
of involvement by citizens within the criminal process.  Juries have 
therefore almost always played crucial roles in bottom-up lawmak-
ing.334
To be clear, we have no illusions that the jury process constitutes 
an ideal mechanism for disseminating information to the broader po-
litical community.  The feedback between the jury and the democratic 
process, for example, cannot work when the jury system is itself fatally 
flawed or reflects unbridgeable cleavages within the polity.  When a 
segment of the population is excluded from the jury, as was the case 
in the Jim Crow South, juries simply cannot function as a stand-in for 
the conscience of the community or as a means of filtering informa-
tion back into the political process.  Similarly, when a segment of the 
community is excluded from the political process, or when a political 
community is so segmented by class or race that there is an utter lack 
of basic respect for certain members of the community, the jury 
mechanism for feeding information back into the political process will 
334 See KRAMER, supra note 10, at 29 (“The jury’s power to address issues of funda-
mental law . . . reflects and manifests . . . what we might call ‘popular law.’”); Michael 
Kozura, We Stood Our Ground:  Anthracite Miners and Expropriation of Corporate Property, 
1930-41, in “WE ARE ALL LEADERS”:  THE ALTERNATIVE UNIONISM OF THE EARLY 1930S, 
at 199, 215 (Staughton Lynd. ed., 1996) (discussing how juries “composed of friends 
and neighbors” aligned themselves with miners and unions to make “the cost of legal 
repression prohibitive for coal companies”); Jim Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down 
Strikes, and the Shaping of American Industrial Relations, 1935-1958, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 
45, 84 (2006) (describing how a deadlocked jury resulted in dropped charges against 
sit-down strikers). 
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be impaired.  But as long as the jury system operates in a relatively 
nondiscriminatory manner and the society is not already irreparably 
riven by racial or class divisions, broadening the use of the necessity 
defense might provide destitute defendants with a meaningful oppor-
tunity to explain the motivations for their conduct and provide jurors 
with important insights into the challenges or hardships faced by the 
poorest members of society—insights that they can then disseminate 
to the larger political community. 
Robert Ellickson reasonably questions the educative value of brief 
encounters with the poor, such as the typical fleeting interaction with 
panhandlers on the street.335  But in the context of a protracted inter-
action, like a criminal trial, it is plausible to think that exposure to the 
hardships faced by the poorest citizens could help to educate the jury, 
as well as any public or press who might be attending the trial, about 
the contours of economic injustice, thereby feeding useful informa-
tion back into the democratic political process.336  Additionally, a large 
number of acquittals under the defense would provide a powerful sig-
nal to the relevant authorities that something was badly wrong with 
public perceptions of the fairness of the jurisdiction’s system of social 
insurance for the poor. 
335 Ellickson, supra note 237, at 1230 (citing George Wilson, Exposure to Panhan-
dling and Beliefs About Poverty Causation, 76 SOC. & SOC. RES. 14, 16 (1991)).  Although 
Ellickson’s skepticism is plainly reasonable, the particular study on which he relies is 
deeply flawed.  In the study, the author conducted a simple phone survey of 100 lower-
income, white residents of Baltimore in which respondents were asked (1) the fre-
quency of their exposure to panhandling during the prior year; (2) the location of that 
exposure; and (3) their beliefs regarding the reasons for poverty.  Wilson, supra, at 15.  
The study’s author found a correlation between the number of times respondents re-
ported being approached by panhandlers and their adherence to individualistic beliefs 
about causes of poverty.  See id.  The study’s design, however, is obviously unable to 
support the author’s strong conclusion that “[f]or Baltimore respondents, more fre-
quent contact with panhandlers serves to create negative and unsympathetic attitudes 
towards their economic plight.”  Id. at 16.  For instance, the survey’s reliance on self-
reporting of contacts by panhandlers over the period of an entire year likely led to a 
bias within the study’s results, since those already predisposed to view panhandlers as a 
nuisance (who are poor because of their own shortcomings) may also have been prone 
to overstate the number of times they had been approached by panhandlers over such 
a lengthy period of time.  Moreover, the author’s unexplained decision to rely exclu-
sively on lower-income white respondents introduces a potential racial bias into the 
study of panhandling in a city with a history of racial tension, where two-thirds of the 
residents (and many of its poorest citizens) were (and are) black.  
336 See Kenneth W. Simons, Exploring the Intricacies of the Lesser Evils Defense, 24 L. & 
PHIL. 645, 677 (2005) (arguing that trial factfinders are better equipped than legisla-
tures to determine when the “lesser evils defense” should be accepted, since they are 
“appropriately sensitive to [the] special circumstances” underlying specific cases). 
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b.  Increasing Government-Sponsored Redistribution 
Of perhaps greater concern than the long-term effects on law and 
order is the cumulative effect of justified acquisitive outlaw conduct 
on certain property owners.  It is impossible to predict with any cer-
tainty to what extent the costs imposed on property owners by concen-
trated outlaw conduct would lead to further deterioration of eco-
nomic activity in areas of concentrated poverty.  If the consequences 
were extensive, however, they would further harm those living in eco-
nomically depressed communities.  Whether these long-term costs ex-
ceeded the net benefits of the forced transfers would depend on the 
degree of need satisfied by the transaction.  Of course, for nonutili-
tarians, those costs would be irrelevant to the inquiry whether the ac-
quisitive outlaw was herself justified in taking the property to satisfy 
her needs.  Nevertheless, even the nonconsequentialist would have 
reason to favor an effort to provide for the justified needs of the poor 
through the most efficient means possible. 
Compensation or other risk-spreading mechanisms for property 
owners impacted by justified self-help might work to cabin negative 
side effects.  Greg Alexander, for example, discusses Modderklip East 
Squatters v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd.,337 a South African Constitu-
tional Court case considering how to treat 40,000 squatters who had 
illegally occupied property owned by a Johannesburg farmer.338  The 
Court refused to compel the squatters to leave the land they had 
taken, but, acknowledging the unfairness of the burden they had im-
posed on the landowner, commanded the government to compensate 
the landowner for his losses.339  The judgment recognized the legiti-
macy of each party’s claims:  the squatters’ claim to land on which to 
live, and the landowners’ claim not to be forced to bear the entire cost 
of honoring the squatters’ legitimate claims.  In effect, it concluded 
that both parties’ rights had been violated by the State’s failure to ade-
quately address the country’s maldistribution of land, and it crafted a 
remedy that mimicked as closely as possible the benefits of a central-
ized solution to the problem.  As Andre Van der Walt put it, this rem-
edy treats the state’s “failure to protect one right (access to housing) 
337 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA). 
338 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROP-
ERTY:  LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 192-96 (2006); Andre J. van der 
Walt, The State’s Duty To Protect Property Owners v. The State’s Duty To Provide 
Housing:  Thoughts on the Modderklip Case (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with authors). 
339 ALEXANDER, supra note 338, at 192-96. 
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as the direct cause of failure to protect the other right (property) . . . . 
[I]f the one right was protected properly, the other one could have 
been protected as well.”340  In other words, the South African Supreme 
Court’s decision perfectly illustrates the interdependence between 
owner and nonowner that lies at the heart of the phenomenon we are 
describing. 
In the end, the costs associated with self-help suggest that it would 
usually be far cheaper for society to provide for the needs of the poor 
in a more organized and proactive fashion.  A comprehensive system 
of government-sponsored redistribution and social insurance is an ob-
vious substitute for the sorts of self-help redistribution envisioned by 
doctrines like adverse possession and necessity, and would generate 
far fewer spillover effects.341  But it is important to note (although 
scholars sometimes seem to overlook342) that, although a system of 
voluntary or mandatory redistribution may be more efficient than dis-
tributive-minded changes in property law, it does not follow that self-
help is inferior to a highly unequal status quo, and therefore not justi-
fied, when, for whatever reason, adequate redistribution does not ap-
pear likely to be forthcoming. 
As a society expands its formalized systems of redistribution, we 
should expect that its members will rely less and less on acquisitive 
outlaw behavior.  Nevertheless, the status quo biases operative within 
the property system resist the expansion of such redistributive systems, 
and, as Markovits argues, the democratic political process itself gener-
ates its own inefficiencies that prevent redistributive programs from 
being kept up to date.  Accordingly, it seems likely that even in socie-
ties that make substantial efforts to provide adequate social safety nets, 
movements of acquisitive (and intersectional) property outlaws will 
crop up from time to time to prod the process along.343
An example of the natural interplay between these two strategies 
of redistribution is provided by the homeless.  The services currently 
340 Van der Walt, supra note 338, at 18. 
341 See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient 
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) (arguing 
that “redistribution through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution 
through the income tax and typically is less efficient”). 
342
See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 237, at 1190 (“Lawmakers would be unwise to 
abandon otherwise appropriate rules-of-the-road simply to provide aid to street people.  
If redistribution is to be carried out, families, charities, and welfare agencies know far 
more than judges about who is deserving of aid.  Judges should rebuff advocates’ ef-
forts to sacrifice street law on the altar of income redistribution.”). 
343 See, e.g., PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 311, at 4-6, 33-41. 
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available to the homeless are viewed by many to be inadequate to pro-
vide for even their most basic needs.344  In addition, because of their 
uniquely challenging circumstances, the homeless find it very difficult 
to take advantage of those social services that are provided by the state 
and by private actors.345  Accordingly, they frequently find themselves 
forced to resort to informal (and increasingly, illegal) mechanisms of 
providing for their needs, such as illegal begging and trespass. 
Surveys of public opinion indicate that citizens generally believe 
that the resources available to the homeless are inadequate and 
should be expanded.346  Members of the public also appear to believe 
that the criminal law should not penalize the homeless for taking ac-
tions necessary for survival.347  Availability of the necessity defense to 
the homeless who nonviolently break laws against trespass, theft, or 
panhandling might well result in a substantial number of acquittals.348  
If, however, the services made available to the homeless were plainly 
adequate, as some have argued, the public would likely be unsympa-
thetic toward those homeless who continued to prefer illegal means to 
satisfy their needs.  Broader availability of arguments under the neces-
sity defense, therefore, need not be a harbinger of chaos or the col-
lapse of private ownership, as the Williams court feared.349
2.  Responding to Property Outlaws’ Informational Value 
Because willingness to break the law is endogenous to the system 
of criminal punishment, ratifying forced transfers, ex ante, in order to 
344 See NAT’L COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS & NAT’L CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & 
POVERTY, A DREAM DENIED:  THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 8 
(2006) (“In the 24 cities surveyed in the U.S. Conference of Mayors Hunger and 
Homelessness Survey for 2005, an average of fourteen percent of overall emergency 
shelter requests went unmet, with thirty-two percent of shelter requests by homeless 
families unmet.”); Foscarinis, supra note 322, at 13-16 (describing the “discrepancy be-
tween need and resources” in many cities, as well as the dearth of “[r]esources that 
could provide long-term solutions to homelessness”). 
345 See Foscarinis, supra note 322, at 15 (“[H]omelessness itself creates additional 
barriers to long-term aid:  without a permanent address, telephone, and transporta-
tion, finding housing and employment . . . is extremely difficult . . . [and] it may also 
be difficult or impossible to apply for and receive public assistance benefits . . . .”). 
346 See id. at 51-52. 
347 See id. at 53. 
348 Note, however, that if these factual assertions were inaccurate, the mechanism 
we advocate would be largely self-correcting. 
349 See Southwark v. Williams, 2 Eng. Rep. 175, 179 (A.C. 1971) (“Necessity would 
open a door which no man could shut . . . . There would be [those] who would imag-
ine that they were in need, or would invent a need, so as to gain entry.”). 
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accommodate certain categories of lawbreakers is likely to have some 
effect on the value of the information communicated by lawbreaking.  
Deterrence theories of punishment (and common sense) suggest that 
making the perceived punishment for crime less certain or less severe 
will itself increase to some extent the likelihood that people will be 
willing to break the law.350  Moreover, excusing, ex ante, certain cate-
gories of lawbreaking is likely to generate strategic behavior on the 
part of lawbreakers that may well blur the boundaries distinguishing 
justified from unjustified outlaw behavior.  The trick is to avoid com-
pletely foreclosing certain types of productive lawbreaking without 
encouraging broader criminal behavior to such a degree that the in-
formational value of productive lawbreaking is itself destroyed.  The 
task, therefore, is to preserve the expressive and communicative value 
of the lawbreaking in such a way that it (1) reduces spillover effects 
and (2) avoids diluting the message, but (3) still provides an adequate 
level of deterrence against other, less productive forms of criminality.  
The law can accomplish this by selectively awarding a combination of 
case-specific immunities and particularized reductions of sentences, 
all of which can help preserve informational value without necessarily 
blurring the boundaries between productive and unproductive law-
breaking. 
However, it is very difficult to specify in advance in general terms 
the content of the category of justified property lawbreaking with any 
precision.  It is far easier to judge the justification of such actions on a 
case-by-case basis after the fact.  Accordingly, most of the legal re-
sponses that we advocate in this Part focus on ex post evaluations, of-
ten discretionary and nonprecedential in nature, that permit govern-
ment decision makers to take into account the full complexity of the 
circumstances in determining how, or whether, to punish a particular 
act of lawbreaking. 
The use of ex post mechanisms that operate on a case-by-case basis 
has two benefits.  First, they are the sorts of mechanisms best suited to 
the moral complexity involved in outlaw conduct.  Second, because 
deterrence operates on the expected sanctions of potential criminals, 
the case-by-case operation of the reforms we suggest limits their po-
350 But only to some extent.  As already discussed, this deterrent mechanism oper-
ates most forcefully with respect to a small subset of the population, which is assumed 
to be generally law-abiding.  See supra notes 223-226 and accompanying text.  More-
over, as theorists have noted, minor changes in the extent or likelihood of criminal 
sanctions are unlikely to have an appreciable effect on crime rates.  See ZIMRING & 
HAWKINS, supra note 229, at 195. 
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tential long-term effects for those contemplating future criminal acts.  
The general deterrent effect of building an ex ante exception into 
laws of theft and trespass is likely to be more substantial than that 
caused by granting after the fact case-by-case relief from criminal sanc-
tions for defendants whose conduct happens to satisfy the require-
ments for, say, a necessity defense.351  The use of such ex post reme-
dies therefore largely preserves the informational value of protracted 
outlaw conduct. 
These mechanisms are not without their shortcomings, however.  
Giving broad discretion to public officials presents the danger of 
abuse and partiality in its exercise.  Moreover, the case-by-case adjudi-
cative method of relief has difficulty taking into account relevant con-
sequences that flow from the aggregation of decisions in individual 
cases.  On the other hand, much of the discretion for which we advo-
cate already exists, but may not be exercised along the lines we are 
suggesting.  Consequently, our proposals would not do much to make 
the existing state of affairs worse.  And, as we have argued, the ex post 
strategies we are recommending help to minimize long-term costs.  
Moreover, even where the legislature is better situated to take into ac-
count the implications of an emerging pattern of lawbreaking, case-by-
case adjudication can help to draw the legislature’s attention to the 
problem in the first place.  For example, in the Netherlands a judicial 
decision in favor of urban squatters generated a firestorm of contro-
versy that led to the enactment of a law prohibiting property owners 
from keeping their property vacant or unused for long periods of 
time.352
351 This would remain true unless (1) ex post relief were granted in an appreciable 
number of cases and (2) the substantial likelihood that they would be able successfully 
to take advantage of such ex post relief were communicated to potential criminals.  Cf. 
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 229, at 195-96 (observing that knowledge by potential 
criminals of the extent and likelihood of sanctions, and of changes in sanctions, is nec-
essary for punishment to have a deterrent effect, and noting the low level of public 
awareness regarding the prescribed sanctions for particular crimes).  This circum-
stance does not seem especially likely to occur. 
352 See Andre J. Van der Walt, Exclusivity of Ownership, Security of Tenure, and 
Eviction Orders, Pt. II.b (2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors). 
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a.  Engaging Property Outlaws 
i.  Expressive Necessity 
While we favor the broad availability of the necessity defense for 
acquisitive outlaws, our analysis suggests that the necessity defense is 
somewhat less justifiable in the context of expressive outlaw conduct.  
And in fact, federal courts in particular have been reluctant to allow 
civil disobedients to avoid punishment by arguing necessity.353  Most 
instances of expressive property lawbreaking, however, involve what is 
known as “indirect” civil disobedience, in which the law that is expres-
sively broken, such as the law against criminal trespass, is not the law 
that the protesters are trying to change.  This is the case, for example, 
with protesters who trespass on military bases in order to express their 
condemnation of nuclear deterrence.  But intentional lawbreaking by 
those we are calling property outlaws aims at protesting the very prop-
erty law being broken.  That was the case, for example, with the 1960s 
civil rights protesters and the urban squatters of the 1970s and 
1980s.354
Application of the doctrine of necessity is more appropriate in 
situations involving direct civil disobedience.  This argument depends 
on the greater informational value provided by direct civil disobedi-
ence.  When someone violates a property law to protest some other 
sort of law, the only information she conveys is the intensity and seri-
ousness of her moral opposition to the law in question.  In contrast, 
when someone violates the very law to which she is opposed, she con-
veys both her intensity and seriousness, and, in addition, provides a 
visible example of the alternative state of affairs she hopes to bring 
about.355  Moreover, while there are a variety of ways to express seri-
ousness and intensity of belief without violating the law, the only way 
for some nonowners to produce a concrete example of the property 
regime they seek is by violating the very law holding that reality back.  
This combination of the informational advantage of direct civil dis-
353 See Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 276, at 1173; James L. Cavallaro, Jr., The 
Demise of the Political Necessity Defense:  Indirect Civil Disobedience and United States v. 
Schoon, 81 CAL. L. REV. 351, 351 (1993); Robert F. Schopp, Verdicts of Conscience:  Nulli-
fication and Necessity as Jury Responses to Crimes of Conscience, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2039, 2083 
(1996). 
354 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
355 See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text; see also Gerken, supra note 201, 
at 1754-59 (providing examples of how “decisional” dissenters “offer a real-world ex-
ample of what their principles would look like in practice”). 
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obedience and the more effective means of expression it provides may 
justify widening the range of cases in which defendants may plead ne-
cessity. 
It might be that the legal status quo is supported by reasons more 
weighty than sheer inertia or a lack of imagination on the part of the 
dominant majority.  If that is the case, allowing the defendant to assert 
necessity will not do much harm.  It is unlikely that a jury would find 
the expressive outlaw’s conduct to be justified under most circum-
stances.  But if a great number of people come to see the existing state 
of affairs in a different light as a result of the lawbreaking itself, they 
may come to view those who first showed us the way as heroes rather 
than criminals. 
ii.  Discretionary Relief 
In addition to the doctrine of necessity, there are other ex post, 
discretionary, and nonprecedential tools at the disposal of the crimi-
nal law.  Prosecutorial discretion and sentencing are both areas where 
legal decision makers could, in cases of clear necessity, exercise their 
authority in ways that would recognize the legitimacy of the defen-
dant’s actions while only minimally undermining the strength of 
criminal norms.  Prosecutorial discretion differs from sentencing, 
however, in its binary nature, which causes it to operate more like a 
jury’s decision to acquit.  Because of this, it should perhaps be re-
served for situations in which the merits of the defendant’s actions are 
the clearest. 
A related, though less risky, strategy is for judges or the executive 
to treat subsequent legal reform or social consensus ratifying the 
property outlaws’ conduct as grounds for vacating their convictions 
and sentences.  This is the approach the Supreme Court appears to 
have taken in cases involving civil rights protesters.  In a number of 
cases,356 the Court vacated the convictions of participants in the lunch 
counter sit-ins in light of the subsequent enactment of state and fed-
eral statutes prohibiting restaurant owners from excluding on the ba-
sis of race.  As the deeply divided Court stated in Hamm v. City of Rock 
Hill, where the legislature has substituted a “right for a crime,” there is 
356 See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 312 (1965); Bell v. Maryland, 378 
U.S. 226, 228 (1964). 
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a strong basis for vacating convictions, even for conduct that occurred 
before the legal change.357
The majority opinion in Hamm does not fully capture the power of 
the legislative transformation at work in that case.  The statutes that 
shifted the legal landscape were no fortuitous coincidence; they were 
enacted in direct response to the very lawbreaking for which the de-
fendants before the Court stood convicted.  When lawbreakers and 
legislatures engage in such fruitful dialogue, judges (or executives) 
are on particularly strong ground in granting relief from criminal li-
ability.  Forgiveness of outlaw conduct that the community has come 
to embrace only marginally reduces the deterrent effect of criminal 
sanctions for most criminals.  In addition, it encourages those who are 
contemplating the possibility of setting out on an outlaw strategy for 
legal change to carefully assess the likelihood that they are on the 
wrong side of history. 
Finally, unlike a broader exemption of expressive lawbreaking 
from criminal liability, this approach would not itself undermine the 
expressive power even of the outlaw conduct to which it applied.  
There is substantial truth to the notion that the moral courage of civil 
disobedience depends upon the willingness of the outlaw to risk (or 
even welcome) criminal punishment in order to express the depth of 
her dissent.  But selective ex post decisions to exempt certain law-
breakers from criminal punishment would preserve the moral power 
of the lawbreaking at the moment it occurred (since the lawbreaker 
had no assurance at the time of the action that her action would fall 
within the scope of the exemption) while also signaling that, on occa-
sion, such behavior is indeed a legitimate form of political expression. 
b.  Subsidizing Alternatives to Outlaw Behavior 
Outlaw strategies are particularly appealing to those who cannot 
challenge the existing legal regime, whether by amplifying their voice 
with monetary donations to political actors or through mass media, or 
by pursuing civil litigation.  In the case of expressive outlaws, the pub-
lic subsidization of criminal defense counsel means that criminal liti-
gation may well constitute a more practicable mechanism for pursuing 
357 Hamm, 379 U.S. at 314.  Justice Black, dissenting in Hamm, condemned the ju-
dicial excusal of the protesters’ “lawless conduct,” id. at 319 (Black, J., dissenting), and 
Justice Harlan blasted it as a “revolutionary” perversion of precedent.  Id. at 324 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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legal change than the civil litigation that is the focus of many discus-
sions of evolution within private law.358
It stands to reason that some of the pressure to engage in outlaw 
behavior might be reduced by affirmatively creating legal alternatives 
to expand the voice of the property-poor.  Two obvious mechanisms 
present themselves.  First, the state could (as it has in the past) subsi-
dize civil litigation on behalf of the poor.  Expanding legal aid for the 
pursuit of civil complaints might well provide a viable alternative out-
let for a significant amount of discontent that would otherwise be di-
rected toward outlaw strategies for legal change.  Second, expanded 
state subsidies for access to the political process or means of mass 
communication would help to amplify voices that might otherwise go 
unheeded, perhaps encouraging legal change that would otherwise 
await the pressure provided by property outlaws.  It is unlikely that 
state subsidization of legal alternatives to outlaw strategies will com-
pletely eliminate the important role of property outlaws, but the goals 
of property outlaws suggest that they will provide adequate substitutes 
for at least some of that conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The intentional violation of property law plays an important, 
though underexamined, role in the development of property doc-
trine.  The behavior of property outlaws of all sorts provides a particu-
larly effective mechanism by which those who are left out of the sys-
tem of private ownership can challenge and change that system from 
the outside.  Persistent violation of property laws often provides im-
portant and useful information about inefficiency or injustice in the 
existing distribution or content of property rights.  While such inten-
tional lawbreaking is often deployed as a strategy of legal change in a 
variety of areas, it is particularly effective in the context of property 
law, within which an emphasis on stability ensures that property doc-
trine will often fall out of step with the needs of contemporary society.  
Property scholars should be attentive to the criminal enforcement of 
property laws and the ways in which that enforcement may unfairly 
punish or overdeter justified and useful lawbreaking by property out-
laws. 
 
358 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
